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When the Stranger says: "What is the meaning of this city? 
Do you huddle close together because you love each other?' 
Wha� will you answer? We all dwell together 
To make money from each other'? Or 'This is a community'? 
And the Stranger will depart and return to the desert. 
0 my soul, be prepared for the coming of the Stranger, 
Be prepared for him who knows how to ask questions. 
T.S. Eliot 
Property has its duties as well as its responsibilities 
Thomas Drummond 
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Abstract 
The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights· 
particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the 
philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In 
our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also 
obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared 
rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title 
to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is 
exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken 
cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral 
philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a 
preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource 
management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been 
ignored. 
Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: 
(1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of 
obligations); 
(2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; 
(3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and 
in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by 
Medieval and refonnist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal 
and equitable concepts through to the current day; 
4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,· maps it and offers a 
schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; 
and, 
(5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and 
assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world 
views: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Rawts' social contract theory; 
Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; 
Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; 
Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; 
and, 
offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an 
ethically plural community. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Plato's dilemma and our own 
Almost two and a half millennia ago Plato, in The Republic broke open the arguments 
about justice and rights to resources with Socrates' words: 
excellently said, Cephalos, • ... "But this very thing justice -are we to say that 
it is just simply to pay back what one has received from anyone? or is it true 
that this may be sometimes just and sometimes unjust? for example: 
suppose you have received weapons from a friend when in his right mind, 
everyone would say that you should not give such things back if he were 
mad when he asked for them. Then it would not be right and just to give 
them back, .... "1 
How much more advanced are we in answering these questions about "who should get 
what, when?• For decisions must daily be made about resource allocation and 
utilisation by people in their public and private lives. They look for guidance in 
answering questions with moral content about resources. Questions like the following: 
Should the Commonwealth Government change the taxation arrangements by 
abolishing a sJiding Wholesale Sales Tax and replace it with a Goods and 
Services Tax of a frxed rate when regard is had to the redistributive effect of 
taxation on a nation's resources? 
Should a person, when resources are scarce (as they usually are), favour family 
and friends over others? And if the answer may vary, when is it right or wrong to 
do so? 
Should our moral concern about resource allocation include animals, and even 
non-sentient beings and the inanimate? If so when? 
Should the churches be selling their buildings to feed the hungry? 
In what circumstances might n be morally appropriate to steal resources and what 
Plato, The Republic Book 1 (330B-332A) trans. W.H.D. Rouse in Great Dialogues of Plato, 
J.C.G. Rouse, (ed.), 1956, 129. 
1 
factors should inform the morally mature decision maker in such a context? 
These and other significant questions related to resource allocation and utilisation are 
questions upon which those seeking to resP<>nd ethically may legitimately hope for 
ethical guidance from the modem, moral philosophic discourse. As we look into that 
discourse however, instead of finding clear guidance to such questions, we find a 
dominant philosophical paradigm which has set individuals free from any obligation to 
have regard to the moral claims of others in deciding the usage or allotment of 
resources. This was one of the major outcomes of the enlightenment. Consequently, 
however, at least five fundamental difficulties now plague any discourse on the subject. 
1.1.1 Rights and obligations 
The individual's right to private property and the concept of ownership have been 
argued extensively in moral philosophy. The structure of these arguments has been 
such that the moral obligation which might be thought to accompany rights has been 
excluded. There is a subtle but significant difference between the questions "Who has 
a right to what, When?" and "Who should get what, when?". 
1.1.2 Pluralism 
An ·increasing diversity of cultural world-views ( eg. liberal. feminist, utilitarian, Christian) 
makes consensus progressively more and more difficult to find in any public, ·or for that 
matter private, discourse. Families, wori< colleagues, community groups and those 
responsible for government are finding that they share increasingly diverse world-views 
when they come to decide resource allocation and utilisation questions. In such a 
context where even if rights are agreed upon, obligations are not - the problem of what 
criterion should be used to decide issues remains to be resolved. 
1.1.3 Philosophy v law 
Law sets out what must or must not be done. lt does not set out what should and 
should not be done. What should be done is the province of moral philosophy. But 
moral philosophical debate is out of step with the eontent and process used by the legal 
system to resolve questions of resource allocation and utilisation. This creates a 
potential problem for everyone who wishes to respond both lawfully and morally, as 
consistency between the two systems is likely to be arbitrary. 
The dominant philosophy, from which the individual rights arguments are drawn, is 
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preoccupied with a quest for timeless universal answers to moral dilemmas for the 
individual in the context of the state. The idea of a state of nature is central to the 
discourse. The legal system on the other hand has a casuist approach. The principles 
which it generates are constantly changed and discarded as it responds to the particular 
community's concerns. States of nature are unnecessary as the methodology is rooted 
in lived reality. As a consequence there is not any necessary correlation between the 
philosophical and the legal answers to questions about "who should get what, when?" 
in Australia at the end of the twentieth century. 
1.1.4 Philosophy v experience 
People's experience has no place in the discourse which is dominated by a 
preoccupation with individual rights, justified on the basis of arguments about the state 
of nature. In such a context, where the focus is on a quest for absolute universal 
theori�s of rights to property which are true for all time, lived reality stands off-stage and 
is not called upon for it cannot play a useful role. lt is too complicated and too 
particular. Abstraction and generality are required. When this abstract approach to 
philosophical argument is combined with linguistic inadequacies (which are raised 
below) reality is effectively excluded from the discourse. As a consequence, philosophy 
has become removed from experience and in the area of resource allocation and 
utilisation, the dominant discourse has offered ordinary people little practical guidance. 
1.1.5 Language difficulties 
Less evident, but perhaps more important, is the realisation that the language available 
for resolution of difficulties in the discourse is inadequate. Whilst Australians of 
different world-views share a common language, English, when it comes to discussion 
of resource allocation and utilisation the need i.n such a discourse for words capable of 
conveying complex relational ideas is absent. "Ownership" and •property" when tested 
in the applied ethical domain disclose significant inadequacies. The words "property'" 
and ·ownership" begin to describe the interface of persons with resources but that is 
only one aspect of the discussion. Words and phrases are needed which describe the 
inter-actions between people (in communities) in relation to resources (rights duties 
etc.) tf the discourse is to be advanced. 
For the pure philosopher these concerns may be irrelevant but this is less likely to be 
the case for the applied philosopher and the ordinary person. This work attempts to 
point a way towards resolution of some of the dissonance resulting from these five 
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deficiencies in the dominant discourse. lt endeavours to provide meaningful assistance 
to the applied ethicist seeking to justly allocate and utilise resources. 
1.2 A beginning 
lt is appropriate first to summarise the central arguments that make up the basis for the 
paradigm which currently dominates the resource allocation and distribution discourse. 
This task is undertaken in the next chapter. In the chapter which follows, Chapter 3, the 
deficiencies alleged above are spelt out more fulfy. This is intended to provide a 
platform for seeking a more satisfactory basis for advancing the inquiry. 
Logically, it may seem appropriate to go back to the problem which the foundational 
writers, Hobbes and Locke, were endeavouring to address, to identify the line of thought 
from which they cut their path and see if perhaps a wrong bearing was made. Perhaps 
the thinldng which preceded these writers still holds clues for future directions. But the 
temptation t<;rgo back simply to the writers who immediately preceded, these two writers 
resisted. For those writers in turn stood at the end of a road which had been pioneered 
from Athens and Jerusatem. So, in endeavouring to find answers, a beginning is made 
in Athens then on to Jerusalem where those roads joined in the Greek New Testament 
and then spread out through the Patristic period. 
Aquinas, who paved that road back to Jerusalem and Athens making it traversable for 
those who were to follow, also shot the bearings for many who would follow him through 
the medieval period. The protestant reformers restated the concepts and give 
interesting practical guidance. Whilst many roads going in many directions were cut, 
paved and used by these thinkers, it i� hoped a relatively direct route is followed by 
pursuing only the paths which lead to outcomes useful to resource allocation and 
utilisation issues for the new millennium. This exercise - the establishment of the 
paradigm which preceded Hobbes and Locke - occupies Chapter 4. 
lt also seems prudent to consider the possibility that those involved in resolving 
disputes over resources at an applied level - the courts - may have something to 
contribute. For this reason Chapter 5 is devoted to listening to the voice of the judges 
and legislators for their accumulated insight on the way in which resource allocation and 
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utilisation disputes have been resolved at law, with a view to gleaning if the moral 
principles suggested in Chapter 4 are consistent with the legal principles noYo( prevailing 
in Australia. 
Inherent in this journey is the argument that a paradigm shift away from the narrow 
preoccupations of property rights and ownership agendas along with abstract methods 
of inquiry is likely, at least in the context of a discussion about resources, to result in 
resources being seen in a different and more satisfactory light. This light is called the 
Stewardship Paradigm. The approach taken to exposit the paradigm is largely historical. 
Essentially it is argued that the idea of stewardship has been present since the 
foundations of western philosophy were laid and it thrived until the emergence of the 
paradigm which now dominates. lt is argued to be inherently more useful to resource.. 
related moral philosophical inquiry than the now current dominant approach, because 
it addresses the fundamental deficiencies discussed above in a more satisfactory way. 
This alternative approach, called in this wor1< the Stewardship Paradigm, is described 
and mapped in some detail in Chapter 6. 
lt becomes evident from Chapters 2 and 3 that the pure Hobbesian and Lockean 
approaches to property are incompatible with the Stewardship Paradigm prop()sed. But 
the approach of the leading modem liberal social contractarian philosopher� John Rawts, 
is not. Thus, whilst these earlier social contractarians must reject stewardship, modem 
. social contractarian liberalism need not. The object of the work is, in part, to offer 
stewardship as an alternative paradigm for viewing resources which may enjoy wide 
philosophic appeal. In Chapter 7 suggestions are offered as to how resource related 
moral problems may be address� taking cognisance of the Stewardship Paradigm from 
within a Rawlsian framework. The implications for Utilitarianism are also considered in 
that Chapter along wKh comment on the way the paradigm may interface wKh the 
Christian and Feminist wor1d-views. Chapter 7 does not suggest, let alone attempt to 
show, that the Stewardship Paradigm answers every resource related concern of these 
disparate wor1d-views. lt attempts to point out that persons from each of these world 
views may be able to take up this paradigm and use it, in appropriate cases, to assist 
in diagnosing and resolving moral difficulties regarding resources without compromising 
their world-view. Whilst persons of different world-views may never agree on a common 
philosophy that will guide their decisions and actions, they may find in the Stewardship 
Paradigm more satisfactory language and a tool for arriving at a consensus in the detail, 
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without compromising at a higher philosophic level. For the paradigm proposed here 
does not purport to be yet another complete philosophy but rather a tool which may be 
taken up and used by persons of various philosophic persuasions, (together or 
separately), in an endeavour to move towards more satisfactory answers to their daily 
pressing concerns about resource allocation and utilisation in Australia in the 21st 
Century. 
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CHAPTER 2: ACCEPTED APPROACHES TO 
PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP "ISSUES 
2.1 The Dominant discourse 
In philosophic enquiry at the end of the 20th Century, resources are discussed (almost 
invariably) within an agenda set by the classical, liberal, individualist philosophers. The 
methodology may vary from consequentialist to non-consequentialist and the 
perspectives are vastJy diverse, but in an enquiry about civil organisation, property rights 
and ownership interests are usually, if not the dominant subject, then one of the major 
topics. lt is under these heads of "ownership• and •property" that resources are 
considered. 
The following issues are key to the exploration of this agenda: 
1 What is "property" and "ownership"? 
2 What (ownership) rights have individuals to resources and how may these 
be justified? 
3 What State interference with an individual's propertY rights can be justified 
and on what basis? 
As will be seen, these arguments have as a central objective proving that individuals 
may do ·as they please with resources under their control without needing to consider to 
· seek the consent of any other person. 
Why? What is at stake? 
At stake are ethical obligations. More particularly, in this context, ethical oblig�tions 
about what may and may not be done with resources . 
. R.H. Tawney eloquently observed the significance in his classic work Religion and the 
Rise of CapitalisfTil: 
2 RH. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. Penguin Books Ltd. London, 1926, 
rpt. 1937. 
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If property be an unconditional right, emphasis on its obligations is little more than 
the graceful parade of a flattering, but innocuous, metaphor. For whether the 
obligations are fulfilled or neglected, the right continues unchallenged and 
indefeasible. 3 
Some individuals who have, want to be able to do as they please without having to 
account to anyone; (particularly those who have not), or as Fred Hirsch suggests "lt is 
the haves who expect too much· .4 
The extent of this domination of the agenda by these classical, liberal and individualist 
philosophers is due in no small way to the original contribution of three great authors; 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jeremy Bentham. lt is upon their rational foundations 
that so much subsequent argument is built. 
lt is then, to the writings of these three men and their arguments and comments 
regarding ownership of and property in resources, that this chapter is primarily directed. 
After considering the ideas of Locke, the more sophisticated theory of John Rawls is also 
considered. The ideas of Bentham are set out only in a preliminary way and are flashed 
out primarily by reference to the comments of Peter Singer who is probably the best� 
known Australian follower of Bentham's utilitarianism. 
The wori<s of Rawls and Singer represent the more significant 20tn Century 
developments of the traditions in which they write. In the next chapter deficiencies in the 
central ideas discussed here are opened up. The object of this work, though, is not 
merely to attack weak arguments; it is primarily to show how moral discourse may be 
advanced. In Chapter 7 it will be suggested that the ideas developed in this thesis may 
be of use to proponents of Rawlsian liberalism and Singer's utilitarianism, even though 
the idea is anathema to the arguments of Hobbes and Locke, and were not at the 
forefront of Bentham's ideas about resource utilisation. 
3 
4 
Ibid., 152. 
F. Hirsch, Social Limits of Growth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976, 
188. 
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2.2 Social contract 
Contributors to the discourse rooted in the works of Hobbes and Locke proceed by way 
of selection of certain (minimum) assumptions5 about the nature of civil society and the 
importance of the individual. Out of this a Jheory (usually including a theory about 
property) is developed by a process of reasoning built from the minimum assumptions. 
At its base usually lies a concept of social contract. The enquiry commences by way of 
identification of certain characteristics of society in its original form -that is, in the state 
of Nature or in an hypothetical original position. The significant foundational shift to 
individual property rights and ownership came progressively, but it was Thomas Hobbes 
and Johry Locke who marked out the two quite different and distinct methods of 
departure. 
2.2.1 Thomas Hobbes and positivism 
Thomas Hobbes in his work Leviathan published in 1651 developed the concept that 
property rights are dependent entirely upon the will of the sovere_ign: The sovereign may 
have regard to moral laws but, if the sovereign does .not. the citizenry may not challenge 
the laws as unjust for the citizen has ceded their rights to the sovereign by being a part 
of that civil sodety. To determine whether a person's claim to any resource is just is 
. · · simply an enquiry into the mind of the sovereign expressed in law; and that alone. The 
methodology is simple and through the centuries, since 1651, this approach has come 
to play a dominant role in all facets of philosophy and jurisprudence. 
Hqbbes' argument is built from the presumption that the state of nature is a chaotic state 
of war and fear6. In such an environment people are free to do as they think frt. 7 This 
state of nature forces humankind to cede their right of violence to another, provided 
each does so.8 Hobbes points out that such a laying down of one's power is dependent 
upon others doing so -the law of men is therefore contrary to the law of Christ as 
6 
7 
a 
eg. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 1971; 
R. Nozick. Anarchy State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, 1974. 
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, rpt. J_ D. Dent & Sons Ltd., Aldine Press, Letchworth, Herts, 
Everyman's Library, 1976, 64-65. 
lbid.,66. 
lbid.,67. 
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Hobbes points out. For Hobbes, in the state of nature "every man has right to every 
thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust". Therefore, justice is linked to the 
formation of the social contract.9 In Hobbes' state of nature, all are equal and inequality 
is introduced through civil laws.10 The laws emanate from "one Man, or upon one 
Assembly of men" .11 Hobbes explains that this submission to the sovereign is more than 
just an agreement, a genuine union is fonned.12 This sovereign has untrammelled 
usage of this power for good government. From this foundation then are built property 
rights. All property rights emanate from the sovereign.13 
Thus, Hobbes laid a foundation for the entire analysis of justice and property to be 
understood purely in the context of legal relations emanating from the sovereign. 
If the individual's rights are understood in the context of the state alone {as distinct from 
other individuals or the community) then property becomes simply a matter of state 
limitation on usage. Others are excluded.14 The _sheer genius of the argument 
overcomes all of the difficulties inherent in the natural taw arguments about what is 
justice.15 Deciding what is just in dealing with resources becomes an exercise in asking: 
"what does the law sayr. This point mark� a significant shift in moral philosophy. The 
rights of the individual have moved to centre stage and (but for the sovereign) the moral 
rights of others lost- excluded from the agenda. The discourse is now defined in terms 
of, what does the sovereign say I may do? Or more precisely what does the sovereign 
say I must not do? The discourse is not defined (for example) as induding people in 
families, or communities to whom moral duties may be owed. The agenda is not about 
obligations owed but about rights asserted and assertable against others by individuals. 
The demarcation of the moral agenda is defined exclusively by the rights the sovereign 
I 
10 
,1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Ibid., 74. 
Ibid., 79. 
Ibid., 89. 
Ibid., 89-90. 
Ibid., 130..131. 
The idea of a state of nature is not radical in itself. 1t is at the point where obligations to others 
.are excluded in favour of the sovereign that Hobbes breaks free of the shackles of his 
predecessors. Writings from antiquity and the early church discuss the state of nature but, In that 
context, set out persons' obligations to one another and to God. (See, for example, M. Hengel, 
Property and Riches in the Early Church, 197 4, particularly 3 and 4 ). 
J.W. Hams, Legal Philosophies. Butterworths, 1980, 10. 
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gives. Hobbes' observation that his thesis is contrary to the law of Christ is not 
hyperbole. He understood perfectly the moral impact on others of his approach. 
A better modem articulation of this concept would be harder to find than that of Bruce 
Welling in his work Property in Things in the Common Law System published mid 1996, 
where he writes: 
Legal relationships are what property is all about. 1t works like· this. 
Property is a relationship. There are always three people in a relationship. The 
first person is the state. 
The second person is someone whom the state has concluded is the holder of a 
specified form of property. The third is any other person whom the state has not 
concluded is the holder of that specified form of property. 
The state will suppress the civil liberties of the third person to the extent they fall 
within the scope of the form of property held. 
· 
The first proposition describes the nature of property.16 
This approach, which has come to be known as legal positivism, · has exercised 
enormous sway throughout the centuries since Hobbes, down to today. 
lt follows that unless the law says something must not (or must) be done with a resource 
a person is lawfully entitled to do as he or she pleases without morally being obliged to 
consider anyone else. If one wishes to know what is just in property distribution, one 
simply asks '"what is. the law?". That is not to say that there is not the possibility of 
further enquiry beyond this but it prqvides a very simple, concrete foundation from which 
to build a jurisprudence: "go ask the sovereign•. 
16 B. Welling, Property in Things In the Common Law System, Scfibblers Publishing, Hyde Park 
Press, Adelaide, South Australia, 1996, 5-6. 
11 
2.2.2 John Locke and property rights 
2.2.2.1 Introduction 
An alternative to the approach of Thomas Hobbes, which starts with assumptions about 
the state of nature and builds individual property rights out of a social contract theory, 
but which takes a very different view of nature to Hobbes, is that of John Locke. 
The awesome reality is that his work has set the agenda for property discussion for both 
liberal and Marxist alike throughout the centuries to today. Locke's thesis is that the 
purpose of civil government is the protection of individual rights and his work is a 
justification for such property rights. 
According to Locke: 
The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and 
putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.17 
Locke•s argument for this i� systematically built up through Book 2 of his Two Treatises 
·of Government. He states his object in these terms: "I shall endeavour to shew, how 
men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind 
in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners• .18 
This right to resources without 1he express compact" of anyone else which has come 
to be called the individual's private property right is justified principally on an argument 
founded in the labour of the individual. This paramount argument is founded In, and 
buttressed by, three other arguments about individual property rights. This work sets out 
the four foundational principles in the order in which they unfold in the Two Treatises of 
Government. They are: 
t7 
18 
(a) the institution of property is useful to our societal organisation and its 
justness is vindicated by its usefulness; 
(b) our conception of freedom demands that we be free to do as we please 
with resources; 
(c) the equality of individuals dictates that all people have rights to resources; 
J. Locke, Two TreatisesofGovemment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1692, 
rpt. 1960, 396, see particular1y para. 1 ?4. 
Ibid., para. 25. 
12 
and most importantly, 
(d) there is a natural and absolute right to property based on one1S labour; 
which is justified on the basis that: 
(i) our entitlement to a resource is the desert of our labour; 
(ii) it was created without wrong doing to anyone else; or, 
(iii) we own ourselves, our bodies.19 
Kart Olivecrona20 summarised the writers that were pre-eminent in Locke's mind in his 
writing Two Treatise of Government and it is important to contextualise the work by 
noting that Locke's problem was a need to obtain the consent of others in decisions 
regarding resource allocation. Locke's answer was to design a framework that 
arrogated21 property to individuals absolutely without need to refer to others . 
. Property rights came to be defined having regard solely to the acquirer and the agenda 
came to be determined in relation to the rights of the indMdual to a resource. Set out 
below under the headings discussed above is the way this argument was built up by 
Locke with some comment on the way the idea has been· developed by more recent 
thinkers. 
2.2.2.2 The usefulness of property institutions to our societal organisation 
For l,ocket the starting point of justification of laws was their usefulness '"for the Publick 
Good". 22 His first argument is that the right to private property is justified merely 
because it is of benefrt to the community as a whole. This argument has enjoyed 
considerable success. 
The first chapter of the Second Book summarises the conclusion of the First Book, in 
which Locke establishes that nobody has a natural right to dominion over anyone else. 
In this, he agrees with Hobbes. He continues however "all Government in the wortd" is 
not "the product only of force and violence". In this he stands antithetically against 
19 
2.1 
22 
Whilst these arguments are well known and widely published, the structure and content of this 
chapter was greatly influenced by the work of J .W. Harris, Property and Justice, Oxford University 
Press Inc., New YorK, 1996. The references to the work are appropriately footnoted but I wish 
to acknowledge the influence of his work in shaping the way the subject is viewed at:ld, as a 
consequence, how the material is organised. 
K. Olivecrona, 'Locke's Theory of Appropriation' The phl1osophical quarterly, 197 4, vol. 24, 220. 
I use this word deliberately. 
J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Book 2, chap. 1, 308, see particular1y para. 3. 
13 
Hobbes. The argument proceeds that without at least some basic right to property, for 
example food, clothing, shelter, medicine; society could not function and would not be 
a civil society. 
This idea of the importance of the common good argument for private property rights 
can be found at least as early as Aristotle who argued in The Politics,23 that the right to 
private property was important not only because it resulted in greater productMty than 
would be the case without i:t, but also because it facilitated liberality and temperance. 
He considers three cases in which resources may be held in common but will not be 
drawn to them in anything but a general approbation. Book Five reads: 
Property should be in a certaiq sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, 
when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and 
they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own 
business. 
lt is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the 
special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. 24 
. This· argument based on social utility is usually bolstered, as it was by Locke's appeal 
to the remaining three foundational pillars: Freedom, Equality and Ownership of One's 
Labour. 
23 
24 
AristoUe, 350 B.C.E., The Politics, Bk 11, paras. 5-6, trans. B. Jowett, at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html. 
Ibid., at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.2.two.html. This conclusion, which seems 
extraordinarily ambivalent from a grand theorist point of view, will be seen to be consistent with 
the notion of stewardship developed in subsequent pages, and the conclusion that the functlon 
of legislators is to encourage generosity also fits. 
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2.2.2.3 Our conception of freedom requires that we have property rights 
The state in which humanity finds itself naturally is according to Locke: 
a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their 
Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, 
without asking leave, or depending upon the Wil  of any other Man.25 
As in the state of nature we are perfectly free, a just society not only recognises this core 
freedom but provides institutions which preserve and enhance this. The right of the 
individual to private property preserves and enhances the freedom of choice available 
to the individual. Denial of this freedom, therefore, denies the individual choices and, 
unless such interference is justified on some other basis, it is inherently unjust. A just 
society therefore provides a basis for recognition of a right to property.26 
Freedom, for Locke and most l.iberal, individualist philosophers, is the freedom to be left 
alone and to be able to choose to do as one pleases within one's social/political context. 
lt is a less universal concept than it is for Hegel, whose much more complicated idea of 
freedom included an endeavour to raise one's self above one's context in history. For 
Hegel freedom transcends context and finds expression in reason. l t  is this freedom (in 
a Hegelian sense) which was taken up in 1988 as an organising idea by Jeremy 
Waldron in his The Right to Private Property}7· Waldron argues that as individuals need 
property to express their moral selves (in an Hegelian sense) each person has a moral 
right to property. He also argues in a Rawlsian style that no one would. choose to live 
in a society where they were denied even a basic right to resources.28 This leads 
Waldron to a conclusion, antithetical to Locke, that "there is no right-based argument to 
be found.which provides an adequate justification for a society in which some people 
have lots of property and many people have next to none•. 29 
2S 
27 
29 
Locke, 309. 
See Harris, 1996, 230-275, for a detailed analysis of these arguments and arguments against 
them. 
J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 1988, Clarendon Press. 
A. Pottage, 'Property: Re-appropriating Hegel' 53 Modem Law Review, 1990, 259 at 260. 
Ibid. 
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2.2.2.4 The equality of individuals requires that each have rights to property 
This state of nature is, according to Locke, not only a state of freedom but 
A Sta te also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no 
one having more than another.30 
Locke asserted that all humans are equal. 
Book 1 of Two Treatises of Government is directed to answering objections to this 
position and the first chapter of Book 11 summarises the reasons. 
In modem argument, one of two justifications are usually relied upon to sustain ·this 
premise: 
(a) divine ordination; or 
(b) capacity to reason. 
From this premise- that all poople are equal- a number of arguments regarding property 
rights have been developed, though, sometimes in different directions. Amartya Sen, 
in lnequalityReexamined makes the point • ... the common characteristic of virtually all 
the approaches to the ethics of social arrangements that have stood the test of time is 
to want equality of something - something that has an important place in the particular 
theory". 31 
What equality means, to what it is applied and how it is arrived at may vary enormously 
as the works discu$$fad in this section and the sections on Rawts32 and Singe� which 
follow illustrate. 34 
If all people are equal, then ipso facto, all people should be entitled to an equal share 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
locke, 309. 
A Sen. Inequality Reexamined, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussetts, 1992. rpt. 
1995. Preface page (i) For similar comments see also page 12 and page 130. 
See para. 2.2.3 
See para. 2.3.2 
This vvork avoids the issues associated with the merit or otherwise of equality as a philosophical 
concept The two critical issues, •equality of what" and "why equality", are well discussed in A. 
Sen. Inequality Reexamined, 1992. lt is noteworthy, though, that the concept of equality is 
problematic. Sen. 132, suggests that its possible for different view of equality to be taken up at 
applied levels and agreement be reached even though that may be anathema to pure philosophy 
. noting ·;ndeed, foolish proposals make up much of practical ethics, even though descriptive 
homogeneity evidently appeals to many moral phUosophers (Utilitarians among themt. 
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of resources. This has been the starting point for a number of authors, not the least of 
whom is John Stuart Mill whose work, Principles of Political Economy, argues that the 
premise suggests that all people should be entitled to an equal distribution of property 
but that some special arrangements should be made for persons with particular 
disabilities.35 
The 18th Century author, P .J. Proudhon, in What is Property? argues that equality 
dictates that land must be divided and redivided equally between the members of the 
population and that no-one should own anything.36 Of course, from this premise is also 
argued the classic Marxist position of "from each according to his ability to each 
according to his need". 
The fundamental problems associated with equality of distribution has not stopped the 
work of two modem authors receiving. broad acclaim. Both the works of Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Social Justice in the Uberal State, published in 198037 and the work of 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?,38 published in 1991 start with the premise that 
because all are created equal there are prima facie rights to an equal share of property. 
·Each develop their arguments in different ways. The conclusion to which Ackerman 
comes is that not only does equality dictate equality of division in the original position, 
but that in reality, each generation should be entitled to an equal start. The methodology 
-
.. of achieving this, according to Ackennan, in th� modem state is taxation. 
Dworkin also argues that taxation is the tool for achieving effective equality. For 
Dwor1<in, however, taxation is not to be applied so as to remove all inequalities. The 
function of taxation is to level better than average talents and bring up the poor so that 
they are not disadvantaged. Those who enjoy "exceptional talents" or who achieve 
inequality from wise investment should not have this inequality taxed away. 
The 1996 work of J.W. Harris, Property and Justice, reviewing these various 
36 
37 
38 
See Harris, 1996, 311, who relies upon John Stuart MUI, Principles of Poi/Ucal Economy, in J.M. 
Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 1965, 201-202 U Tor. P, 1965. 
Ibid., 309, referred to Pierre Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? (trans. Donald R. Kelley and 
Bonnie F. Smith, CUP, 1994.) 
Yale University Press, 1980, though, t have relied on the summary of his argument set out in 
Harris,1996, 310 ff. 
10 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1981, 283. 
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perspectives concludes: 
What Mill's, Dworkin's, and Ackerman's thought-experiments make clear is that, 
if a resource is genuine windfall weaffh equality of resources is a sound property­
specific justice reason. As such it has a residual role to play over questions of 
distribution and property-institutional design. 39 
His own views are expressed quite clearJy in his next paragraph: 
The principle stated at the beginning of this section - in principle, all resources 
should be divided equally between the members of any relevant community- has 
a genuine, faute de mieux, role to play in various situations. Jt has first to be 
decided what the relevant community Is; and then whether equal division is best 
achieved either by literal subdivision or by some regime of communal use.M� 
lt is important at this stage to define w;ndfall wealth. 
This Hams does in the fonow;ng terms: 
Windfall wealth acaves where a group of persons is confronted with a resource 
to which no-one outside the group has any claim, but to which nothing gives any 
member of the group a better claim than any other member. Since title to most 
resources arises by conaetised applications of the background right desaibed at 
the end of the last chapter, windfall wealth comes into the picture, usually, only in 
the last resort. lt is so invoked, occasionally, both in common Jaw doctrine and in 
statutory interpretation. 41 
Harris goes on to PQint out that the principle is also applied in the courts of equity and 
is summarised in the maxim "equality is equity". 42 
Thus the principle of equality is argued to play a role in determining entitlements to 
resources. The right may fall anywhere on a continuum between all resources being 
shared equally by all, through to equal resource sharing, being only a rule of last resort. 
If Harris is right, though, that Locke's original argument about the role of equality is 
39 
40 
41 
Harris,.1996, 314. 
Ibid., 314. 
Ibid., 315. 
Illustrating this with the case of Rimmer v Rimmer, [1953] 1 QB 63 at 72, Evershed MR. 
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appropriately limited to last resort situations and, in applying it, it is necessary to define 
the relevant community first, the concept has, in modem time, moved from Locke's 
original argument closer to the notions inherent in the Stewardship Paradigm which are 
to be discussed later. This work will take up the concept of equality in Chapter 6 and will 
suggest that even though different world views may have a. different perspective on 
equality, once a particular resource is identified it may be possible to generate, at an 
applied level, useful outcomes by applying equality to moral cfaimants of the same group 
as a rule of last resort within the Stewardship Paradigm discussed in this work. 
2.2.2.5 There is a right to property based on one's labour 
The argument that there is a right to resources based on one's labour as developed by 
Locke has been refined over 400 years into three key justifications: 
* Ownership of one's self; 
* Labour desert; and, 
• Creation without wrong. 
2.2.2.5.1 Justified on the basis of ownership of one's sett 
Since all are free and all are equal, the labour of one�s body is one's own: 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man 
has a Property in his .own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.43 
Locke then develops the argument by the proposition that if a person owns their own 
body, then they also own the labour which results from that as "The Labour of his Body, 
and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his-.44 
lt follows that if I own my body and I agree with someone else to put my body to labour 
in exchange for some reward,.then (assuming the transaction is not invalid for some 
other reason} I am entitled to the asset for which I exchanged my labour, be it kind or 
cash. Thus I have acquired a right to property in the asset exchanged for my labour . .cs 
43 locke, 328. 
Ibid., 329. 
Ironically, Locke had a servant and considered the servant's own labour Locke's own labour .Ibid., 
30, see paragraph 28- "Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the 
Ore I have digg'd in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my 
Property, without the assignment or consent of any body. The labour was mine, removing them 
out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my Property in them.� 
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2.2.2.5.2 Labour desert 
Similarly, if I labour and as a result of that tabour produce something, be it a work of art 
or a drink of water plucked from the fountain, property in that artwork or that water is 
vested in me by virtue of my labour. 
Locke then develops the argument that if he owns the body and he owns the labour, 
then that which he removes from the state of nature is also his because "Whatsoever 
then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property". -46 
lt is his labour which alienates the resource into a private right: 
it being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this 
labour something annexed to it, so that excludes the common right of other Men. 
For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he 
can have a right to what that is once joyned to. 
Locke continues with one significant qualification:47 
at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.48 
2.2.2.5.3 Creation without wrong 
Locke argues that since the labour of a man's body is his own•9 then the labour, put in 
to acquiring property from the state of nature, fixed title in the property to the person 
· whose labour it was. 
A difficulty arises, though, for even if through labour one is able to arrogate property to 
one's self, the property is not totally (morally justty) appropriated to one's self unless the 
full value of the property is the product of labour. Locke attempts to overcome this 
47 
Ibid., 329. 
This proviso has been the subject of considerable discussion, see Wolfs 'Contemporary Property 
Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests of Future Generations', Ethics , 1995, 791 , where 
Clark Woff develops the ideas extremely well. lt is, though, beyond the ambit of this work to 
digress into these discussions. The purpose of this work is to propose an alternative which 
makes sense of the reason for the proviso. 
Locke, 329. 
Ibid., 329. 
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difficulty by arguing; 'tis Labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing,. 50 
But it is not enough to put the difference ot value on everything, labour must contribute 
the full value. Locke knows, though, that it does not. The highest point he can state is: 
it/ think it will be but a very modest Computation to say, that of the Products of the Earth 
useful to the Ufe of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour: nay, ... what in them is purely 
owing to Nature, and what to labour. we shall find, that in most of them 99/100 are 
wholly to be put on the account of labour". 51 
.. [lt} is only by means of strained constructions that Locke and others have been able to 
trace the origin of this right [of ownership] to labour alone", observed Westermark in 
1912,52 and it is still by this incomplete and not entirely persuasive reasoning, through 
the arguments developed so far in this chapter, that the basis for the modem 
justifications for proprietary rights has been developed. 
These are in skeletal form the philosophic foundations for the modem discussions of 
resources. The language is of rights. The rights are proprietary. Absolute ownership 
is what is being achieved- or so it is believed. In this we have a paradigm which is all 
about rights and there is no mention of duties. There is no mention of duties, in part, 
because no one (beyond the sovereign in the case of Hobbes) is referred to. 
The pre-eminent .liberal thinker of the twentieth century ·does not appear to be 
necessarily so· exclusionary. 
2.2.3 John Rawls and property rights 
The most significant development in liberal thinking this century is the work of John 
Rawls and is set out in A Theory of Justice which was first published in 1972. Rawls 
stands in the liberal tradition of modernity as the pre-emin�nt modem exponent of the 
individuals right to pursue self interesfl within a framework that recognizes equal liberty 
for others. His object is to work out "the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic 
50 
51 
53 
Ibid., 338. 
Ibid. 
E. Westertnarck, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, Johnson Reprint Corporation, New 
York and London, 1912, rpt1971, vol. 2., 35. 
Rawls, 1972, 151. 
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society".54 
lt is to this end that A Theory of Justice is directed. Rawls has been embraced with a 
passion by justice theoreticians. A Theory of Justice is "one of the most discussed 
philosophical works ofthis century.55 His thesis is that rational self-interested individuals 
will choose (in a contractual sense) just arrangements to govern their social 
organization. The thesis is developed by the introduction and then welding together of 
a number of key concepts "none of [which alone] could be expected to wor1<, but 
together they may serve well enough".56 How resources will be considered within the 
theory can only be discussed by explaining key conceptions in the theory. 
The first of these key conceptions is the original position. 
2.2.3.1 The original position · 
Rawls pOstulates that a theory of justice can be developed by imagining an original 
position. Through the use of this device, Rawls sets out a conception of Justice as that 
which is fair for all citizens of a state. Fairness is discovered by imagining· in this 
. 
. 
hypothetical "original position" principles which would be chosen in designing a just 
society. The principles chosen in that hypothetical Original Position are just principles 
and it is these principles (only) which should regulate a society. The problem of possible 
personal bias is overcome by imagining the decision makers are limited in certain 
regards. t9 .eradicate biasP To ensure they do not take into account their own life 
circumstances, persons in the original position are obliged to operate behind what is 
called by Rawls a "veil of ignorance". The decision makers conceive in such an 
environment the principles which they consider fair and, as a consequence, a theory of 
justice based on fairness emerges. 
2.2.3.2 The principles of justice and lexical ordering 
Rawls postulates that in the original position two .principles of justice would be chosen. 58 
These are expressed in the following basic fonn initially. 
56 
57 
58 
Ibid. viii. 
S. Freeman, 1994, Political Uberalism and the Possibility of Just Democratic Constitution, 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 69:589,619-668. 
Rawls 1972, 89. 
lbid ., the criterion for determining whether a principle might be selected are set out at pages 18 
and ff. 
Ibid., 61. 
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First: each person is to ha\'e an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage� and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all. 59 
Rawls develops these conceptions into a quite detailed restatement through the next 
242 pages of the work into "the final statement of the two principles of justice for 
institutions. 60 
The first principle becomes: 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
And the second principle is expressed: 
Soda/ and economic inequalities are to be ananged so _that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of �e /east advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle; and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions offair equality 
of opportunity. 
Rawls then sets out a basis for prioritising these rules and the describes the First Priority 
Rule as The Priority of Liberty. According to this rule: 
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can 
. be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: 
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared 
by all; 
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. 
The Second Priority Rule which is perhaps more central to this work is the Priority of 
Justice over Efficiency and Welfare. He writes: 
60 
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to 
that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opporlunity is prior to the 
Ibid., 60. 
ibid., 302. 
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difference principle. There are two cases: 
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with 
the lesser opportunity; 
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those 
bearing this hardship. 
These principles may then be expressed in a General Conception in the following terms: 
All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution 
of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. 
The postulation of the original position, coupled with these principles of justice, 
overcomes the problem of argument about the actual state of nature by avoiding it all 
together. lt also re-introduces, or at least allows for the reintroduction of others' interest, 
into a discussion of rights and obligations surrounding resource allocation and utilisation. 
These principles are refined by Rawts through a concept he calls the maxim in principle. 
2.2.3.3 The maximin principle 
Rawls' assumption that, in the original position citizens will choose a situation which · 
requires that for all improvements in the position of one, there must not be a diminution 
in the position of another, is called the maximin principle.61 The requirements of .this 
· 
principle set out as the first and second priority rules above are not stated explicitly to 
apply to any grouping particularly, though, the work reads as though the relevant 
grouping is assumed to be a modem state or nation. As will be seen later, the principle, 
when not limited to the individual in the context of a modem state but rather to smaller 
communitjes, raises a range of exciting possibilities. 
2.2.3.4 Redistribution of property 
Rawls addresses distribution of weaHh in his section on Justice and the Constitution. 
He is of opinion that redistribution is needed to preserve the fair value of all of the equal 
political liberties stating: 
61 
A variety of devices can be used. For example, in a society allowing of private 
ownership of means of production, pr_operty and wealth must be kept widely 
distributed and government monies provided on a regular basis to encourage free 
Ibid., 155. 
24 
public discussion. 62 
But he is critical of the injustice that has been allowed pointing out that 
Historically one of the main defects of constitutional government has been the 
failure to insure the fair value of political liberty. The necessary corrective steps 
have not been seriously entertained. Disparities of distribution of property and 
wealth that far exceed what is compatible with political equality have been 
tolerated by the legal system. 63 
Historically redistribution of wealth has not afways been a matter for government and the 
courts. There is a personal, volitional aspect to justice not discussed in A Theory of 
Justice. Rawls' approach is to find just, institutional structures for social organization (at 
a national level). lt fo�lows that the issues of rights to, and obligations associated with, 
resources in his section on distribUtive shares, and his section on economic systems 
(42), focus on the macro, and do not explore the content of the principles which might 
. be selected in the original position to regulate access to, and utilisation of, resources. 
He states that to wade into the area of economics, taxation and property institutions is 
beyond the ambit of his enquiry which is directed to justice in a more general sense. 64 
2.2.3.5 Justice between generations 
Rawts comes to the condus ion. though, that •persons in different generations have 
duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do1065 in what is a 
noteworthy move away from the unfettered discretion to act in one's own self interest. 
2.2.3.6 Priority 
One of the more interesting arguments to be considered when considering rights to 
resources is raised in Rawls' section on Priority. 00 There he sets out the observation of 
John Maynard Keynes that "the immense accumulations of capital built up before the 
First Wor1d War could never have corn� about in a society in which wealth was equally 
divided". This resulted, according to Keynes, in "the more or less steady improvement 
62 Ibid., 225. 
63 Ibid., 226. 
64 Ibid.; 265 ff. 
65 Ibid., 293. 
66 Rawls, 1972, 298·299. 
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in the general standard of living of everyone".67 
Rawts goes on to point out that such a situation would only be acceptable, from his 
perspective, if the requirements of justice as fairness are satisfied. He comments, 
though, that significant differences in wealth may work to the benefrt of all. Thus, having 
set out certain overarching principles which must be foUowed, Rawls has, in the area of 
resource allocation and utilisation, thrown open for debate the best system and will give 
no endorsement to any system in particular. Indeed he raises the question as to 
whether things which prima facie appear unfair (unequal distribution of wealth} may be 
in the best interests of all and accord with his principles. 
2.2.3.7 Overlapping consensus, public reasons and reflective equilibrium 
Following A Thecxy of Justice Rawts published Political Uberalisnf6 and in it developed 
the necessary conditions for justice to be achieved .69 These conditions are summarised 
·by Freeman in the following tenns: 
67 
68 
70 
The acceptance and support of liberal institutions requires then (1) an overlapping 
consensus for inherent stability. But the different comprehensive views forming 
this consensus themselves give rise to the need for common standards, 
independent of any comprehensive views, for interpreting and applying basic 
liberal values and institutions. Here arises the need for (2) a shared public reason. 
If public reason is IC? be of sufficient depth, brea�th, and COtrJpleteness, .if must 
have a certain content, which is provided by (3) a political conception of justice. 
The political conception provides a public justification of liberal institutions that is 
"free-standing� hence based in fundamental ideals demoaatip citizens share in 
common, and independent of the comprehensive views that form an overlapping 
consensus. A society which is effectively regulated by such a political �nsensus 
and the basis of its public reason is a just and stable liberal scheme. 70 
Ibid., 298-299. 
J. Rawts, Political Uberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
In Political Ubera/ism Rawls also changes the order of the priority rules and states the rules in the 
following way: ·{1] Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and 
l iberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal 
political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
[2] Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: [a] they are to be attached to 
positions and offices open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and [b), they are to be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.• See Ibid., 5-6. 
S. Freeman, 'Political Liberalism and the Possibility of Just Democratic Constitution', Chicago­
Kent Law Review, 1994, 668. 
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For such a concept to be adopted and supported in a liberal democracy (both in the idea 
and ideal of Rawls' theory) it must win the willing support of citizens on the basis of 
public reason. 
A base for developing the overlapping consensus is achieved on matters of justice 
through debate to a point where reflective equilibrium is reached and public reasons 
given for the conclusions. 71 Central to his argument then is its evident reasonableness. n 
2.2.3.8· The role of the courts and public reason 
Rawls points to the judicial practice of stated reasons from a secular perspective to 
justify a decision. For Rawls, who is an American, the U.S Supreme Court is the 
exemplar of public reason".73 Whilst jt must be borne in mind, from an Australian 
.perspective, that our High Court and other courts have a more limited function (as our 
constitutional structure is different) the essential point remains. Freeman summarises 
the three ways the U.S Supreme Court serves as an exemplar of public reason. 
First, unlike other branches of government, the political values of public reason are 
the only reasons appropriate for the courl in judicial review. Second, Rawls 
contends that in applying the political values of public reason as the basis for 
constitutional interpretation, the supreme COf!rl serves the 'educative role of public 
reason', bringing to public awareness the principles of justice underlying the 
constitution, while developing and refining constitutional essentials. in publicly 
acceptable terms. A third aspect of the court's role as institutional exemplar is that, 
through its authoritative judgments, the court gives public reason Vividness and 
vitality in the public forum'. 74 
1t is reaoonable to expect therefore, that in the development of detailed rights to and 
obligations regarding resources from within a Rawlsian framework, regard should be 
had to the published reasons of the judiciary in resolving disputes. and perhaps to other 
published public reasons; reasons which self evidently have wide support. These give 
clues in a Rawlsian context to identifying the way in which a just society may allocate 
71 
n 
73 
74 
Rawls, 1972, 46-So, and the whole of chapter VII particularly 472-479. See also Freem.an page 
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and permit the utilisation of resources between persons in a community.75 
2.2.3.9 Conclusion 
As Rawls points out in his introductory comments on political economy "The upshot of 
these considerations is that justlce as fairness is not at the mercy, so to speak, of 
existing wants and interests. lt sets up an Archimedean point for assessing the social 
system without invoking a priori considerations". 76 
· Rawls' theory is a theory of justice. lt is not a theory of just economic arrangements.n 
Rawls, on the topic of just resource distribution, is only willing to go so far as to ask 
some questions regarding "some moral problems of political economy".78 He says that 
attempting to answer these questions "would obviously be out of place" in his theory. 79 
The princ1ples he states are now so pervasive, however, that any attempt to argue a 
resource allocation and utUitisatfon paradigm (which this work will attempt to do later) 
must have cognizance of the theory and its methodology. The matters set out in this 
section of this chapter wm be revisited in Chapter 7 and issues of equality are taken up 
in Chapter 6. 
The outcome of the writings of Hobbes and Locke was a series of justifications for 
.private ownership and proprietary rights which relied for their validity on sources which 
m�de no reference. to others in the community. Self and sovereign were the only 
persons to be consulted. Others were excluded from the agenda and, with that, 
obligations (induding ethical obligations) became entirely a matter of discretion for self 
and sovereign - or, to use Tawney's expression, moral obligations became "'an 
innocuous metaphor". In A Theory of Justice the doorway is opened for a paradigm 
regarding resources to be chosen in the original position which involye obligations to 
others and. in Political Uberalism, ethical obligations may be introduced if they are 
introduced and accepted in the context of public reason. In a modem state the legal 
1S 
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n 
78 
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This statement is made with some caution and the concerns of Rawls that the judiciary is infected 
with "subtle distortions of prejudice and bias" are noted. See Rawls, 1972, 235. 
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With these introductory words Rawls spe�s a whole chapter (about ten percent of A Theory of 
Justice) discussing the moral problems of political economy- core issues of which are the just 
distribution of resources, which is the subject of this enquiry, but offers no practical assistance. 
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system is the exemplar of public reason and it will be suggested in Chapter 5 that the 
legal system points to the Stewardship Paradigm developed in Chapter 6. 
2.3 Bentham and utilitarianism 
2.3.1 Introduction 
A significant school of those not enamoured with the discourses founded on the 
principles of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes or John Rawls have rallied under a standard 
raised by Jeremy Bentham known as utilitarianism. Named because maximum utility is 
its object, proponents of this school argue that the object of moral discourse (and law) 
is to secure the greatest good of the greatest number. Like Hobbes and locke, 
Bentham looked to the Sovereign for the justifications for private ownership and property 
. ·rights. Once the threshold question, of whether such rights were for the greatest good 
of the greatest number, was answered in the affirmative, ownership and property rights 
should exist as defined by law. 
For Bentham the only masters are pain and pleasure, and His they alone that determine 
moral actions, as •Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
, . 
masters, pain and pleasure. lt is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as wen 
as to determine what we shall do·. 80 
lt follows from this a priori that the satisfaction (•utility"') derived from any act determines 
Hs moral worth. 
Recognising that people are grouped, Bentham must logically define how the principle 
. applies to groups. He does this in his fourth paragraph by defining community merely 
as the sum total of the Interests of the group. Thus Bentham is an individualist 
philosopher in the liberal tradition where the community is nothing beyond the individuals 
who make it up. 
Morality then becomes a very simple matter and he can state it as early as his tenth 
paragraph thus: 
80 J. Benth am, 'The Principles of Morals and Legislation' in The Worlcs of Jeremy Bentham, (1838-
1843}, J.Fie s er ,  e d  John B owri ng, a t 
. http:llwww.utm.edu/researchJiepltextJbenthamlbenthprt.htm, last acces sed 24 .. February 
1999. 
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Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either 
that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be 
done. One may say a/so, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not 
wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong 
action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others 
of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none. 
lt follows that if the right of an individual to private property "is confonnable to the 
principle of utility one may always say either that it [should be recognized], or at least 
that it [is not be refused]". After all, the only question for Bentham's utilitarian is: Does 
it secure the greatest good of the greatest number? To which Be nth am answers: Yes. 
Harris summarises Bentham's work on labour and the property rights discussed in 
Principles of the Civil Code in these tenns: 
In his Principles of the Civil Code Bentham extolled property institutions for the 
blessings they had conferred on mankind. Property was the creation of "laW', 
which in this context meant prohibitions securing permanent possession of things 
to individuals, whether enacted by a sovereign legislator or established by custom: 
"[d) we suppose the least agreement among savages to respect the acquisitions 
of each other, we see the introduction of a principle to which no name can be given 
but that of law-. 81 
Harris also quotes Bentham as justifying proprietary rights on the basis that because of 
the existence of property rights:82 
Their labour is more uniform, but their reward is more sure; the woman's lot is far 
more agreeable; childhood and old age have more resources; the species 
multiplies in a proportion a thousand times greater, - and that alone suffices to 
\ 
show on which side is the superiority of happiness. 83 
The most well �nown exponent of the utilitarian perspective in Australia today is Peter 
81 
82 
Harris, 1996, 291. 
lt will be noted later, though, that Bentham was alive to possible problems in the terminology of 
·property". 
J. Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in C.K. Ogden (ed.),'Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of 
Legislation', 114, quoted in Harris, 1996,292. 
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Singer and his work, Practical EthiCS1 is taken as a base for discussing the utilitarian 
approach to resource allocation issues today. 
The first question Peter Singer asks in his work Practical Ethics is" ... what are our 
personal responsibilities towards the .poor?". He continues with three other questions 
"Are we justified in treating animals as nothing more than machines producing flesh for 
us to eat? Should we be using paper that is not recycled? And why should we bother 
about acting in accordance with moral principles anyway?"M Each of these questions 
raise issues of resource allocation and usage which go much deeper than the principles 
discussed so far. 
Singer develops in the first three chapters of the work the ethical approach he adopts. 
On� he has set out the framework in which he states that all peoples pleasures and 
pains are of equal value, of real concern for Singer is the nature of this equality and the 
extension of this equality to animals. �ach of these issues has implications for this 
inquiry and are considered in Chapter 7 of this work dealing with subject areas of ·Rich 
.and Poor" and "the Environment• (Singers Chapters 8 and 1 0) which may appear to be 
. more relevant to the subject of resource allocation and utilisation. 
2.3.2 Singer's approach to ethical dilemmas 
To explain the process for resolving an ethical dilemma, Singer chooses an example of 
"'whether to eat all the fru its I have collected mysetf, or to share them with others". He 
points out that if acting morally, this means that •in place of my own interests, l now have 
to take into account the interests of all those affected by my dectsion·. But this is no 
simple task "'[rt] requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of 
action most likely to maximise the interests of those affected•. 
The problem of identifying the affected persons and ranldng their claim� is immediately 
apparent and Singer's response is to suggest that one does not go through this process 
all of the time to resolve ethical concems. He states that: 
... at least at some level in my moral reasoning I must choose the course of action 
that has the best consequences� on balance, for all affected. (I say 'at some level 
in my moral reasoning' because, as we shall see later, there are utilitarian reasons 
for believing that we ought not to try to calculate these consequences for every 
Singer, preface L 
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ethical decision we make in our daily lives, but only in very unusual circumstances, 
or perhaps when we are reflecting on our choice of general principles to guide us 
in future ... 
No doubt there are sincere utilitarians who wciuld like a paradigm which was of more use 
in deciding such obvious ethical questions as to whether food should be hoarded, eaten 
entirely by oneself or shared, but Singer seems, having set up the dilemma, not to 
answer it. He is, however, willing to point out that the matter is not a simple one and that 
the �ntext and outcomes are critical in deciding the action to be taken noting that 
. . . at first glance one might think it obvious that sharing the fruit that I have 
gathered has better consequences for all affected than not sharing them. This 
may in the end also be the best general principle for us all to adopt, but before we 
-can have grounds for believing this to be the case, we must also consider whether 
the effect of a �neral practice of sharing gathered fruits will benefit all those 
affected, by bringing about a more equal distribution, or whether it will reduce the 
amount of food gathered, be·cause some will cease to gather anything if they know 
that they will get sufficient from their share of what othe�s gather. 85 . 
This short passage demonstrates both the simplicity (at a propositional level) of 
utilitarianism and the complexity (of its application) in a real situation. lt will be revisited 
later. Of note is the possibility th�t keeping the fruit may be in the best interests of all, 
in some cases, but that the criterion for decision making is not self-interest but a 
universalisable principle which takes into consideration the consequences of various 
choices. Also important to note is the inherent problem in deciding who makes up the 
group of persons to be considered. 
2.3.3 Singer"s concerns regarding equality 
The central point Singer makes is that it is nonsense to argue for equality on the basis 
sometimes traditionally argued by proponents of liberalism. According to Singer "the 
only defensibte basis for the claim that all humans are equal is the principle of equal 
consideration of interests". 86 
85 Ibid., 12-13. 
lbid.,47. 
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Once this foundation is laid, Singer extends the right to equality to animals.87 All 
this follows from the essential foundation laid by Bentham that the master of everything 
is pain and pleasure because, for Singer the question is not, Can they reason? nor Can 
they talk? but Can they suffer?S 
The answer to which question is obviously; Yes! Accordingly animals too are entitled to 
equal consideration. 
Singer, unlike Rawls does not focus particularly on institutional structures. He does not 
challenge the assumptions of private property inherited from Bentham and compatible 
with liberal philosophy. His purpose is to argue that morality dictates certain behaviour 
with respect to resources whether or not property rights and ownership can be 
established. That behaviour requires that everyone and animals, and possibly all 
sentient beings, be given equal consideration of interest in ethical decisions. This 
includes decisions about resource utilisation and allocation. In this context he poses no 
·threat to the liberal property agenda. He implicitly accepts it as his great utilitarian 
founding father. Jeremy Bentham, had done. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Conceptions of ownership and property are ju&ified and justifiable on the basis of 
consequentialist, utilitarianism and non-consequentiallst, liberal theories. 
These perspectives, whilst vastly different, locate the individual in the context of a civil 
society where the individual and the state (through its laws) dominate the ethical 
agenda. 
In the frameworks of Hobbes and Locke, resources are considered in the context of 
property rights and ownership, and "obligations" are. absent from the agenda. 
Obligations are absent from the agenda because "others" are absent from the agenda. 
In Bentham and Singer the principle of utility is understood to lead to the adoption of the 
same paradigm regarding property, ownership and the place of the individual in the 
state, as in Hobbes and Locke, but the ownership paradigm does not follow so 
37 Ibid., 56. 
Ibid., 57. 
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inexorably from the premises adopted. 
Likewise in Rawls, the place of the individual in the state is assumed as are the concepts 
of property and ownership, (modified in accordance with Rawls' theory particularly the 
maximin principle), but these notions do not follow inexorably from Rawls' theory either. 
In the next chapter deficiencies inherent in these approaches are considered. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEFICIENCIES IN THE ACCEPTED 
APPROACHES 
3.1 Introduction 
A primary outcome of the success of the arguments developed by Hobbes and Locke 
was the excluding of others (and in that obligations to others) from the discourse. lt 
should not be a surprise then that the paradigms, which flow from those arguments, offer 
little or no moral guidance to those seeking assistance in the making of ethical decisions 
about resource allocation and utilisation at an applied level.89 
The key concepts were •prope� and •ownership•. These two words, discussed in the 
89 
90 
The arguments set out in this chapter CNie much to arguments developed in critiquing the 
dominant paradigm's contribution to btomedical ethical issues. The contribution of the following 
works, whilst not consonant, (sometimes antithetical) with the views expressed here, played a role 
in shaping ideas expressed in this work and should be acknowledged: T.l. Beauchamp and J.F. 
. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, 4th ed.; J. C. 
Callahan, ( ed), Ethical Issues in Professional Ufe, Oxford University Press, 1988, particular1y 3-
25; M. Char1esworth, Bioethics in a Uberal Society, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
particular1y 1-9; KO. aouser and B. Gert. 'A Critique of Principlism', Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 1990, vot15, 219--236; J. F, Crane, Becoming a Good Doctor, Sheed and Ward, 
Kansas City, 1988, ch.10; A. R. Jonsen, ·casuistry: An Alternative or Complement to Principles?' 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 1995, vol. 5 (3), 237-25; T. Jordan, 'Applied Ethics and 
Action Research Methods', in S. Miller and N. Preston ( eds ), Proceedings of the Second Annual 
Conference of the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics, Keon Publications, 
Wagga Wagga, 1996; P. Komesaroff, 'From bioethics to microethics: ethical debate and clinical 
medicine' in Paul A. Komesaroff, (ed), 1996, Troubled Bodies: Critical Perspectives on 
Postmodernlsm, Medical Ethics and the Body, Melbourne University Press, 1995; P. Lauritzen, 
'Ethics and Experience: The Case of the Curious Response', Hastings Center Report, 26, 1, 
1996, 6-15; D. Leder, 'Toward a Hermeneutical Bioethics', in E.R. OuBose, R.P. Ham� and L.J. 
O'Connell, (eds), A Matter of Principles: Ferment in U.S.Bioethics, Trinity Press International, 
Valley Forge, Pa, 1994; W. F. May, lhe virtues in a professional setting', in K.W .M. Fulford, G.R. 
Gillett and J.M. Soskioe, (eds), Medicino and moral reasoning, Cambridge University Press, 
1994; T.H. Murray, 'Moral Reasoning in Social Conte:xf, Journal of Social Issues, 49, 2, 1993, 
185-200; D.Thompson, lhe Nature of Practical Ethics', Ethically Speaking, 1 (2), Summer 
1992,1-3; S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, University of Chicago 
Press, 1990; S. Toulmin, 'How Medicine Saves the Life of Ethics', In J.P. DeMarco and R.M. Fox, 
( eds ), New Directkxls in Ethics: The Challenge of Applied Ethics, Routledge and Kegan, London, 
1986, ch.16; M.U. Walker, Keeping Moral Space Open: New Images of Ethics Consulting', 
Hastings Centre Report, 1993, 23 (2), 33-40; E.R. Winkler, 'From Kantianism to Contextualism: 
The Rise and Fall of the Paradigm Theory in Bioethics', in E.R. Winkler and J.R. Coombs, (eds), 
Applied Ethics: A Reader. Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, particular1y ch.19. 
Much is sometimes made of the distinction between private property and that in which others are 
acknowledged as having an interest. This work does not follow that approach, of two types of 
property, as this way of viewing resources is considered to be inferior to the idea of stewardship 
under discussion. The word •property" is used in this work to refer to private property. 
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context of "individual rights" to resources, controlled the agenda of the last chapter in 
considering Hobbes and Locke and were taken without challenge by Rawls and Singer. 
This acceptance by Rawls and Singer is not surprising as, since Hobbes and Locke, it 
has been generally accepted that once a person has established their right to a resource 
according to Lockean or Hobbesian criteria they may do as they please with resources 
under their control. 
As will be seen, the arguments for such a premise are fatally flawed but the language 
of the discourse has suppressed the emergence of rival conceptions � conceptions 
giving voice to the interests of others. 
This chapter begins with the linguistic issue -how the words •property" and •ownership· 
exclude others. Flaws in the arguments themselves are then considered. Some of the 
excluded voices are identified. Weaknesses in the utilitarian approach are then 
discussed. 
· 3.2 The language of property and ownership 
The first significant deficiency in the accepted approach is that the words most often 
used to describe interests in resources- property and ownership- are inadequate, 
unhelpful and confuse ideas. Their generality and inherent ambiguity fudge complex 
issues. 
Jeremy Waldron introduces his article What is Private Property'91 with the 
acknowtedgement that •Many writers have argued that it is, in fact, impossible to define 
private property - that the concept itself defies definition". 92 
Frank Snare analysed the problems inherent in the language of property in an article in 
1972 concluding:· 
91 
92 
The specific set of conventions of "language game being played" will have to be 
J. Waldron, 'What is Private Property?', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1985, 313. 
Ibid., 313. He goes on to argue that it is possible to break the problem with defining property into 
a series of problems and that we should therefore not give up hope of proceeding towards some 
sort of meaningful definition. 
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clear from the context and not from anything we can say in general about 
ownership. Thus political philosophers would often do well not to speak vaguely 
of "the institution of property• but to describe in detail the rules of tne society they 
are concerned al)out. 93 
About the conception "property" rtself he wrote: 
... use of the word "property" and the analysis of property as an institution remains 
a primary source of difficulty. lt is a word made confusing by the expanse of its 
application and the preoccupation of its analysis as an institution- particularly as 
an institution by which individual rights are preserved.94 
l t  is a sad indictment that in 1.972 (not 1772) he could write: 
There has been much discussion in recent moral philosophy of "institutions• such 
as the institution of promise-making or of the family or of punishment, which are 
constituted by systems which allocate rights, obligations, duties as well as roles 
and offices. ... However not much has been said, in. this regard, of the particular 
institution of property, for this institution too allocates a complex set of rights and 
obligations. And this is indeed peculiar, for of all such institutions it is surely the 
most pervasive in our society and in our thinking. 95 
The key issues identified by Snare are: 
3.2.1 the need to establish the rules or conventions (implicrtty) which will govern 
the arrangements between the. people who are in community; 
3�2.2 the need to find language: 
3.2.2.1 beyond the word •property" which is not forced toward analysis of individual 
rights; and, 
3.2.2.2 which expresses meaning beyond the expansive generality of the word 
"property"; 
F. Snare, 'The Concept of Property', American Philosophic Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2, April1972, 
206, emphasis added. 
Ibid., 200. 
Ibid. 
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3.2.3 so that there are obtigations attaching to proprietary interests.96 
These are fundamental issues. They go to the heart of modem social organisations yet, 
as late as 1972, indeed up until 1996, these terms were left largely unexamined97 and 
the issues, which were inherently problematic, were apparently glossed over by 
philosophers setting out their own definitions of property (and ownership) as they 
thought frt for the purposes of their analysis. 98 
J. W. Hanis, whose 1996 work Property and Justice is by far the most complete and 
compelling work on the subject to date, had to define property in tenns of how it should 
be conceived. He wrote: 
'property' should be conceived of as comprising items which ar� either the subject 
of direct trespassory protection or separately assignable as parts of private wealth. 
More expansive definitions of property' fail to demarcate the subject-matter of 
property-specific reasons. 99 
ft is a word that is  capable of meaning almost anything about a right to a resource and, 
to be meaningful philosophically, each author must define it. This is quite unsatisfactory. 
Ethical debate requires a language that can communicate clearfy an idea, particularly 
about a conception, so central to civil society. 
Criticisms of the word •ownership" are harsher. Not only is it confusing, it is argued 
persuasively by Alf Ross to be philosophically unnecessary. He postulates a fictional 
island community where if-a person eats the chiefs food he is contaminated by tu-tu. 
91 
99 
This was not the first warning. Criticism of the misuse of the term •property" is at least as o{d as 
Jeremy Bentham who dedared in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J.H. 
Bums and H.l.A. Hart (eds.)), Athlone Press, 1970}, 211 n.12 quoted in Harris, 1996, 10: 
lt is to be observed, that in common speech, in the phrase "the object of a man's 
property", the words "the object of' are commonly left out; and by an ellipsis, which, 
violent as it is, is now become more familiar than the phrase at length, they have made. 
that part of it which consists of the words •a man's property" perform the office of the 
whole. 
In a moral, philosophic context it is acknowledged that lawyers have examined the issue at some 
length. See for example B. Welling, Property and Things in the Common Law System, 1996, and 
B. Rudden, 'The Terminology of Title', 80 Law Quarterly Review, 1964, 63. 
One of the more complete listings of the features usually found to accompany ownership is that 
of A. M. Honore in his paper 'Ownership' published in A. G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961 referred to in Waldron, 1985, 335. 
Harris (1996), 13. 
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If contaminated by tu-tu he. must undergo a purification ceremony. Ross points out that 
by removing the expression "tu-tu� the society is still capable of functioning. The 
situation would simply be described as follows. If you eat the chiefs food you must 
undergo a purification ceremony. The term "tu-tu" is an unnecessary term. Ross points 
out that wherever ownership is described what is actually described is a set of rights. 
lt would be better to simply state the rights than confuse the situation with an 
. unnecessary word - the word "ownership" .100 
A. D. Hargraves writing in 1956 in relation to English land law (though his comments are 
capable of general application) stated: 
English land law has made no contribution to the legal theory of ownership more 
striking, more brilliant and of more permanent value than the separation of the land 
from the estate in the land .... By distinguishing the land from lhf! estate, English 
land law has shown conclusively that even within a society as individualistic and 
as legalistic as England in the nineteenth century, ownership is not a necessary 
legal concept. The problem of ownership remains, but it Is not a legal problem; it 
is the concern of the politician, the economist, the sociologist, the rnoraHst, the 
psychologist - of any and every specialist who can contribute his grain to the 
common heap. Ultimately the philosopher will try to unify this shifting mass into a 
coherent whole. 101 
Hargraves' statement is correct as a matter of law in Australia today. Ross' arguments 
are compelling. lt follows that the first deficiency with the dominant philosophical 
paradigm is that it is centred on language which fails to adequately define relations. 
Instead it has a pre-occupation with at best a dlfficutt, and at worst a virtually 
meaningless term - ownership - and a pre-occupation with property. lt may be claimed 
. that this is simply a linguistic difficulty but it is not. An analogy is apposite. When 
something is closely examined under a magnifying glass at the centre the thing 
examined is easier to discern, though, at the edges it will appear fuzzy. If the words 
•property" and ·ownership" were so - clear at the centre and fuzzy at the edges - there 
could be no complaint. A word cannot always carry all of a meaning. But these words 
are not of this ilk. The more closely they are examined the more difficult it is to discern 
anything. The more we look at ownership the more satisfied we are that the concept we 
100 A. Ross, 'Tutu', 70 Harvard Law Review, 1975, 812, in Harris. 1980, 89. 
101 A. D. Hargraves, 'Modem Real Property', 1956, 19 MLR 14, at 17, quoted in Harris, 69. 
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seek to find is not there. The more closely we examine property the clearer it becomes 
that the blurring is not in the eye of the beholder but that the subject is distorted. The 
linguistic problems belie a deeper philosophical problem. 
3.3 There is no absolute right to resources 
Difficulty with respect to the word "property" leads into the more fundamental issue that 
there is no right to property. There are only property rights. Rights which are perhaps 
more correctly described as •proprietary rights". These rights are associated both with 
title to and a power to control, the allocation of and use to which a resource is put. At 
a legal level proprietary rights are one of the rights defined by the relevant jurisdictions 
system of laws. They are one of many rights found in a complex matrix of legal rights 
and obligations. They have no sacred stature above any other but take their place in the 
rules regulating a civil society. These rules have become complex in part because "for 
historical reasons, the language of property law is based on assumptions which do not 
withstand close analysis.102 
In an applied ethical context only confusion is created by describing the rights as 
property rights. lt is suggested these rights should be described as proprietary rather 
than property and that these rights too should be seen as taking their place in the 
complex array of moral rights and obligations which undergird a civil society.103 
Whilst some will argue that there is such a thing as a Property Institution 104 it cannot be 
argued that the purpose of the Institution is to define and limit property rights. Property 
rights are about relationships between people not simply a person and a resource. 
Referring to a property institution as if it is a shelter (from the problem of defining the 
inter-relation of different persons interests) simply perpetuates the confusion. Property 
rights (so called) are not rights to property as such, they are a series of rules that set out 
rights and obligations between persons in relation to a resource. The philosophical 
102 
103 
104 
R. Sackvilte and M. Neave, Property Law Cases and Materials, BuHerworths, Sydney, 1988, rpt. 
1989, 1991, 2. 
The expression •property rights• or even •proprielafY rights• may be inadequate to completely 
describe the right of control which is implicit in the notion of the steward's rights to the resource 
to be discussed in later chapters. This may depend to a large extent on the context. This work 
does not focus on this aspect. Its intention is to focus on the moral obligation which accompanies 
control of a resource however that control be described in law or in moral philosophy. 
eg. Harris, 1996. 
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problem "that there is no right to property" is a problem rooted iri the foundations laid by 
Hobbes and Locke. For as soon as it is conceded there are only property rights, 
interests of others are not excluded and ipso facto must be considered. 
Felix Cohen's Dialogue on Private Property105 is most instructive on this point. He writes: 
Can we all agree at this point that essentially this institution of private property that 
we are trying to identify in outline is not a collection of physical objects, but rather 
a set of relationships - like our conversation on our differences of opinion? If we 
can agree on this, at least tentatively, perhaps we can go on to the narrower 
question, what sort of relationship exactly is this property? Is it a relationship of a 
man to a thing, or is it a relationship among men? 
(Mr Delaney, how does Blackstone define property?) 
D.- Blackstone refers to property as· the "sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe .... • 
C. Well, now, in the world we live in, could you point to any examples of property in 
Blackstone's sense of •sote and despotic dominion ... "over the external things of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe? 
D. No, I don't think I could. 
C. What does V on Jhering mean when he says ... that an absolute right of property 
would result in the dissolution of society? 
D .  I suppose he means that society could not exist without laws o f  taxation, eminent 
domain, public nuisances, etc, and if any property owner c:iould really do anything 
he pleased with his own property, the rights of all his neighbours would be 
undermined. 
c. 
105 
Exactly. In fact private property, as we know it, is always subject to limitations 
F. Cohen, 'Dialogue on Private Property', 9 Rutgers LR 357, 1954, 359-74, rpt. R. Sackville and 
M. Neave, Property Law Cases and Materials, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, 3rc1 eel., 3. 
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based on the rights of other individuals in the universe. These limitations make up 
a large part of the law of taxation, the law of eminent domain, the law of 
nuisances, and the obligations of property owners to use due care in the 
maintenance operation of their property, and so on. Property in the Blackstonian 
sense doesn't actually exist either in communist or in capitalist countries.106 
The first deficiency regarding language - that ownership is an unnecessary tenn and 
property is a confusing tenn - seems to suggest a deeper deficiency, namely that there 
is not an absolute right to property only property rights - at least so far as lived reality is 
concerned. Property cannot be understood exclusively in tenns of an individual and a 
resource. At best it is a collection of rights in relation to a resource which are subject to 
limitations based on the rights of others. These inter related rights may be context 
specific, complex and ambiguous. As Partha Dasgupta the Marshal! professor of 
Economics at Cambridge observes: 
The idea behind a private right over an asset is that an indMdual (or household) 
has exclusive title to it and its uses. This is an extreme notion, of course, and in 
all societies there are constraints on the use to which even private property 
resources may be put. Thus, you may own your house, but you may need 
permission to extend it. In some rural communities you may own the land you 
have cleared, but you can't sell it or bequeath it to whomever you wish without 
obtaining permission from the clan or village head. Then in some communities 
there are elaborate rules over the sharing of rights to resources offering multiple 
uses, such as land whose use is rotated over cultivation and grazing, or on which 
there are trees providing fuel, wood and fruit. The piece of land may also have a 
water source. The person (or family line) who owns the land and cultivates it may 
have to acknowledge others' rights to some of the joint services it provides. For 
example, in some communities the agricultural aop is private property, but the 
post-harvest stubble is not (Feber and Noronha, 1987). Similarly, the agricultural 
land may be private property, but the produce of the trees may not be. 
lnevffably, a great many rights over resources are incompletely specified.107 
From a moral, philosophical perspective the incompleteness of the definition of individual 
rights is not of concern unless the agenda requires ownership to be clear. From a legal 
106 Sackville & Neave, 4-5. 
107 P. Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. 
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perspective rights do not need to be clarified until a conflict arises which cannot be 
resolved in the moral realm, or the state requires some form of regulation to attach to 
a human being associated with the resource. The legal system has devised notions of 
trust, easement, and profit a prendre and would no doubt be capable of managing any 
rights and corresponding obligations generated in lived reality. Law can handle reality. 
-lt may be suggested though, that whatever be the situation in lived reality, 
philosophically it is possible to justify both ownership and absolute proprietary rights to 
a resource.108 But this seems impossible also. 
J. W. Harris in his work mentioned above canvasses exhaustively all the philosophical 
arguments raised in the previous chapter, along with other arguments, in an endeavour 
to identify if an absolute right to property can be justified philosophically. His work 
seems by far to be the most extensive work to date and fills the concern raised by Snare 
that Property had not been analysed. He concludes: 
Property institutions cannot b6 erected on natural rights to full-blooded ownership� 
because there are none. 
In the end, we are left wffh a mix of property-specific justice reasons - property 
freedoms, labour-desert, privacy, incentives and markets, independence, and 
· basic needs. None of these imports precise, context-free considerations, and their 
mix can do no more than structure our answers to general or specific problems. 
On the contested planes of politics or adjudication, there can be no such thing as 
judgment-free determinacy. In any case, property questions are inseparably 
affected by the social setting in which a property institution exists. For example, 
whether ownership of resources of itself anns the owner with powers of illegitimate 
domination, or whether a class of dtizens' basic needs are adequatelY. catered for, 
may turn on cultural and political atrangements outside the purview of property.109 
lt will be recalled that Jeremy Waldron in his 1988 work The Right to Private Property 
also comes to the conclusion that there are no rights-based justifications for 
1011 
109 
In relation to ownership S. Coval, J. C. Smith, and Simon Coval in 'The Foundations of Property 
and Property Law', 45 Cambridge Law Jouma/457,at 465, make the interesting observation that 
Locke gives no theof)' of justifiCation of ownership, only an extension of an as·sumption that a 
person has a right to their own body. 
Harrts, 1996, 365. 
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untrammelled control of resources to the exclusion of others.110 
Philosophically, and in lived reality, property rights are but one of a myriad of rights 
claimed and exercised in the context of human relationships and may be displaced like 
other rights in certain situations. Such situations will "turn on a cultural or political 
argument outside of the purview of property". 
Rights which are currently described as "Property rights" come in the context of 
relationships and as a consequence (as will be discussed later} with obligations 
embedded. The "Property Institution" which is sometimes said to be part of a just 
society is subject to a multitude of limitations and ownership is never absolute. A person 
may never simply do as they please with a resource in which they have a proprietary 
interest. 
The second defiCiency is that it is not possible to justify an absolute right to a resource. 
All rights are subject to the rights of others and must be considered in a broader social 
context. 
3.4 Artificial society versus lived reality 
Rooted as it is in the concept of an abstract. social contract (and not real and particular 
relationships) the discourse excludes the experiences of lived reality from the agenda 
of important Issues for discussion in resource allocation and utilisation. Persons are not 
considered in their particular relationships but as abstract entities in an abstract context 
and their rights (and obligations) are analysed in abstract language. In such a context 
persons are detached, mechanistic, moral actors rather than persons in humane 
communities with unique circumstances which may affect their moral choices.111 
Once a "property right" or an "ownership interesr is established, the concept is 
considered to be just for all time. The uniqueness of each relationship and the varietY 
110 
111 
See para. 2.2.2.3. 
The span of writers emphasising that people are not detached mechanistic· individuals but located 
in the context of communities should not go unnoticed. For example Aristotle writing in about 350 
B.C.E. begins The Politics with the words: "Every state is a community of some kind .. : (See 
http://ctassics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html) and Singer writing in 1993 points out at page 
227 of Practical Ethics that "Our ancestors were - like other primates -social beings long before 
they were human beings, and could not have developed the abilities and capacities of human 
beings if they had not been social beings first. In any case, we are not, now, isolated individuals·. 
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of complex situations that can arise are subsumed under the over-arching theory. 
Persons are forced to take a more passive role as their rights are subsumed under 
general rules flowing from the theory.112 
At the heart of the Hobbesian view of the social contract is an assumption that persons 
are in community for the pursuit of self interest. This assumption has not and cannot be 
proved to be correct. Indeed, the belief in the concept of an original position as 
postulated by Hobbes (or for that matter Locke, or any of the other social contractarians) 
r�quires a significant step of faith. 
Jt is possible that our social organisation involves a matrix of other, perhaps more 
sophisticated, reasons and our communities may be the product of social, religious and 
political affinities which are not entirely dependent on self-interest 113 The paradigms in 
which proprietary rights (and obligations) were discussed in the last chapter exclude the 
wealth of these possibilities from the agenda.114 lt also provides a very weak base for 
moral conduct with respect to resources and, accordingly, it is not surprising that the 
debate has focused largely on establishing the limit of abstract rights in the context of 
enforceable obligations. If a person's motive for moral conduct with respect to resaurces 
is social preservation, any motivation for compliance, particularty where there may be 
significant personal benefrt by non-compliance, is weak. 
One of the more interesting criticisms of the limits of selfishness has come from Fred 
Hirsch in his 1976 ·WOrk The Umits of Growth.115 Writing as an economist from within 
the liberal tradition he condudes Mfuat the prime economic problem now facing the 
.economically advanced societies is a structural need to pull back the bounds of 
economic self advancement". 
112 
113 
1f4 
115 
Dusgupta, 543, (admitting he is overstating things a little) points out that the Interface of reality 
and theory is far from resolved in the context of economic debate. 
For a discussion of the nature of the human bonds that break down atomicity see Brenda Almond 
'Human Bonds' 59 -72 in Applied PhHosophy Morals and Metaphysics in Contemporary Debate 
Eds. Brenda Almond and Oonald Hill, Routledge, London and New York, 1991. 
C. Gilllgan, In A Different Voice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts and 
London, England. In page xix of her letter to readers introduCing the.1993 version of In a Different 
Voice Gilligan makes the point. 'Moral problems are problems of human relations'. There is no 
rational basis for excluding, for example, this perspective from the discourse on moral questions 
regarding resources simply �use two men writing centuries ago were able to think of a way 
of excluding the need to refer to others in inquiries about resource allocation. 
F. Hirsch, Social Limits of Growth, Harvard University Press, Cam bridge, Massachussetts, 1976. 
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Describing the problem as "the awkward stage that has been reached through the 
working out of the modem western enlightenment"116 he suggests that "[we] may be 
near the limit of explicit social organisation possible without a supporting social 
morality" .117 
Reasons which involve broader conceptions of justice or care or altruism, as well as or 
in lieu of selfishness, are ipso facto excluded because, as Hirsch points out, .. [T]he 
central fact of the modem situation is the need to justify"118 and this, when limited to a 
liberal framework "imposes drastic limits on the set of feasible solutions·.119 
From a Lockean perspective the social contract is agreed upon to regulate social 
. interaction between persons already bound by a higher law. The agenda is not the care 
of persons in relationship but rather the justification for, and protection of, individual 
private property rights. 
The freedom, presupposed to exist in the state of nature, becomes in society a 
·justification for arrogating to oneself that which was held in common. lt is not an 
. endeavour to map out within the context of relationships the way in which conflicting 
freedoms may achieve optimum results for all concerned. 
When one looks at the issues from a Rawtsian perspective, his .theory is capable of 
. more scathing criticism. lt is entirely dependent upon a situation which is purely 
·fictitious. lt may be argued that almost anything would be adopted in the original 
position depending upon the imagination of the author of the concept. Thus the society 
imagined by Rawts, but subject to his limitations, can be said (even more crudely than 
society as understood by his predecessors) to avoid the complexities of real society and 
as a consequence the richness of its actual community. 
Once it is ackrlowledged that even philosophically an individual may not have absolute 
rights to do as they please with a resource, the interests of "others• must be recognised. 
Furthermore these others may have something relevant to contribute to a dialogue which 
116 lbid.,190. 
117 Ibid. 
ua Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
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need not be confined to the individual, the individual's rights and the individual's rights 
in the context of the state. 
This then is the third deficiency. The dominant philosophies eroded the basis for moral 
obligations through the postulation of abstract fictitious "states of nature" or "original 
positions" which are not provable and without an adequate social morality exclude from 
the discourse the richness of the lived reality of people in community. In community the 
relationships of individuals are shared, not only in rights but in obligations. The voices 
of care and altruism inherent in such social experiences may have something to say to 
the discourse regarding rights to, and obligations associated with, control of resources. 
3.5 The accepted approaches to property and ownership issues 
contrasted with the applied ethical approach inherent in law 
Whilst philosophers (following the methodology and agenda of the classical liberal 
individualist philosophers) were postulating philosophical theories of property and 
associated rights at an applied level, courts were resolving actual conflicts over rights 
and obligations with respect to resources by a completely different methodology and in 
the context of a significantly different agenda. The contribution of the accrued wisdom 
and applied methodology of the judicial system remained largely ignored by the 
dominant discourse.120 In this. lies ·th e fourth deficiency. 
People appeared before courts almost invariably in the context of conflict with others 
(and therefore in the context of relationships), be they family disputes over a will or a 
contract dispute arising from a commercial relationship. Individual rights are never 
considered in isolation from that individual's context. There is no general rule that the 
State represents or even is an appropriate representative of all •others" .121 
The focus upon particular cases and real problems forced a practical result which 
accorded justice by the then prevailing legal standards. 
The approach of the legal system, particularly its casuistic approach based on principle 
120 
121 
Rawls, 1993, is an exception of note. 
Through the Censorship board and in the prosecution of breaches of business standards 
through the Australian Competition and Consumer Council. These are particular cases which 
may be justified on particular grounds. 
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and precedent, and its acceptance of the concept that communities can be represented 
by units of less than the State, does not sit well with the abstract notions of the social 
contract and the liberal conception that persons define themselves principally as 
individuals not as members of a community. The liberal philosophical approach also 
does not sit well with judicial interest in legal obligations as much as legal rights when 
it comes to resolving disputes regarding· resource allocation. 
The obsession of the theories discussed in the last chapter, with individuals principally 
in the grand context of the universe or at least the State, ignores the humbler more 
context-specific relationships in which people daily find themselves. lt was with these 
that the law is principally concerned. 
The dominant moral philosophy regarding resources, being obsessed with grand 
abstract theories rooted in presumptions about humanity's original position leaves it out 
of step bOth methodologically, and as to its content, with the legal system in which it is 
posited. 
3.6 The deficiencies so far summarised 
lt is concluded that the social contractarianism (rooted in Hobbes and Lock:e) so far as 
res6urces are concerned: 
(a) has lost its way in its language; 
(b) cannot provide a reasonable justification for its central premise; that an 
individual may d� as they please with resources under their control; 
(c) seems out of step with the pathos of human experience as being found in 
community and expressed in care; 
(d) is out of step with the law (both as to methodology and persons in the 
context of relationships). 
Utilitarianism is not subject to some of these criticisms. At least if the criticisms may be 
made, an answer in reply is also available. The deficiencies inherent in utilitarianism are 
of a different ilk. 
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3.i The difficulties inherent in utilitarianism 
Having established proprietary rights to assets as good, the ethical difficulty inherent in 
allocating resources is no less vexed for utilitarians than deontological ethicists. 
The two vexed questions for utilitarians: 
(a) what is "the good"; and 
(b) "who" are the greatest number? 
apply· as much to resource allocation as to any other area of moral enquiry. 
The answer utilitarianism offers: resources should be allocated on the basis that results 
in the greatest good of the greatest number, offers little at an applied level. Acceptance 
of individual "property"' rights in the way of the disciples of Hobbes, Locke and Rawts 
does not assist the utilitarian past the difficulties discussed above. These rights may be 
set aside if the greatest good of the greatest number so justifies. 
Utilitarians have genuinely endeavoured to struggle with the practical consequences of 
'their theory and Peter Singer's recent book Practical Ethics is a good example of this. 
Singer, to his credit, acknowledges the difficulties frankJy, and frequently, in pressing his 
position up against the moral dilemmas of our age. · · · 
Commenting on the need to develop an environmental ethic he writes: 
Now we face a new threat to our survival. The proliferation of human beings, 
coupled with the by-products of economic growth, is just as capable as the old 
threats of wiping out our society- and evety other society as well. No ethic has yet 
developed to cope with this threat. Some ethical principles that we do have are 
exactly the opposite of what we need. 122 
In applying the model of equality of interests he confesses: 
122 
123 
We have a complex mix of interests - some definite, some highly speculative - to 
be considered. Equal interests are to be given equal weight, but which way does 
the balance lie ?123 
Singer. 285. 
Ibid., 258. 
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This problem remains real for all utilitarians. 
The complexity of the difficulty is sharpened as Singer attempts to push the limits of 
moral consideration initially beyond human to non·human sentient beings124, and then 
beyond sentient beings to trees and plants.125 At page 276 he acknowledges this 
absurdity then pushes it further writing about a flooding of a natural environment by a 
dam: 
One might question whether life for animals in a natural environment yields a 
surplus of pleasure over pain, or of satisfaction over frustration of preferences. At 
this point the idea of calculating benefits becomes almost absurd; but that does not 
mean that the loss of future animal lives should be dismissed from our decision 
making. 
Here we have a fundamental moral disagreement. 126 
My object in setting out these difficulties is not to be critical of the attempt to make sense 
of the apparent ethical problems; that honesty is laudable. The intention is to identify 
that there is much further to be done in answering in a practical way these dilemmas. 
This is the subject of Chapter 6. Singers concerns are returned to again in Chapter 7. 
The point made here is that it is one thing for utilitarians to boldly assert that the greatest 
good of the greatest number is the obje·ct of moral choices. lt is quite another to take 
this ideas into the marketplace of practical concerns and generate clear, consistent 
liveable moral outcomes. 
Between this chapter and Chapter 6, two chapters will set out an alternative way of 
viewing resources which is not subject to the limitations discussed in this chapter. A 
paradigm rooted in the ideas that preceded the enlightenment project (Chapter 4) and 
consistent with the content and process of our legal system (Chapter 5) is defined and 
mapped in Chapter 6. 
124 
125 
126 
Ibid., chap. 5. 
Ibid., chap. 10, particularly 274 ff. 
Ibid., 276. 
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CHAPTER 4: APPROACH OF EARLIER OCCIDENTAL 
ENQUIRY 
4.1 Introduction and etymology 
In the last chapter the limitations of language were discussed with particular reference 
to the words "p�operty" and "ownership". This thesis is concerned with rights and 
obligations associated with resource allocation and utilisation, that is "the development 
and regulation of the material resources of a community or nation"127- a meaning given 
to the word "Economics". 
lt is therefore to this word that this thesis turns in exploring these ethical rights and 
obligations. 
The word "economics" in modem par1ance is essentially seen as value free.128 This may 
be because there is a word in the English language which has come through the ages 
to cany moral obligations and deals with the same subject matter. That is the word: 
"stewardship". •stewardship", rather than "economics", tends to be chosen as the 
appropriate word to use when ethical duties as well as rights with respect to a resource 
are· discussed. 
The roots of the word ·economics" are in a word which has an almost identical 
etymology to that of •stewardship" the word: "oikonomea".129 This ancient Greek word 
is pregnant with moral obligation as well as rights as will be shown. 
An enquiry into the meaning of this word, oikonomea, yields a rich vein of ore from which 
may be smelted ingots of value to this enquiry. lt is therefore the exploration of this 
concept- stewardship- and in that an exploration of the word, oikonomea, that begins 
this chapter. Having laid a foundation, the way in which the concept has been 
developed in various Writings dealing with resource utilisation in accidental philosophy, 
127 
128 
129 
Compact edition, Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 80, Oxford University Press,1980. 
lt is worth noting though, that the great J. M. Keynes considered. economics to be one of the 
moral sciences. See The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan 
Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Economic Society, 1936, rpt. 19!8. 
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through to the writings of Thomas More. is reviewed in historical order. 
The English word "steward" may be traced to the 11th Century where it was written 
"stigweard". "Stlg" probably meant house or some part of a building. "Weard" (later 
"ward") meant a warden or keeper.130 The meaning given by the Oxford English 
Dictionary is firstly stated to be "an official who controls the domestic affairs of a 
household. supervising the service of his [sic] master's table, directing domestics and 
regulating household expenditure; a major-domo". 
Douglas Hall draws the conclusion that stigweard in fact approximates accurately with 
both the classical and common, ancient Greek term for steward and the ancient Hebrew 
word which describes the same concepts.131 
Hall goes on to point out however. 
"Language .. .is not Immediately reve/atory. The word not only reveals, it also 
conceals meanings. The idea is larger than the word ... ". 132 
Just as the modem English word "economics" doses out moral content and the word 
"stewardship" embraces it, so the ancient word being even broader becomes a window 
into an idea which may be difficult to clearly articulate but intuitively known. In this 
-enquiry, we are assisted by our moral philosophy being sourced from a common 
language. 
Western moral philosophy is sou reed almost exclusively from two cities - Jerusalem and 
Athens. Whilst the world-views of each were fundamentally different. together they have 
contributed "the lion's share• of the foundations of our ethical systems. With the writing 
of the New Testament in ancient, common Greek the Christian wortd viewt which is 
rooted in Judaism, came to share essentially the same language as the classical Greek 
culture and in this came to share this word "oikonomea•. This word was used in both 
cultures to capture a very broad notion of ethically responsible resource management. 
130 
131 
D. J. Hall, The Steward A Biblical Symbol Come of Age, William. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1990,40. 
Ibid. 
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The only complete review of this word, "oikonomea", and its related terms is .that 
undertaken by John Henry Reumann in his unpublished doctoral thesis: The Use of 
Oikonomea and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about AD100 as a Bac�ground for 
Patristic Applications.133 An indebtedness to his encyclopaedic work .js acknowledged 
in identifying the key terms in the classical writers revised in this chapter. 
Reumann's definitions 134 are set out under four headings: 
1. Stewardship in the sense of household .management. 
2. Stewardship by extension to the management of a larger household: 
a) an army or military matters; 
b) a city or political affairs . 
. 3. Stewardship as arrangement in general: 
a) · legal arrangements; 
b) arrangements of the body or life; 
c) arrangements of materials in the arts; 
d) arrangement of one's conduct. 
4. Stewardship as the management of the largest househol� imaginable, the 
Universe. 
The breadth of application is noteworthy at the outset. 
4.2 The Greeks 
4.2.1 Earliest Greek writings 
The ear1iest definition we have of oikonomea (and with it the concept of stewardship 
under discussion) was written before Plato by lsidor of Pelusium (B.C.E. 435). Defining 
a steward he wrote •he is called an oikonomos 135 because of the fact that he distributes 
to each what is his own, or because he distributes to each one in the house what is in 
accord with his worth•.136 
133 
134 
135 
136 
J .H .P. Reumann, The Use ofOIKONOMIA and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about 100 
A.D., As a Background for PatristicApplications, Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1957. 
Reumann, 490-494. 
OlKOV01J.0<; (steward) 
Ruemann, 145. 
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This definition recognises both the importance of title to property and the importance of 
justice. The function of the steward is not merely one of recognising a right of title or 
.claim but also carries with it obligations for just distribution to others who may also have 
a claim; others who belong to the household. 
The second limb of the definition "he distributes to each one in the house what is 
according to his worth" does not fit within the current dominant paradigm discussed in 
Chapter2. 
Hesychius, writing probably in the same century, defines oikonomos 137 (steward) as "the 
one who manages the household" .138 
Whilst Hesychius provides us with the oldest definition, the oldest reference appears to 
be that of the lyricist Phocylides who exhorts his reader to pray for a wife of the busy bee 
kind "a good household manager ( oikonomos) and who knows how to work" .139 
From the eartiest times while the reference to stewardship is neutral (one can be a good 
or bad steward), the call to good stewardship is plain. 1t involves not just giving each one 
what is his own recognising title, but also recognising just daims based on worth by 
those belonging to the household . 
... 
4.2.2 Piato 
Stewardship was considered by Socrates to be a part of the common art of justice 
applied by all levels of manager. "king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master 
and the temperate and just mari". Socrates asked, "And when one man governs a 
house rightly, what is the name for this man? Is he not a household manager1� and a 
master?" "Yes." "Then would this man govern his house well by justice or by some 
other art?" "By justice." "Hence, they are the same, so it seems - king, tyrant. 
statesman, house manager, master, and the temperate man and the just m.an; and it is 
all one art- the kingly, the tyrannical, the statesman. the master's, the house manager's, 
137 oCKovo-pO� (steward). 
138 Reumann, 145. 
139 Ibid., 14Q. Phocylides reflects the patriarchal views prevalent in Ancient Greek society. 
140 OlKOVOp.OC: (steward). 
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and justice and temperance;" A common art binds them together.141 
Plato also emphasises that the government is to be "rightly" to qualify for the title 
"steward". 
4.2.3 Aristotle 
For Aristotle every art had a purpose and the purpose of the art of stewardship was 
wealth.142 This art was, for Aristotle, one of the three "most honoured of the faculties"143 
ranking with rhetoric and generalship in the division of politics. As it is from the 
household that the city state is built, Aristotle writes at some length on the management 
of the household. Useful to our purposes is the quest Aristotle undertook to press for 
a broad definition of the art of stewardship. Whilst some in Aristotle's day considered 
the making of money was the sole object of stewardship, Aristotle rejected this. Aristotle 
cOnsidered such a view to be a perversion and not natural. .Aristotle draws a clear 
distinction between creating weaHh and mere money making. Stewardship, for Aristotle, 
is concerned with having enough to get along on comfortably and then putting that 
property to proper use. This distinction builds on the concept of just distribution 
mentioned in the definition of-lsidor of Pelusium. Reumarm comments "Aristotle's 
concept of oikonomia is a humanitarian one" .144 Reumann spells out the importance of 
relationships and stewardship for Aristotle in a footnote in these terms: 
Thus, for example, Aristotle tends to put the human relationships within the 
household (master-slave, husband-wife, father-child) in the forefront of his 
discussion of oikonomia; thus he holds money-making is strictly no part of this art, 
.but at best an auxiliary to it; thus a/so his emphasis that oikonomia will not be 
indifferent to the goodness or badness of the resource if uses146 and will care for 
. the. excellence of the human beings with whom it has to deal; thus even the 
question is taken up of whether slaves have virtue, with an affirmative answer 
being given. 
Five principles inherent in Aristotle's writings about stewardship are: 
141 Reumann,169, quoting Plato The Lovers 1·38c. 
142 Reumann, 170. 
143 Ibid., quoting Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1.1.3 (1094a 9). 
144 Reumann, 178. 
145 Ibid., see Reumann, note 63. 
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1. Stewardship is primarily about relationships; 
2. lt is about wealth creation not moneymaking. Money making is ancillary to 
the art of stewardship and is not the art itself; 
3. There is an ethical dimension inherent in considering the goodness or 
badness of the resource - it is not value neutral; 
4. The steward is concerned about the character of the human beings 
involved; and, 
5. Stewardship is one of the most honoured of the faculties. 
Reumann points out that one author believes these views may go back to Socrates.146 
Stewardship for Aristotle is an ethical management of resources to provide a 
comfortable existence for oneself having regard for and concern about others.147 
4.2.4 Pseudo-Aristotle (The Oeconomica) 
The pseudo-Aristotlean 'NOrk, The Oeconomica, written probably over time by students 
of Aristotle, commences by establishing that the basic art of stewardship is concerned 
firstly with people and secondly with chattets.148 
Stewardship is concerned initially with the ordering of relationships and duties within the 
household. Managing possessions is an imp6rtant but secondary concem.149 
147 
144 
149 
Ibid. 
Interestingly Rawls considers his theory of justice to be a development of AristoUe's notions of 
ethically dealing with another with respect to resources and not in conflict with it. He writes: 
·Now [my] approach may not seem to taHy with tradition. I believe though that it does. The more 
specific sense that Aristotle gives to justice, and from which the most familiar formulations derive, 
i$ that of refraining from pleonexia, that is, from gaining some advantage for one$clt by seizing 
what belong$ to another, his property, his reward, his office and the like, or by deny;ng a person 
that which is due to him, the fulfilment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the showing of 
proper respect and so on . ..• Aristotle's definition clearly presupposes, however an account of 
what properly belongs to a persoo and of what is due to him. (Rawls (1972) 10 referring to 
Nicomachean Ethics, 112�1130b5.) 
Rawts goes on to explain that his theory of justice will provide a method of addressing this 
apparent lacuna. 1t is central to this work, though, that Greek language and culture at the time of 
Aristotle had a well developed concept accounting for what properly be{ongs to a person and of 
what is due to him. (Whilst it is argued later that this ancient approach is consistent with Rawls 
its principles were, it is respectfully submitted, more advanced and detailed and more useful as 
an applied ethical concept. This thesis will argue that the questions raised by Rawls in A Theory 
of Justice, chap.v, are best answered by returning to the concepts articulated by these ancient 
writers and developed in chapter 6.} 
Reumann, 182-183. 
Ibid., 183. 
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In this work the concept of a divine frnmework or ordering as a substratum of the 
concept of stewardship is also introduced.150 This notion was inherent in Aristotle151 but 
in The Oeconomica it is stated explicitly and its importance must not go unnoticed. 
Reumann states that "in Pseudo-Aristptle we seem to have for the first time a view of 
some sort of providential arranging behind the subject of oikonomia".152 
4.2.5 Philodemus and the Epicureans 
An Epicurean writer of the first century B.C.E., Philodemus, takes our understanding of 
the term "oikonomia" to a deeper level. At the time of his writing, Epicureanism still 
stood for "an absence of pain and a neutral state of feeling as the goal, not sensual self 
indulgence"153 (which it was later to represent). 
Philodemus argues that the goal of household management (stewardship) is not, as 
some suggest, money-tnaking, but "onry to provide a comfortable living according to a 
means of expediency" .1s. 
Reumann, in explaining Philodemus, quotes the traditional definition of household 
management "to manage well one's own household and to cause the house of another 
to be weii-Qrdered".155 Philodemus then is concerned to argue out the meaning of the 
word "wen· .156. The expression had come to mean "'lavishly,. by making tots of money" 
but for the Epicurean it meant "comfortably, in accordance with a simpler standard" .157 
·The wise Epicurean will measure the need for goods and take only what he needs for 
a comfortable existence, leaving the remainder, as the cost of gaining excess outweighs . 
the benefit. Furthermore, the Epicurean of Philodemus' day, to be truly rich, would seek 
150 Ibid., 184. 
151 Ibid. 
152 lbid.,165. 
153 Ibid., 193. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 (eu) 
157 Reumann, 194. 
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to curb his inordinate desires.158 
4.2.6 Zeno and the Stoics 
For Zeno (335-263 BCE, the founder of stoicism), there are two types of people, the 
good and the bad. The good are nprosperous and fortunate and blessed and happy and 
pious and god-fearing and very dignified, both inclined to rule and hold military office, 
and politically inclin(:ld and inclined to household management and to business. But the 
bad are completely contrary to these things" .159 
Good people, for Zeno, are inclined to household management, that is, to stewardship. 
Chrysppus (c. 28Q-207 BCE) who was, at that time, the head of the Stoa, wrote: 
For ability and household management is a contemplative and practical skill 
concerning those things which are expedient for a household; and household 
management is an arrangement concerned with expenditures and tasks and has 
to do with the care of possessions and of those who work on the land. And skill 
in business affairs means experience in acquisition of money ... But no wicked man 
becomes a good protector of a household, nor is he able to provide a household 
which Is welf'60 managed. 161 
Chrysppus points out therefore that stewardship involves expediency, C<ire· and 
protection and implicitly it is a duty to provide for others in the household. 
4.3 The New Testament 
We tum from the classical Greeks to the New Testament. 
4.3.1 Luke's Gospel 
The first reference to oikonomos in the New Testament is Luke 12:42-44 which is in the 
following terms: 
And the Lord [Jesus] said, 'Who then is that faithful and wise steward whom his 
158 Ibid., 199. 
159 Ibid., 201. 
100 (€U) 
161 Reumann, 202. 
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Lord shall make ruler over his household to give them their food allowance at the 
proper time? lt will be good for that steward whom the master finds doing so when 
he returns. I tell you the truth, he will put him in charge of all of his possessions,. 
This relatively simple passage makes it dear that the concepts elucidated under 
classical Greek texts referred to above are present in the New Testament: 
* The call to wise stewardship; and 
* the duty to balance claims and apportion appropriately; 
* the importance of character. 
The steward is a 'servant'. He serves those over him (master) and those l,mder him (the 
other servants). He is faHhful over even small and insignificant responsibilities and Is 
therefore trusted with access to power and wealth. In this is his character demonstrated. 
That passage has caused theologians some difficulty but for the purpose of defining 
oikonomos and related tenns the following principles seem evident from the passage: 
1) Waste is wrong; 
2) Account is to be given for one's stewardship; 
3) Poor management, namely bad stewardship, results in loss of one's right 
to manage assets; 
4) Shrewd action is_ commendable; 
5) Those who may be trusted with little wortdly wealth should .be given more 
and those who may not should not; 
6) A steward needs to identify to whom the stewardship is owed and fulfil! H. 
One cannot "mix" stewardships. 
Two other observations are worth noting. The first is that the shrewd steward was 
hoping his actions would make him welcome in the oikos (house) of others, The second 
is that the lesson of the text summarised at verse 13 as "You cannot serve God and 
mammon" suggests that a steward cannot serve both one's master and setf interested 
pursuit of personal wealth. 
4.3.2 Other references in the New Testament 
Other references in the NewT estament are to the word ·oikonimos". This word is used 
to describe the chamberlain/treasurer of a ctty. lt builds on the point that a steward must 
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act in the interests of those for whom the steward acts.162 
That stewardship is stated to be a charge, the carrying out of which is not always 
enforceable, is made plain by Paul.163 
The letter to the Galatians makes reference to oikonomos in Chapter 4 verses 1 and 2 
and reinforces the concept that a steward acts for the benefit of others (in this case the 
child) but has complete control of the assets. 
This passage suggests the steward's duty is akin to that of a trustee as that tennis 
understood in modem laws of equity. In equity, the general rule is that a trustee may not 
benefrt from the-trust. This apparently higher duty (not to benefit at afJ) whilst arguable 
from passages seems to overstate the steward's obligation. The position of a steward 
seems to be more accurately represented in the proposition that a steward must give 
account but may take into consideration the steward's own needs in deciding how to 
allocate resources. 
The references to oikonomos in the New Testament are concluded by noting that Paul 
was a steward of God (Co1.1 :25), bishops are to be stewards of God (Titus 1 :7), that 
believers generally are stewards of the manifold Grace of God (1 Pet 4:10) and that a 
stewardship in the sense of an arrangement or administration can extend to such 
abstract things as the gospel and the unfotding of history. There is even a stewardship 
of God.164 
A root word of oikonomos is oikos 165 which translates into English as house or 
household. The exploration of this word in the New Testament sheds further light as the 
word has a broader meaning and encompasses all those within the group to which 
reference is being made. lt seems to have a conception of including all those under the 
162 
163 
164 
165 
Corinthians 4:1,2. 
•tf I preach voluntan1y, I have a reward; if not voluntarily, I am simply discharging the trust 
committed to me." 1 Cor. 9:17. New International Version. 
see Ephesians 1 :10, 3:9 and 1 Timothy 1 :4 
o\Ko� (household). 
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umbrella of responsibility of the householder; everyone in the family or group.166 
This word then is critical in our understanding of the breadth of persons to whom the 
duty of stewardship is owed, for it defines the class of persons to whom the duty is owed, 
and with it the ambit of the steward's responsibility: the household. 
Whilst the word steward is an adequate rendering of .oikonimos and the expression 
stewardship canies, sufficiently for the purposes of this work, the concepts inherent in 
oikonomea, difficulties arise in giving expression to the word "oikos". The closest 
English rendering is the expression household. Unfortunately that word has become, 
with the advent of the nuclear family, too narrow. lt still, to some minds, may capture 
the idea of those falling under the umbrella of one's responsibility and it is with this 
broader meaning that this work is written. Accordingly throughout the remainder of this 
work when the word household is used, it is to be understood it is the wider sense, 
capturing up this idea of the class of persons who fall within ambit of the steward's 
responsibility. 
From these passages it seems ctear that th� ideas developed in the classical Greek 
writings fit comfortably with New Testament passages. · 
·what then does the rest of the New Testament say about 1he prioritisation of potential 
recipients of claims that are made upon a steward? 
4.3.3 Saint Paul's letters 
The first epistle to Timothy, which is generally understood to be a letter from Paul to 
Timothy giving guidance on the establishment of an earty church, sets out, in the midst 
of a number of other d!rections on how to go about his pastoral duties, this teaching: 
if anyone does not provide for his own, especially of his own household, he 
has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever. 
This su9gests first that there is a duty to provide of one's resources to one•s own and 
166 Examples are: Heb. 3:4-6; Heb 10:21; 1 Pet 2:5; 1 Pet 4:17; Acts 7:1 0; Acts 11 :14; 1 Tim 3:4, 
5, 12; 2 Tim 1 :16; 2 Tim 4:19; Titus 1:11. The word is also used to describe a church in 2 Tim 
3:15 and of the Jews In Matt 10:6; Luke 1:27, 33; Acts 2:36; 7:42; Acts 16:15; 
1 Cor 1:16, 1 Cor 16:15; Phil 4:22; 2 Tim 4:19. See also W. E. Vine, Vine's Expository 
Dictionary of New Testament Words, MacDonald Publishing Company Mclean, Virginia, 
undated,1345, where he shows the word has been variously translated, family, home, house, 
household and temple. 
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that failure to do so amounts to "denial of the faith" and is conduct "worse than an 
unbeliever- and second, there is a duty to provide for those of "one's own household" . 
. This theme is taken further in the letter to the Galatians where ttie author, whom most 
betieve to be Paul, appears to take up the general command to love one's neighbour but 
suggests particularly that that duty be taken up with respect to those who belong to "the 
household of faith". The author writes: 
let us not lose heart in doing good, for in due time we shall reap if we do not 
grow weal)'. So then, while we have opportunity, let us do f!.ood to all men. 
and especially those who are of the household of faith. 167 
We may at this stage therefore conclude from the New Testament: 
(a) that there is a specific duty to care for ·those who belong to "the household 
.of faith"; 
(b) that there is a more specific duty to care for one's own; and 
(c) failure to care for "those of one's household" amounts to a denial of the 
Christian religion. 
Three other observations are made: 
( 1) These are the only classes discernible and these classes are not capable 
of further subdivision. There is no suggestionthatthe classes·are mutually 
exclusive or coiJectively exhaustive but they do appear to admit of some 
difference in strength of moral obligation. 
(2) The duties are stated to be general and there is no suggestion that duties 
with respect to resources under one's control are excluded. Quite the 
contrary, all passages suggest that resources are to be taken and applied 
for the purposes of "loving one's neighbour". 
(3) This notion of love of ones n�ighbour, which is central to the Christian 
religion will be explored in some depth in Chapter 7. For the present it is 
sufficient to note that there is a prioritizing of claimants. 
4.3.4 Wealth and the New Testament 
Aristotle taught that the purpose of the art of stewardship was "wealth". The ancient 
167 1 Galatians 6:9,10. 
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Greek word for wealth is "euphoria" .168 This word is made up of two parts "eu" 'Athich 
means 'Well" and "poros" which means "a passage."169 This issue was touched upon 
when considering the definition of steward offered by Philodemus.170 Stewardship in this 
context meant not living lavishly but rather in a manner which was 'Well ordered" and 
"comfortably in accordance with a simpler standard" .171 
The teaching of the New Testament is consonant with this. Firstly, in that there is a 
general principle that wealth implies a fruitfulness to one's activity leading to more 
assets.1n ·Secondly, though, with this fruitfulness comes an exhortation to be 
conservative, if not simple in the use of resources for personal purposes and an 
exhortation not to hoard.173 Clearly the early disciples took this teaching quite literally 
and took it to include a duty to share. The writer of Acts records that the new converts 
in Jerusalem treated their property as common property and that as a consequence 
"there was not a needy person among them• .174 That author also records that when the 
disciples at Antioch became aware of a famine in Jerusalem each of them according to 
their wealth 175 gave to assist their fellow befievers.176 
The New Testament is full of injunctions to share and assist those in need.177 He who 
has two coats is to share with him who has none, according to the teaching of John the 
Baptist.176 
16& 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
173 
eunopia. 
Vine, 1226. 
See para 4.2.5. 
See ibid. 
See Luke 12:16 (eucl>opl')oev- euforasen); Mark 4:20 (Kapol')opoumv- karpoforousin); 
Acts 19:25 (eurroia- euphoria); Colossians 1:6 (Kapol")opoO!Jevov- karpoforoumenon). 
eg: Matthew 6:19-34, 1 Timothy6:17,18. 
Acts 4:32. 
eunopeiT6. 
Acts 11:29. 
See Matthew 19:21; Mark 10:21; Luke 14:13,21; 18:22; Romans 15:26; and Galatians2:10for 
examples. 
Luke 3:11. 
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The references covered in this section are the only references to the word wealth179 (or 
related words} in the New Testament. 1t is impossible to construe from any of these 
references anything other than that the New Testament teaches against hoarding 
assets, and that the disciples considered themselves obliged to share of their wealth at 
least to other believers in need. Other passages of the New Testament where Jesus 180 
and Paul181 teach on treasures and riches make the point explicitly that rich people are 
to be generous and share and not to hoard or put their trust in their assets.182 
4.4 Summary of classical Greek and New Testament 
We can conclude as Reumann does183 therefore that the Peripatetics, the Epicureans, 
· 
the Stoics, indeed philosophers of all minds in the ancient wortd, considered stewardship 
an important concept and being a good steward a particular virtue. 
Whilst popular notions of the day may have reduced stewardship to money making par 
excellence, the classical moral philosophers of the day were critical of this as an 
inadequate definition. The inquiry to this point suggests that oikonomia has a broad 
ethical dimension. Its meaning is extraordinarily wide and whilst it could be adopted as 
a vehicle for good, neutral and bad concepts the moral philosophers demonstrate a 
keenness to exhort readers to good stewardship. 
lt may be concfuded, also, that 'Wealth" is to be managed so as to enable resources to 
blossom to their full potential184 - to maximise usefulness. lt  does not mean an 
increasingly large bank account. Quite·the contrary. The teaching of both the dassical 
scholars and the New Testament is against hoarding assets and makes it plain that if a 
person has excess, they should share it. lt is important to note that assets, according 
to Jesus, should be taken from those who are not managing them to produce wealth and 
given to those who are; even if it means taking it from those with less and giving it to 
180 
181 
182 
183 
164 
eunopia or variations thereto such as at note 173. 
eg: Matthew 6:19-24. 
eg: 1 Timotf1y 6:17-19. 
For a good short summary of passages on this topic see G. Kirby, Understanding Christian 
Ethics, Scripture Union, London, 1973, 72-77. 
Reumann, 200. 
Hall has noted that little has been written from a Christian Theological perspective· on stewardship 
outside of the aspects offundraising (see comments and references 153). 
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those with more.185 Not to generate wealth from assets entrusted appears to be a 
ground for invoking God's displeasure and judgment.186 
4.5 The Early Church and the Patristic period 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The patristic period marked the first substantive fusion of the ideas of Greek philosophy 
and Judeo-Christian religion. Indeed as Shedd observed; •ptato, Aristotle and Cicero, 
exerted more influence than all other philosophical minds united, upon the Christian 
Fathers .. : 187• But it is not just the philosophy that is of interest. This period is of 
significance because in it we see the practical outwor1dngs of the principles under 
discussion. ft is an example of the integration of the conception of stewardship in the 
lived reality of a multicuttural community. 
The communities in which the ear1y Christians lived out their faith were communities 
which had no government organised welfare programmes. Many people were in 
substantial need. Focusslng initially on the need within their own communities, then 
attending to the needs of those outside their Christian communities, they fused the idea 
of stewardship with their particular values and made it a major focus of.their individual 
and corporate life. The writings of the period are extensive and no one author stands 
ot.it, at least in this area of resource management, as dominating the landscape. The 
works selected for discussion below identify key concepts and progressively expose the 
fusion of Greek and Christian thought on the topic under enquiry. 
From the works reviewed, a series of key ideas emerge which show how the critical 
questions about "who should get what, when?" developed as Greek philosophy and 
Judeo-Christianity came together in a Christian community .  
At the foundation is the notion that it is not the having of riches that matters (ownership 
or proprietary rights) it is what the possessor of the resources does with them that ts 
decisive. The skilful use of resources is affinned, but not the accumulation of resources. 
1&5 
186 
187 
Matthew 25:14-29. 
Ibid., 26-30. See also comments in the paragraph on Zeno at para. 2.1.6. 
W.G.T. Shedd, A History of Christian Doctrine, fl' edition, Klock & Klock Christian Publishers, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 1889, rpt. 1978, Vol1, 52. 
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A possessor of resources should use only what they need. Excess is for others. In 
considering which others, poor others of their community are to be considered first. But 
those considered should not be confined only to the Christian community. Looking after 
strangers is expected. The self interested pursuit of wealth is condemned. The 
·philosophic/theological justification for this approach rested on the premise that no 
person has an absolute right to do as they please with anything for all comes from God. 
Poverty is not affirmed as a virtue per se; it is the giving up of things for others that 
counts. So, under theseworks, wealth need not be given away or destroyed; that would 
be bad stewardship. lt should discriminately be made available to others. 
The particular circumstances of the person in need were to be considered in deciding 
. who should be the beneficiaries of assistance. The poor who were capable of wori<lng 
may be looked after for a time, but must soon be encouraged to find work and not prey 
upon the goodwill of their neighbours. The sharing was voluntary. Compulsory 
communism was rejected. It seems the voluntary moral nature of sharing in love 
dominated thinking. 
The beliefs of the ethical actors were critical. The dominant beUef was the notion that 
if anyone had anything more than anyone else it was because of the special gifting of 
·God to the person, and not their own merit. If they had special talents or training that 
·simply placed them under greater personal obligation. 
Within this context, it is not surprising that ownership and property rights do not feature 
as prominent. Who •owns" a resource (in common parlance or, in legal parlance who 
holds title) is not of such importance when with it comes obligations as well as rights. 
In a context where greater resources simply bring with them greater responsibilities, 
ownership is a privilege and a responsibility, not merely a right. 
lt is not surprising in this context that a doctrine of property cannot be found in the early 
church writings. "Property" is not the proper paradigm within which to view the rights and 
responsibilities discussed. A better paradigm is one which looks not to incjividual rights 
alone but one which incorporates moral obligations to one another - that is not a 
paradigm of "property" but a paradigm of •stewardshipn. Significantly the Christian's 
response to resources and their care for those beyond their immediate converts 
(households), were used in apologies to justify the adoption of the new religion which 
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initially was nothing more than a new Jewish cult188 
Atso of significance is the apparent lack of distinction between public and private 
morality. The same principles seem to apply whether a person is making a personal 
choice about lifestyle or setting out principles to be applied by leaders of a community. 
Seven works are very briefly reviewed in chronological order below and it is noteworthy 
that six relate to the period before Constantine declared Christianity the religion of the 
Roman Empire. From this review, the princip,es set out above are drawn. 
4.5.2 The Epistle 1 Clement 
Clement, who is believed to have lived from AD 30 to AD 100 was bishop of Rome. His 
first letter to the Corinthians (circa A.D. 96) is considered to be possibly the "oldest 
specimen of post apostolic literature-.189 That epistle exhorts all to recognize the 
importance of their inter-relation with one another and in such context for the strong in 
the community to care for the weak.190 
Clement argues that this duty to one another is founded on the special grace each is 
· given of God, for even if skill and labour contribute to possession of resources this is all 
ultimately due to the grace of God who has placed us in community to care for one 
another.191 
4.5.3 The Apology of Aristide the philosopher 
The Apology of Marcianus Aristide (who was an Athenian philosopher who continued in 
his art following his conversion to Christ192) was written at about AD 125.193 lt is an 
190 
191 
192 
193 
See Para 4.5.3 for an example of using this case as a basis for an apology for the faith. 
See E.S. Moyer and E. E. Cairns, The Wycliffe Biographical Dictionary of the Church, Moody 
Press, Chicago, 1890, 1982, 94. 
Clement, The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, at 37.5, metaphorically writes of the 
Church as follows: •Let us take our body as an example. The head without the feet is nothing; 
so likewise the feet without the head are nothing: even the smallest limbs of our body are 
necessary and useful for the whole body: but all the members conspire and unite in subjection, 
that the whole body may be saved•. (1 Clement 37:5). 
Ibid., 1 Clement 38:1, 2. 
Moyer, 16. 
Hengel, 42. 
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appeal to the Emperor Hadrian194 to give serious consideration to the Christian faith 
which, it seems, Hadrian's son may have embraced.195 Appeal is made to the character 
and conduct of the Christians as evidence of the worthiness of the religion for his serious 
consideratlon. In one passage in section XV Aristide describes the way the Christians 
treated resources under their control as held as steward. The first point he makes is that 
the attitude of steward comes from their understanding that they hold all things as 
emanating from God. He then goes on to describe what this meant for the Christians 
of his day pointing out that as a consequence of having embraced this new faith, they 
no longer embezzled others but rather "show kindness to those near to them" and "do 
good to their enemies" and care for their slaves well. They did not covet other people's 
resources but rather went out of their way to share. Aristide points out that this kindness 
of Christians primarily to "the w;dow", "the orphan" and "the strange( rather than to those 
who could repay. He goes so far as to say that Christians -wquld even go without food 
that others may eat. 
This is a letter to the emperor and an -apology. A letter writ en to such an authority 
today, if on the topic of resource creation and distribution, may well be expected to 
contain exhortation and expectation of the State in the conduct of such matters. This 
letter suggests resource allocation is �een entirely by the author to be a personal 
matter.196 In complete contrast to our own age, Hengel observes that " ... for the first 
Christians the question of property was a problem of personal ethics or at most the 
problem of relatively small group�· .197 The primacy given to the vulnerable in the 
community also cannot be escaped. 
4.5.4 Clement of Alexandria 
Clement of Alexandria (c.150-c. 215)198 was born in Athens, was converted at a mature 
age to Christianity and took up as head of the catechumen school in Alexandria in190 
194 
196 
196 
197 
198 
Whilst addressed to the Emperor that is not proof the emperor was the intended audience. Often 
the intended audience was the •educated public of the daf, History of Christianity, Lion 
Handbook, 75. [The following note as quoted may therefore be significant]. 
See section XVI ofT he Apology of Aristides the philosopher translated from the Greek and from 
the syriac version in parallel columns, by D. M. Kay, B.Sc., B.O., Assistant to the Professor of 
Semitic Languages in the University of Edinburgh. http://www.knight.org/advent. 
The possibility of persecution and death ls obviously a factor but that does not detract from the 
essential point that how these matters are differently viewed in the different periods is noteworthy. 
Hengel,85. 
Moyer, 94. 
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A. D. He is considered the father of the Eastern Church. His sermon Who is the Rich 
Man That Shall Be Saved?199 takes the passage from the gospel, where Jesus teaches 
that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to 
enter the kingdom of heaven, and gives the rich both hope and challenge. He argues 
that a Christian may go to heaven even if rich, if wealth is used wisely.200 
He explains that the mere giving away of resources does not help. In fact it can make 
the giver worse off if the desire for riches continues. He points out there is nothing 
particularly Christian about giving away riches; that was a practice of pagans such as 
"the Anaxagorases, the Democriti, and the Crateses" .201 
lt is the reason the Christian gives away resources that is critical. The Christian gives 
away resources out of concern for others, not the pursuit of self interest. 
Attitudes to riches were a critical issue in the early church, for as Hengel points out: 
From the beginning, early Christianity was essentially a petty bourgeois movement. 
This was Its strength for, in the historical form which it attained as a result, the 
Christian community found inner constancy, missionary strength and a sense of 
social responsibility which extended beyonf} its own ranks and courage to 
withstand state persecution. 
These very simple remar1<s indicate the solution that the problems regarding the 
allocation and utilisation of resources was to find in the Christian communities of the 
second century. The condemnation of money-making and self indulgence remained but 
the ear1y Christians saw no need for compulsory resource redistribution. Moral 
responsibility properly taken up was sufficient to ensure that the wealthy both increased 
their wealth and yet lived modestly. They then had ample resources to distribute 
generously to the poor. In taking up these responsibilities the sense of a community 
unmed as a body was built.202 
199 
200 
201 
202 
Clement of Alexandria, Who is the Rich Man who Shall be Saved?', Ante-Nicene Fathers, 190 
A.D., vol. 2, at http:llccel.wheaton.edu/fathers21ANF-021arif02-86.htm, translated byW. Wilson, 
last modified 3rd February 1998, last accessed 4111 February 1999. 
Ibid., para. Ill. 
Ibid., para. XI. 
Hengel, 58-59. 
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4.5.5 The Apology of Tertuman 
At about the time Clement of Alexandria was taking up his post at the catechumen 
school, a lawyer born in North Africa of heathen parents was to embrace Christ and 
about two years later was to write an apology for the faith he embraced. His name was 
Tertullian. He was familiar with the classics and wrote in Latin. His Apology gives in 
Chapter XXXIX, an insight into the conduct of the Christian society of his day so far as 
resources are concerned. Resources were seen as a matter upon which all within the 
community may have claim, yet Tertullian is at pains to make it clear that this is not a 
compulsory communism (as more recent centuries have known it) nor is it the result of 
a religion where good works purchase an eternal reward. He points out that because 
of their unity in "mind and soul" they call each other by names of consanguinity "brother" 
and "sister" and "do not hesitate" to share "earthly goods". Indeed they share, he says, 
"all things" but their wives. As to the common "treasure chest" they keep, he points out 
this is used not for parties but to look after those who cannot look after themselves. He 
I ists burying of poor people and care for "destitute boys and gIns", "old persons confined 
now to the house'", "shipwrecked" persons and persons banished to "islands", ·mines" 
and "prisons" as recipients of this money. He is at pains to point out that unlike a secular 
club where the common purse is for common revelry the common purse of the 
Christians is to help the most vulnerable and needy. That such conduct is considered 
morally appropriate is implicit in that this is an apology. 
Hengel observes that the real communism did not take off within the Christian 
communities and it was only outsiders "like the Gnostic Epiphanes, son of 
Carpocrates"203 who called for institutjonalised or organised communism. The dominant 
theme throughout the early church was that the sharing of property resulted from a 
change in heart and a desire to be generous, not from a legal or forced obligation. 
Emest Bloch, an atheistic philosopher, when referring to the community of Christians of 
the early church, stated: 
This community, built up on a communism of love, wants neither rich men nor poor 
men in a forced or ascetic sense. 'No one said that any of the things which he 
possessed was his own, but they had everything in common' (Acts 4.32). Their 
possessions were assembled from gifts, . . .  204 
Ibid., 45. 
Quoted in Hengel, 32, E. Block, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Ill, Stuttgart, 1959, 1482-93. 
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Hengel observes: 
Bloch stresses the spontaneous and voluntarycharacterofthis 'love communism'. 
If was not organised, nor was it subjected to external compulsion. The decisive 
thing was koinonia, not organization. 205 
Hengel summarised the position as follows: 
lt follows from what has been said that the ethics of the early church were 
exclusively community ethics, binding on the community of believers. This is also 
the case with the question of property. 206 
This community and not the individual or the state is a central theme in understanding 
the outworkings of the S�ewardship Paradigm in the early church. 
4.5.6 The Didache 
The Didache (meaning Teaching and alleged to be of the twelve apostles) is dated at 
about the middle of the third century. Its contains detailed teaching regarding 'need' and 
'character'. lt suggests that upon realising that another person has a need, that person 
has an obligation to meet the need unless the person seeking assistance is capable of 
meeting that need themselves. The willingness of the community to support those in 
need is not to be abused by those not willing to wor1<.207 
4.5. 7 The Sentences of Sextus 
Composed towards the end of the second century, whilst it is a Christian writing, the 
Sentences of Se.xtus�show a marriage of Greek and Christian thought and the sentences 
are compatible to both. 208 Sentences emphasise the obligation to share and have regard 
for others, particularly the needy.209 
A selection of the sentences follow: 
205 Ibid. 
lbid.,42. 
Did ache 1 :5; 4:8. 
Hengel at 9 and 56 argues the ideas are fed from Pythagorean philosophy. 
The Sentences of Sextus, translated by Frederik Wisse 
http://www.webcom.comJgnosis/naghamm/sent.html, last accessed -r" January 1999. 
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(338) Not only do not hold an opinion which does not benefit the needy, but also 
do not listen to it. 
(345) lt is better to die than to darken the soul because of the immoderation of the 
belly. 
(3771378) lt is better for man to be without anything than to have many things while 
not giving to the needy; so a/so you, if you pray to God, he will not give to you. 
(382) God does not need anything, but he rejoices over those who give to the 
needy.210 
Such attitudes were not eo nfined merely to the Christian populace of the Patristic period. 
Hengel quotes the later church father Gregory Nazianzen : 
'(Philosophy) has taught us to worship that which is divine, to love that which is 
human; she has told us that with the gods lie dominion, and among men, 
fellowship. This fellowship remained unspoiled for a long time, until avarice tore 
the community asunder and became the cause of poverty even in the case of 
those whom she herself had most enriched. For men cease to possess all things 
the moment they desire all things for their own. But the first men and those who 
sprang from them still unspoiled, followed nature (Epist. 90.3f.). 211 
While the earty church drove a radical moral agenda regarding resource creation and 
redistribution it was an agenda acceptable at a moral level (even if not practiced) to the 
wider community of which it was a part. lt would not be a useful vehicle.for the apologies 
were it not so. 
4.5.8 Basil 
One of the church leaders of the fourth century ( c.329-379) was a monastic father called 
Basil. He was well born and trained in law. He took a tour of monastic institutions in 
Syria, Palestine and Egypt and on his return gave away his wealth and took up the 
monastic life.212 In answer to the question: "To whom am I doing wrong .... if I keep my 
possessions to myself?" Basil wrote: 
210 
211 
212 
Tell me, what is yours? Where did you get it and bring it into the world? lt is as if 
one has taken a seat in the theatre and then drives out all who come later, thinking 
Ibid. 
Hengel, 6. 
Moyer, 32. 
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that what is for everyone is only for him. Rich people are like that. For having pre­
empted what is common to all, they make it their own by virtue of this prior 
possession. If only each one would take as much as he requires to satisfy his 
immediate needs, and leave the rest to others who equally needed it, no one would 
be rich - and no one would be poor. 213 
Hengel points out that Basil, when he was Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, lived out 
his beliefs: "by setting up a large welfare centre at the gates of the city for the poor, the 
old and the sick, together with a hospice for the penniless travellers. Refuges of this 
kind also came into being in other cities in his diocese".214 Elgin S. Moyerin The Wycliffe 
Biographical Dictionary of the Church credits Basil with the first Christian hospital. 
Evidently he had a particular concern for lepers.215 
Throughout these writings one cannot escape the conclusion that those who are 
vulnerable and in need are within the household of those who can meet that need. This 
builds on the ear1ier notion of the household and is a significant expansion. The idea of 
the household is extended outward to include those in need. This idea is explored and 
developed in chapter 5. 
4.5.9 Philosophic ideas, utopian states and the state of nature 
. Comment should be made not only on what is included in the literature from these· 
cultures but also what is excluded. Martin Hengel analyses the natural law and utopian 
ideas of society in antiquity, and he concludes: 
Early Christianity and the New Testament, the 'documentation of the preaching on 
which the Church was founded' (M. Kahler) and thus the earliest source of 
Christian history, were only marginally affected by all these theories and utopias, 
which gave their stamp the later Christian natura/law theory about property. 216 
Nor were they concerned it would seem even with a doctrine of "Property". The first of 
Hengel's ten concluding theses is: 
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1. We cannot extract a well-defined 'Christian doctrine of property' either from 
Hengel, 2, referring to (Migne, PG 31, 276f). 
lbid.,3. 
Moyer, 32. 
Hengel, 8. 
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the New Testament or from the history of the early church. Right down to 
the most recent times, views which have claimed to possess this character 
owe more to natura/law than to Christianity. Where the beginnings of 
natural-law theories have been offered in the early church, whether for the 
purpose of radical criticism or to provide a relative justification for property, 
they have usually been borrowed from Graeco-Roman philosophical 
discussion. Of course they were closely associated with the biblical 
doctrine of creation. 217 
Unconcerned about the need to establish a rationally argued philosophy of resource 
management which was anchored in the dominant paradigms of the day, nor a doctrine 
of "property", the early writers of this critical phase of western history concerned 
themselves with the need to give guidance to those who must make choices on a daily 
basis. The driving force in this paradigm was not philosophy but a sense of obligation 
to God and one another arising out of their religious experience. 
The beliefs of the ethical actors were critical. The dominant belief which was central was 
the notion that if anyone had anything more than anyone else ft was because of the 
special gifting of God to the person and not their merit. If they had special talents or 
training that simply placed them under greater personal obligation. 
The paradigm was one which looked not to individual rights alone but to moral 
obligations to one another - that is not a paradigm of "property" but a paradigm of 
"stewardship". 
4.6 Writings from the Medieval Period 
4.6.1 Thomas Aquinas 
Thomas Aquinas, the great systematiser, addresses issues gennane to this enquiry in 
his work Summa Theologica'l18 written between 1265 and 1273.219 He wrote "whatever 
certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of 
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All of the quotes from this work are taken from the edition at the New Advent Catholic Supersite 
from http://www.newadvent.org/summa/30660 last accessed 13th November 1998. 
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succouring the poor" .220 lt is an absolute statement but seems to be soundly drawn from 
the material discussed so far and Aquinas points to Ambrose as authority for this 
position. 
He provides a window into the issues, scholarship, and frameworks that had developed 
up to the twelfth century on the way these ideas were developed in relation to justice and 
restitution.221 Justice in relation to resources, is more than the narrow returning of that 
to which a person is entitled. There is a species of justice, which goes beyond this, and 
is called distributive justice. Aquinas states the five objections to distributive justice, the 
first three of which are pertinent to this inquiry.222 
The first objection is to the effect that it is not just to re-distribute common goods within 
a community as it can lead to moral corruption because people believe they may receive 
gain without work and thereby be worse. Aquinas responds that this is not so for this 
concept of justice, (which in this work has been called stewardship223) for it is not a wild 
and excessive distnbution but rather a moderate and wise resource allocation. 
If this limitation of Aquinas is understood in the light of the Patristic writings a concept 
emerges of provision of basic needs for those in real need but a cut off which includes 
those who would abuse the generosity of others. 
The next objection, building on the first, suggests that it is unjust for a person to receive 
something in which they have no "proprietary" interest. The argument ran that when a 
person got something which came from the community it wasn't their own so it wasn't 
just for them to receive it. 
Aquinas' answer is to assert that persons do have some claim by belonging to the 
community. 
The next objection addressed by Aquinas is the objection that it is only for the state to 
undertake and be involved in distributive justice otherwise it is not justice. But in reply 
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Aquinas, second part of the Second Part, Question 66, Article 7. 
Aquinas, second part of the Second Part, Questions 61 and 62. 
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Aquinas points out that stewardship obligations, as they are described here, are not 
purely matters for the government but apply to all aspects of relationships. Stewardship 
is not simply a concept for governmental authorities, it is as much a matter of personal 
ethics. 
The first significant additional point is that in different communities the allocation of 
resources is not always according to the same criteria.224 Different communities use 
different criteria for deciding portions. In each case, though, it would seem that the 
character of the recipient (albeit judged by a different criterion) is what is crucial. 
Aquinas is at pains to point out that the concept of stewardship, itself a subset of justice, 
must not be used as a vehicle for injustice. A way will be found to achieve a just result 
without compromising the core principles.225 
One of the arguments advanced under the heading of Restitution is to the effect that 
restitution may be avoided if n would deprive parents or other benefactors of an 
obligation owed to them. This puts squarely the possibility that one may avoid moral 
obligations to those in more remote classes by ensuring that one provides for those to 
whom primary obligations are owed. Aquinas' answer in this case is "No!". The only 
situation where t�is may be permitted is where one in the class to whom primary 
obligations are owed iS in extreme need.226 
The stewardship obligation cannot be used as a justification for avoiding one's 
contractual obligations.227 A steward must also distinguish between different 
households. Resources entrusted to a steward under a contract must be used to satisfy 
that stewardship and not another. That is, the contract should be performed. Resources 
must always be appropriated having regard to the commission of the person from whom 
the stewardship commission is obtained. Thomas Aquinas points out, however, that the 
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Aquinas, second article in question 61. 
See the quote at Question 62 Article 5 where the quote from Plato which introduced this work is 
discussed. 
see Aquinas; replyto objection 4 in Question 61, article 1. 
This interface of contract and moral obligation to kin is extremely interesting. This work argues 
that the existence of a contractual obligation brings with it a moral obligation to perform the 
contract. 
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moral obligations admit of more complex analysis. Once a steward has a stewardship 
commission the tenns of that commission define the accounting in a way not dissimilar 
to the modem legal concept of a trust. 
The concept of distributive justice set forth in the Summa Theologica sits comfortably 
with the concept of stewardship developed earlier in this chapter. The notion transcends 
the bare right of *an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"- justice. lt is a moral right 
which is also more than treating all equally. lt is �ppropriate in some cases to treat 
people unequally. Different communities may decide differently the basis of resource 
distribution but for certain it is not simply a matter for a sovereign. 
Aquinas does not spell out the significance of different relationships but does point out 
that the mere existence of moral obligations to persons of a particular class (such as 
parents) cannot be used to justify breach of other moral obligations such as the duty to 
perform contracts. 
These passages from Aquinas suggest that by end of the Middle Ages the notion of 
stewardship had developed to be much more than simply a personal ethical 
responsibility. lt was also, though, not simply a responsibility of the State. lt was an 
aspect of justice which had developed some level of complexity, and applied to all levels 
of social interaction from the individual, through the various communities in society to the 
largest group, in the State itsetf.228 
4.6.2 Wycliffe 
lt appears that the penetration of the notion throughout society was sufficiently well 
accepted (at least by the church) for it to be used as a powerful weapon of social 
criticism against the church by the 12th Century. Wycliffe suggested that if the church 
was not a wise steward it should not be a resource controller. He offended the church 
by supporting the right of government to seize the property of corrupt clergymen229 
expressing justification for his action by relying on the concept of stewardship.230 
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lt is beyond the ambit of this work to inquire into the extent to which the notion of stewards is 
inherent in the ideas of feudalism and the concept of noblesse oblige. Prima facie conceptual 
parallels appear to be evident. 
History of ChrisUanity, Lions Handbook, Lion Publishing Co. PLC, Herts., London, 1977, 338. 
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The church is capable of injustice and in particular injustice regarding resource 
utilisation. If the church does not manage well231 it is as open to the criticism of injustice 
through bad stewardship as anyone else be they individual, community or state. 
In doing so he sets stewardship up as a possible paradigm for critique of civil 
government. His ideas were clearty rooted in the personal ethic of the earty church but 
he translated it into a basis for social criticism. 
4.6.3 Thomas More 
In Thomas More, the criticism flows beyond the church and into the wider community. 
His Utopia232 sets out in terms more idealistic than Marx or Engels the hope that law 
would not focus on the capacity to prove title but rather the capacity to empower and 
properly utilise resources- particularly human resources. In More the State, and in 
particular its unjust laws regulating resources which he describes as "pernicious 
abominations", become the object of vitriolic criticism. 233 For More, a law which upheld 
proprietary rights of the individ ua I against wise resource utilisation and concern for others 
in the community, was a law to be abhorred. A state which has such laws was the 
antithesis of a Utopia. 
More would go further (and, contrary to this thesis, too far) describing the ideal state as 
one where all people should have and enjoy equal portions of wearth. Drawing no doubt 
on some of the earty church writings (and rejecting others) he wrote in favour of a largely 
voluntary communism.234 
4.6.4 Summary of Writings reviewed from the Medieval Period 
In Aquinas the focus on the individual in the context of that individual's community is 
affirmed over and against an individual in the context of the state (a lone). Furthermore, 
communities are free to apply the principles of stewardship according to their own moral 
standards. Aquinas will not allow this justice which he calls distributive justice to be lost. 
Nor will he let it be used as a tool for further injustice. lt takes its proper place applied 
according to historically justifiable principles. 1t is those principles that Wycliffe takes up 
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The word "we lift is used here in the context of the earlier discussion of the Greek word for which 
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as a criterion for judging the church's own conduct and which Thomas More takes up as 
a basis for social criticism. For each of these authors from this medieval period 
resources are but another context in which moral obligations between people in 
community are worked out. 
4. 7 Writings of the Protestant Reformation 
4.7.1 Martin Luther 
"Utopia" was published in 1516 and one year later Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses 
to the door in Wittenberg. On the third January 1521 Luther was excommunicated. 
Luther, prior to this excommunication, had enormous support throughout Germany and 
that is due in no small part to three treaties he published in the months prior to his 
excommunication. In the first of these, "To the Christian nobility of a German nationrll:J5 
Luther not only criticizes Church practices, he makes comment on what should be done 
to improve "the dreadful state of affairs" in Germany at the time. 
Access to resources was a critical issue. Luther stated "One of the greatest necessities 
is the abolition of all begging throughout Christendom. Nobody ought to go begging 
among Christians."236 The problem was that it was ·impossible to distinguish clearly 
between genuine beggars who were in need of financial resources and priests who went 
from town to town begging. Thus the people were continually subject to claims of a 
moral nature to allocate resources to beggarn. 
Luther wrote: 
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"I have figured out that each of the five or six mendicant orders visits the same 
place more than six or seven times every year. In addition to these there are the 
usual beggars, the "ambassador" beggars, and the panhandlers. This adds up to 
sixty times a year that a town is laid under tribute! This is over and above what the 
Secular authorities demand in the way of taxes and assessments. All this the 
Romanists See steals in returns for its wares and consumes for no purpose. To 
me it is one of God's greatest miracles that we can still go on existing and find the 
wherewithal to support ourselves!"237 
M. Luther, ·rhree Treatisesa• trans. Charles M. Jacobs, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1521, rpt 
1957. 
Ibid., para 21, page 80. 
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Luther, confronted this issue and offered practical advice. 
He wrote: 
"If would even be a very simple matter to make a Jaw to the effect that every city 
should look after its own poor, if only we had the courage and the intention to do 
so. No beggar from outside should be allowed into the city whether he might call 
himself pilgrim or mendicant monk. Every city should support its own poor, and if 
it was too small, the people in the su"ounding villages should also be urged to 
contribute, since in any case they have to feed so many vagabonds and evil rogues 
who call themselves mendicants. In this way, too, it could be known who was 
really poor, and who was not. 
There would have to be an overseer or warden who knows all the poor and informs 
the city council or the clergy what they need or some other better arrangement 
might be made."238 
In contrast then to More's appeal for voi!J_ntary communism, Luther offers very practical 
advice on the proper limits of moral claims and on the moral obligation to satisfy these. 
He does so by first identifying the relevant household. For Lutherthe relevant household 
is the city, or possibly the city and its surrounds. That household will know its own. In 
knowing its own it will not only be able to discriminate between those who are genuinely· 
in need and those who are not. lt will also be able to identify the nature of the need and 
how it may best be addressed. 
His practical solution is consistent with the didache239 and with anchoring justice in 
relation to resource access in the context of reJationships of care. 
4.7.2 John Calvin 
John Calvin, In his Institutes of the Christian Religiorr40 sets out guidance on how to 
apply resources in chapter X of Volume 11 Book 3. He teaches against extremes of 
excessive austerity and excessive luxury. He teaches God has given the earths 
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resources to be sensibly enjoyed knowing that an account must be given to God for the 
application. 
Scripture, moreover, has a third rule for modifying the use of earthly blessings .... 
For it declares that they have all been given us by the kindness of God, and 
appointed for our use under the condition of being regarded as trusts, of which we 
must one day give account. We must, therefore, administer them as if we 
constantly heard the words sounding in our ears, •Give an account of your 
stewardship. 1(241 
This teaching is rooted in the premise that "there is no such thing as lawful possession, 
unless our conscience testifies that what is ours is ours by righf. 242 This right is not, for 
Calvin, an absolute right, it follows from a submission of one's self completely to Christ. 
This submission brings with it not a right to do as one pleases. lt brings certain 
obligations. These obligations are to use the resources primarily having regard to ones 
gifts and calling recognizing that there is an obligation as a steward to give an account 
to God.243 In Calvin's work there is not a condemnation of weaHh but rather a caution 
against falling into its traps. He will not condemn the enjoyment of the earth's resources. 
For him there should be limits but there need not be frugality or a limitation of usage of 
resources to bare necessities. Such an austere approach Calvin describes as •pious 
indeed"244 but unnecessary. 
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If anyone raises the objection that a frugal use of food and drink is sufficient for 
the nourishment of the body, I answer: Although food is a proper provision for our 
bodily need, yet the legitimate use of it goes beyond mere sustenance. For good 
flavors were not added to food value without a purpose, but because our 
Heavenly Father wishes to give us pleasure with the delicacies he provides. lt is 
not by accident that Ps. 104:15 praises his kindness in creating wine to cheer 
man's heart. 245 
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H�ving stated this freedom though, Calvin turns immediately to impress the importance 
of restraint falling short of complete abnegation. 
But the more kindly God treats us, the more it becomes our duty to be careful to 
control ourselves and to use his gifts temperately. ... . This means to be on our 
guard when large quantities are at hand so that we are not tempted to 
extravagance ... 1€46 
Calvin summarizes the Christian's obligations in these terms: 
Therefore while the liberty of the Christian in external matters is not to be tied 
down to a strict rule, it is, however, subject to this Jaw-he must indulge as little as 
possible; on the other hand, it must be his constant aims not only to curb luxury, 
but to cut off all show of superfluous abundance, and carefully beware of 
converting a help into an hinderance. 247 
4.7.3 Westminster Confession of Faith 
In 1643 a gathering of Divines was called at Westminster to declare the confession of 
the emerging protestant denominations in the United Kingdom. These Divines 
considered the obligation to provide for others in need (amongst believers) important 
enough to state in a Chapter titled Of Communion of Saints.243 The relevant section is 
followed two paragraphs later with an affirmation of the maintenance of individual 
proprietary rights. In so doing it puts the obligation to care for others first but states that 
that obligation does not override the legal rights to resources commonly called 
"ownership".249 The Westminster Concession of Faith then affirms legal rights but puts 
these in the context of Christian moral obligations. 
4.7.4 John Wesley 
John Wesley was an Anglican Clergyman and fellow of Lincoln's College, Oxford. He 
was highly skilled in classical Greek and koinia Greek and translated a number of wor1<:s 
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from those languages into English. He was also a fervent believer in the power of Jesus 
Christ to transform not only individual lives but social institutions. His sermon number 
44 of the Standard Sermons of Method ism is titled "On the use of money'. lt was read 
and applied as core teaching in the Methodist movement. The sermon is summarised 
succinctly as "earn all you can, save all you can and give all you can". Wesley preached: 
"If you desire to be a faithful and a wise steward, out of that portion of your Lord's 
goods which he has for the present lodged in your hands, ... First, provide things 
needful for yourself; food to eat, raiment to put on, whatever nature moderately 
requires for preserving the body in health and strength. Secondly, provide these 
for your wife, your children, your servants, or any others who pertain to your 
household. If when this is done there be an overplus left, then "do good to them 
that are of the household of faith." If there be an overplus still, "as you have 
opportunity, do good unto all men." In so doing, you give all you can; nay, in a 
sound sense, all you have ... 
If, then, a doubt should at any time arise in your mind concerning what you are 
going to expend, either on yourself or any part of your family, you have an easy 
way to remove it. Calmly and seriously inquire, "(1.) In expending this, am I acting 
according to my character? Am I acting herein, not as a proprietor, but as a 
steward of my Lord's goods? (2.) Am I doing this in obedience to his Word? In 
what Scripture does he require me so to do? (3.) Can I offer up this action, this 
expense, as a sacrifice to God through Jesus Christ? (4.) Have I reason to 
believ_e that for this very work I shall have a reward at the resurrection of the 
just?" You will seldom need anything more to remove any doubt which arises on 
this head; but by this four-fold consideration you will receive dear light as to the 
way wherein you should go. 
5. If any doubt still remain, you may farther examine yourself by prayer according 
to those heads of inquiry. Try whether you can say to the Searcher of hearts, your 
conscience not condemning you, "Lord, thou se est I am going to expend this sum 
on that food, apparel, furniture. And thou knowest, I act herein with a single eye 
as a steward of thy goods, expending this portion of them thus in pursuance of 
the design thou hadst in entrusting me with them. Thou knowest I do this in 
obedience to the Lord, as thou commandest, and because thou commandest it. 
Let this, I beseech thee, be an holy sacrifice, acceptable through Jesus Christ! 
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And give me a witness in myself that for this labour of love I shall have a 
recompense when thou reward est every man according to his works." Now if your 
conscience bear you witness In the Holy Ghost that this prayer is well-pleasing 
to God, then have you no reason to doubt but that expense is right and good, and 
such as will never make you ashamed. 
Wesley would not develop the idea of stewardship to the level of setting out certain 
stages of priority beyond that set out here. There is a level beyond which apportionment 
is a question of judgement and rules cannot resolve the personal moral dilemma. From 
that point moral choice is a matter for the conscience of the steward in light of the 
principles as to how it is apportioned. Wesley's lifestyle provides an interesting 
illustration of the principle. Kirt>y points out that "When at Oxford his yearly income was 
30 pound, two pound of which he gave away. As the years passed his income rose even 
as high as 120 pound a year, but he contrived to live on 28 pound and to give the rest 
away".250 
4.7.5 Summary of Writings of the Protestant Reformation 
Each of the authors considered in this section considered resources to be but another 
context in which moral obligations between people in community are worked out. Luther 
took this idea up in a very practical way stating that cities (and their surrounds) are 
responsible for their poor, and not others. Calvin focussed on being neither unduly 
austere nor excessive but maintaining an attitude of complete submission to Christ. The 
Westminster Confession affirms the moral duty but is quick to point out that it is subject 
to legal rights. Wesley is adamant that one must first provide for immediate dependants 
and after that other members of one's household. If there is still resource to spare it is, 
in Wesley's view, a matter for the individual's conscience how the resources are 
allocated. 
4.8 Concluding comments 
The Reformation was followed by the Enlightenment. The religious moral base that 
justified stewardship in refonnation thinking was displaced by a preoccupation. with 
rational individualism. Moral philosophy became concerned with proving "rights" to "own" 
things not duties to share and care. The arrangements set out in chapter two were born. 
Kirby, 1973, 76 
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They grew and were developed over the years to the mature stature and dominant 
presence they hold in accidental moral philosophy today. They did not sweep all before 
them, though. For whilst the limelight of philosophical discussion may have fallen upon 
individuals and the extent of their propriety rights, conflicts arising out of competing 
claims to resources continued to require resolution between individuals, communities 
and governments. These disputes were not all resolved by moral principle. Some 
required judicial determination and in some cases parliament had to pass laws 
determining rights. 
In the context of legal resolution of conflicting claims to a resource, the philosophy of the 
individual, absolute-rights thinkers, held almost no sway except for a period in America 
up until the 1930s.251 As a general rule, though, that philosophy didn't significantly 
penetrate legal theory in the tradition from which Australian law today draws. 
As a consequence, in the next chapter laws and equitable principles applicable to 
Australian society today are canvassed for further insight into the Stewardship Paradigm. 
251 Sackville and Neave quoting W. Frledmann, Legal Theory(!/' ed.) 1967, 405-407 make the point 
that: 
In most countries statutes and courts have supplemented each other in bringing about 
this gradual adjustment in the rights of property. In the United States, however, the 
earlier conception of property as an absolute right not conditioned by social duty has 
persisted longer than anywhere else. This is due largely to the support given by the 
Supreme Court, as interpreter of the Constitution, to a rigidly individualistic interpretation. 
Grants of tiUe to land, and eventually all property rights, were elevated into inalienable 
natural rights, and the power of taxation and other legislative interference strictly limited. 
The learned authors go on to observe that even in that jurisdiction the notion couldn't survive. 
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CHAPTER 5: STEWARDSHIP IN LAW 
5.1 Comments on laws generally 
In Chapter 3 the dominant paradigm was suggested as being inadequate for a number 
of reasons. lt was said to ignore ooligations. 1t was said to be inadequate when 
participants in the discourse rejected tts assumptions and thus had increasing difficulty 
addressing cultural diversity. Jt was said to be out of step with both the content and 
process of law. lt was said to be unable to satisfactorily deal with the complexity of 
diverse experience. lt was said to lack a language sophisticated enough to address 
comple?' relational problems arising in the actual resource allocation and utilisation 
discourse. These are, of course, all problems with which the legal system has had to 
deal for centuries. 
This chapter suggests that the way in which the legal system has addressed these 
problems has insights to offer philosophic enquiry regarding resource allocation and 
utilisation, and points the way to the explanation of those insights for this work in 
Chapter 6. 
In the last chapter the linguistic, philosophic and historical foundations of stewardship 
were explored. lt is apparent that those foundations are present in the laws of Australia 
at the end of the twentieth century. The way the law has taken up these matters further 
elucidates the paradigm under discussion. 
This chapter then, after introducing the methodology of taw in the context of a discussion 
about competing claims to (bits of} a car, overviews the extent to which stewardship is 
inh�rent in the content laws regulating interests in resources in Australia at the end of 
the 20th Century.252 In so doing, it suggests that wittingly or unwittingly the moral clay 
of stewardship has been taken and shaped over and over again in different ways by 
252 For a general discussion on the intersection of law and morality, and more specifically the extent 
of the influence of Christianity on the legal system in Australia, seeK. Mason, Constancy and 
Change, the Federation Press Pty Ltd., Sydney, 1990, chapters 2 and 1 respectively. 
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lawmakers to fashion legal vessels suitable for bearing rights and obligations regarding 
use of, and access to, resources. lt follows from this that the law may have a substantial 
contribution to make in defining and articulating the concept into a paradigm useful for 
moral enquiry. 
5.1.1 The prohibitive nature of law. 
The law has a Jong history (at least since the Ten Commandments) of being prohibitive, 
not prescriptive, imposing injunctions which are negative in nature rather than positive. 
The reason for this is that it has always been considered a fundamental tenet of civil 
society that people are free to do whatever they please provided they do so within certain 
legal limits. 1t is not the function of the Jaw to tell people what they should do. lt is the 
function of the law to tell people what they must not do. Ethical and religious conduct 
(which is not compulsory) is the domain of the "should". 
lt follows, though, that jf a community considers certain conduct inappropriate enough 
to prohibit it legally, that the community a fortiori considers such conduct should not 
(morally) be done. We therefore see in our laws not just what must not be done, but also 
what should not be done. The law then has a contribution to make in mapping moral 
conceptions. 
5.1.2 Laws regulate people not resources 
No law regulates resources. All laws regulate people.253 Accordingly, it is to the e�hical 
obligations imposed upon people, not resources, to which we must look in endeavouring 
to identify the situations where a person's proprietary right is displaced because an 
ethical obligation is owed to another. In this regard law stands against the dominant 
philosophic paradigms discussed In Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, the law does not 
simply regulate people, but rather people in the context of particular relationships, and 
usuaiJy with respect to particular proprietary rights. 
5.1.3 Selective approach 
This treatise does not seek to deal in depth with any area of law. Every endeavour is 
Morice v Bishop of Durham, ( 1804) 9 Ves.399 at 404,32 E.R. 656 at 658 in H. A. J. Ford. and W. 
A. Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, law Book Company Ltd., Sydney, 1983, 171. 
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made not to become preoccupied with tho wood without perceiving the commonality of 
the species of the trees in the forest.254 
This thesis is supported not by the detail but by the breadth of the areas of law 
addressed. This paradigm - stewardship - is argued not to be inherent merely in some 
small part of some obscure legal concept. lt is endeavoured to show that it runs through 
most major areas of law and equity regulating entitlement to resources, with 
permutations suitable to the particular subject area. The chapter will review the following 
areas: 
Succession Laws, particularly the laws regulating the rights of the deceased to 
decide who will benefit, and when these rights will be set aside with particular 
attention to the rule against perpetuities; the obligations imposed through Family 
Maintenance Provisions; and of course the rules applicable on intestacy; 
Criminal. Contract and Tort-Laws. both as to the historical development of these 
heads of law so far as this informs tt�e discussion, and also with a brief review of 
key statutes and judgements defining the law today; 
The Nature and Context of the Resources is also considered in the way the law 
has dealt with what is really Plato's original problem with the weapons; and finally, 
Eguity which informs significantly the communities understanding of just 
interpersonal relations regarding resource related obligations on a more general 
basis. 
lt will be seen throughout the legal and equitable principles discussed that the courts look 
to the relationship existjng between the parties. Then the proximity of a claimant to the 
person (in this work described as a steward) is considered. In this context need, 
dependency and vulnerability are key concepts along with familial relationships (in which 
such dependencies are typical). lt is suggested that the law intervenes to convert what 
254 lt follows also that the statements of law whilst correct are incomplete and may not be relied upon 
as legal advice. 
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seems to be an obvious moral obligation to have regard to the needs, dependencies and 
vulnerabilities of the claimant into legal obligations at certain points and, in so doing, 
assists in defining when a person may be considered to owe another an ethical 
obligation when dealing with a resource. In this work the word used to label that moral 
obligation is stewardship. 
5.1.4 The sources of law 
Australian law has traditionally drawn almost exclusively from its British heritage. A 
review of the development of the concept of law as an applied ethical concept requires 
therefore a review of the laws that have developed through our British history. Such an 
exercise is, however, fascinating. 
We see the beginnings of the imposition of social mores on individual behaviour through 
legal sanction before the invasion of England by William the Conqueror.255 Under the 
Great King Cnut (1016-1035), who was King of England, Norway and Denmark, a kind 
of grand jury was dev�loped. Through the jury- judgement of conduct by one's peers -
our law has for more than a millennium prohibited individual conduct which falls short of 
community standards. This process of jury involvement (in civil matters if there is not an 
actual jury the judge acts as jury) is central to the presumption that the legal system 
reflects community values.256 The legal system, at its roots, is committed to interpreting 
the voice of the community in its processes in its service of the community. 
Where the courts have either been too slow or, in the opinion of the community have 
made a mistake, legislative enactment has corrected or developed the Jaw to reflect 
community attitudes. 
This century has been marked by a proliferation of legislation. This is a new 
phenomenon. Most of our laws and our legal principles developed through judge made 
law. Legislation played an important role but it was not dominant. 
256 
T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise Historyofthe Common Law, Butterworth & Co., London, 1956, 5111 
ed., 9. We also see, though, that from earliest time there was a responsibility placed upon a 
community to care for, and take responsibility for, the conduct of those within that community. 
Even though the larger number of civil trials are conducted without a jury empanelled, the concept 
continues with a clear distinction between the function of the judge deciding questions of law 
(what the law is) and the function of the jury (whether the conduct in question breaches the law). 
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This presents a unique blend of problems and opportunities in the investigation of the 
subject of this work. 
The gleaning of a unified jurisprudence from a body of case law is never easy. The 
gleaning of the ethical obligations undergirding the jurisprudence is arguably even 
harder. As Plucknett put it (referring to the way case law developed}: 
lt is only natural that it should be more difficult to catch the turn of thought of 
people whose thoughts are only half expressed, than it is to follow the argument 
of a jurist who is deliberately expounding his speculations. In the former case we 
have to search for the thought as well as we can among the daily practical affairs 
of the old lawyers; in the latter we have merely to read attentively a carefully 
written exposition. Yet. as everybody knows, the ideas which most powerfully 
influence conduct in every department of life are not the ideas of a systematic 
philosophy deliberately held, but rather the vague notions and unconscious 
prejudices, habits of mind, and so forth, of which we are for the most part 
unaware.257 
The challenge then is to find that which it was never intended to express. The 
opportunity is present in the vague notions and unconscious prejudices, habits of mind, 
and so forth. This is a long way from precise logical philosophic reasoning. lt does 
however plunge directly into the real stuff of life and find answers which a community can 
by and large Jive with - or appeal. 
5.2 Ownership or estates and interests 
Some comment was made in Chapter 3 about the limitations on the notion of ownership 
and the ambiguity associated with such narrow conceptions. lt was foreshadowed that 
the idea of ownership may not be adequate for discussion of legal relations. The idea 
of property has more meaning, but essentially what is then meant is that the party 
concerned has some form of proprietary right which may be exercised in certain 
contexts. The law is concerned with the nature of that proprietary right and the context 
257 Plucknett, 254. 
90 
in which it arises. Then, and only then, may a priority be given to that right in the context 
of other claims to rights and obligations. Thus, whilst the idea of ownership (particularly 
absolute ownership) may have appeal at an abstract theoretical level, at an applied level, 
in the conflicts of daily life, its limitations are readily apparent. An example which 
highlights why the law focuses on identifying the particular nature ofthe estate or interest 
claimed in a particular resource, and gives·only appropriate weight to the status of title 
holder (owner) is discussed below. 
Take the statement "Tom owns that sports car." "He bought it from Bob's Luxury Cars 
pty. Ltd for $100,000." 
As an abstract statement dislocated from its more complex context the statement 
suggests that Tom has an absolute right to the vehicle. Nothing may be further from the 
truth - at law or morally. 
In this example, Tom is a 46 year-old accountant. He has finalised a property settlement 
with his former wife and was due seven days ago to pay (pursuant to a Consent Order 
of the Family Court of Australia) to his wife $25,000 being the net proceeds of sale of the 
house of which he was the registered proprietor. 
He has been in a de facto marriage relationship with an eighteen-year-old girl, Tammy, 
for three months. Tom and Tammy have a joint bank account. lt was opened for the 
purpose of depositing monies to be used for the home they have agreed to buy together. 
To this account Tom contributed $1,500 and Tammy contributed the $30,000 she 
inherited and a further $3,500 from the wages she earned working as a cleaner. Either 
may operate the account for withdrawal purposes. 
Tom paid for th� car seven days ago using $20,000 of the proceeds of the sale of the 
house, $30,000 from the joint account with Tammy and $50,000 obtained from a 
financier under a hire purchase contract. 
Bob's Luxury Cars Pty Ltd obtained the car from Luxury Car Wholesalers Ltd. under a 
contract that contained clauses which provided that whilst possession may pass to Bob's 
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Luxury Cars pty Ltd .. legal title to the sports car remained with luxury Car Wholesalers 
Ltd. until the full amount owed to Luxury Car Wholesalers ltd was paid. 
None of the purchase price owed to Luxury Car Wholesalers Ltd. has been paid to that 
company by Bob's Luxury Cars Pty Ltd. Three days ago a provisional liquidator was 
appointed to Bob's Luxury Cars Pty Ltd. 
The police have possession of the car. They believe they have sufficient evidence that 
Tom has been trafficking in narcotics and has secreted narcotics in the sports car. They 
have both arrested and charged Tom and impounded the car pending further 
investigation. 
Two days ago Tom damaged one of the tyres of the car and delivered that tyre to Peter 
for puncture repairs. Peter is exercising a lien over the tyre until he is paid. 
The financier has checked its paperwork and there are questions as to whether it has 
complied with the laws regulating sale of such goods under this type of hire purchase 
contract 
The Courts, when resolving such conflicts whether over land or chattels (or any other 
resource), do not need to (and do not) refer to vague conceptions of ownership but 
rather state the various interests in the particular resources in very particular ways­
identifying the interest of each party including the extent of, and priority of, that interest. 
In the fictitious example mentioned above the Court will require a lot more information 
to decide the priority to be given to the respective claims in relation to the respective 
resources. lt may well be that in different jurisdictions slightly different results may 
ensue. In every Australian Jurisdiction, though, the Court will ultimately be able to say 
who is entitled to what and when. lt will not say who has what rights. lt will call in aid a 
multitude of guiding principles and legislative enactments to sort out the mess. 
In such a sophisticated society with such complex and precise notions regulating a 
parties rights and obligations to a resource, the law has developed language of inter­
related rights and obligations anchored in relationships which are expressed in particular 
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contexts. lt has not adopted the language of individual ownership. In such a context this 
idea of an absolute right implicit in "ownership" and even the more general notion of 
"property" is an unhelpful nonsense once the conflicts become complex.258 
There is a right to resources which is property called "proprietary" or even in simple 
cases "ownership" but it is not absolute. Rights to resources may be set aside in many 
cases. There is no apparent judicial support for the proposition that anyone has (or can 
have) any absolute right to any resource which may never be set aside in favour of 
another, be it land or personalty. The courts have always set aside proprietary rights in 
appropriate cases or required payment instead by way of damages as the brief review 
of succession law, contract, tort, discussed in this chapter evidences. Proprietary rights 
have always been weighed by courts in relation to rights of others to that resource and 
the obligations of the holder to various persons with whom he or she is in relationship. 
The inability or unwillingness of liberal, moral philosophy to focus upon resources in the 
context of relationships has left it out of step with the community values expressed in law 
and with little or nothing to say about the moral obligations regarding resources.259 
Law's experience in this area suggests that in the philosophic context it is necessary to 
find a language of inter-related rights and obligations anchored in relationships which are 
expressed in particular contexts to give voice to the complexity of resource claims in 
modem community life. 
258 Some legal academics such as Bruce Welling are scathing of the notion of ownership and not 
much kind er to glib statements about property, see particularly 11-14. The litmus test of this point 
is that there is no cause of action in Australia that requires ownership to be pleaded. The law 
requires the actual estate or interest to be particularised along with the alleged right or obligation 
infringed. 
This point may need explanation for those inculcated with the view that one is to look to the right 
to the resource not the relationship. Take an apple as the simplest case. lt is the relationship and 
context which determines the legal rights of, and obligations upon, the holder of the apple. 
Absolute legal and beneficial title to the apple, even in such a basic resource, will not always 
withstand the claim of another so the title is never absolute. For example, assume the apple is 
held by a parent. The parent's dependent child is without food. The apple is the means by which 
the child may be fed. lt is the parenfs obligation at law (not merely morally) to feed the child with 
the apple if that is all that is available and failure to do so may result in criminal prosecution. The 
assumption that the parent may do as he or she pleases with the resource, because the parent 
has absolute legal and beneficial "ownership". is wrong and will result, in such a context, in a 
possible jail sentence. Appeals to absolute title will not be heard as a grounds for defence on 
sentence if the child dies. The apple should have been given to the child. See paragraph 5.4.1 
for a discussion of the law and paragraph 7 .3. 7 for a m ore detailed discussion of the moral issues 
associated with these matters in the context of a utilitarian dilemma. 
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5.3 Stewardship in Succession Laws 
Death is the great leveller: in resource matters as much as anything -for "you can't take 
it with you". Ethicists and lawyers therefore start with as clean a slate as they are likely 
to find when looking to allocate or reallocate the resources that belonged to a deceased 
person. 
A complex set of rules have been developed overmany centuries to deal with distribution 
of resources following death. As the owner relinquishes any proprietary right to a 
resource on death these rules perhaps more than any other give a detailed insight into 
the principles under investigation, for nowhere is the lacuna of "ownership" so clear and 
the courts and legislature freer to spell out community standards. 
Furthermore, these complex rules developed over millennia, have stood the test of time 
and therefore are more likely to reflect entrenched community values than, say, 
legislation enacted hastily before an election to shore up a sceptical constituency. 
The first rule is that the will of the deceased expressed in writing and properly witnessed 
will be canied out. Thus, at the foundation, the discretion of the steward to decide freely 
how the steward's property will be allocated is preserved. "Proprietary" interests are 
respected. The second principle is that assets cannot be hoarded forever and attempts 
to do so will be struck down by the law. The third principle is that if fundamental duties 
of justice to dependants are not satisfied, the courts will rewrite the will to see that they 
are. 
The sections below deal with each of these in tu m. 
5.3.1 The will of the deceased 
The first point is relatively simple. A steward may do as the steward pleases with 
resources under his or her charge; devising it as he or she wills.260 
260 Subject of course to any legal obligations in contract. to trusts and estates of limitation such as 
life estates for example. 
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5.3.2 The rule against perpetuities 
The second principle against hoarding after death is expressed in a rule known as the 
rule against perpetuities.261 This rule has the effect of limiting the extent to which a 
person may exercise control over resources from the grave. The rule states that a 
person may only control resource usage for a maximum of eighty years or the life of a 
person conceived in the lifetime of the testator plus 21 years. lt is of significance that 
charitable gifts are an exception to this general rule. Charitable gifts are not so limited 
arguably because they are not hoarding. Charitable gifts are gifts to relieve sickness, to 
care for the poor, to educate, for religious purposes and other purposes recognised as 
charitable.262 In making a charitable gift, one is giving back to the community and the 
limitation is unnecessary. 
5.3.3 Testator family maintenance 
The third principle is expressed in legislation. 
In 1900 New Zealand's parliament made a radical development to the succession laws 
and this development was soon followed in the Australian states and later in many other 
common law jurisdictions. The legislation has become known as the Testator Family 
Maintenance provisions.263 This legislation authorises the courts to rewrite the will of the 
deceased if the deceased failed to make adequate provision for dependants. 
The function of a Judge in considering this legislation is as follows: 
261 
262 
263 
If is the duty of the courl, so far as is possible, to place itself in all respects in the 
position of the testator, and to consider whether or not. in regard to all existing 
facts and suffounding circumstances, the testator has been guilty of a manifest 
breach of that moral duty which a just, but not loving, husband or father owes 
towards his wife or towards his children, as the case may be. 264 
See for example Property Law Act(Queensland) Part 14 for the rules regulating gifts in perpetuity 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel {1891] Appeals Cases 531 at 583. 
WA Lee, Manual of Queensland Succession Law, Law Book Company Ltd., Sydney, 1975, 179. 
J. Edwards in Re Allardice, 29 NZLR 959, 1910, 972, Lee 184-185. 
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The cases make it plain that the size of the estate is to be taken into consideration. 
What might be adequate provision from a small estate may be inadequate provision from 
a large estate.265 
5.3.4 The intestacy rules 
If the will of the deceased is for any reason invalid, or if the deceased died intestate, then 
a set of rules have been established which set out the order of claim upon the estate. 
The rules on intestacy deal with the circumstance where the deceased has made no 
(lawful) direction. These rules are arguably a strong indication of the priorities of the 
moral claim persons have upon the resources of another. In the rules the concept of 
stewardship explored in the last and the next chapter is clearly seen. The priorities 
follow an order of remoteness based on familial claims. 
W.A. Lee, in his Manual of Queensland Succession Law, sets out in a diagrammatic 
fonn (on the cover of his book) the concept of remoteness of claim. The claimants in 
closer rings must be satisfied before the estate is available to claimants in more remote 
rings. Whilst the diagram is now slightly legally inaccurate,266 it illustrates well the point 
made in this section. 
265 Lee, 185, relying upon Re Buckland dec'd [1966) V.R. 404. 
266 The Succession Act Amendment Act (1997) No. 54 (Queensland) made simplifying changes. 
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One sees in the diagram that the more remote one is from the testator/testatrix, the 
weaker the claim upon the deceased's resources. 
5.3.5 The origins of the concept 
The ancient origin in Athenian, Jewish, German, Bengali, Roman and Hindu law of the 
concept discussed above affirm profoundly the principles that the first claimants upon 
the estate of a deceased are the family of the deceased, and more broadly those who 
may be described as falling within the household of the deceased.267 
The concept that one owes a duty to provide for those related is thus a very ancient 
concept and present in an extremely diverse range of ethnic origins. Commenting 
expressly on the Roman traditions which have significantly influenced our jurisprudence 
Maine continues: 
267 
The canons of primitive Roman jurisprudence regulating the inheritance of 
H.S. Maine, Ancient laws, 1861, last accessed 28th December 1998 at 
http://www. http :/Is ocserv2. socsci. m cm aster .ca/-econfugcm/3113/m aine/ancl aw/index. htm I 
discusses the approach of each of these communities in ancient times. See the page or so 
commencing: "The evidence, however, such as it is, seems to point to the conclusion that 
Testaments are at first only allowed to take effect on failure of the persons entitled to have the 
inheritance by right of blood genuine or fictitious ... • 
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relations from each other were, so long as they remain unmodified by the Edictai 
Law of the Praetor, to the following effect: - First, the sui or direct descendants 
who had never been emancipated succeeded. On the failure of the sui, the 
Nearest Agnate came into their place, that is, the nearest person or class of the 
kindred who was or might have been under the same Patria Potestas with the 
deceased. The third and last degree came next, in which the inheritance 
devolved on the gentiles, that is on the collective members of the dead man's 
gens or House. The House, I have explained already, was a fictitious extension 
of the family, consisting of all Roman Patrician citizens who bore the same name, 
and who, on the ground of bearing the same name, were supposed to be 
descended from a common ancestor. 268 
This concept of the household developed in the last chapter is therefore present at the 
fountain head of succession laws. Maine spells out what was meant in some detail by 
the expression household . 
. . the Testator's material property or substance is understood to pass as an 
adjunct or appendage of his household.... There does not therefore appear to be 
any mode of escaping from the conclusion, that, even at an era so comparatively 
recent as that of the Decemviral compromise, terms denoting "household" and 
"property" were blended in the current phraseology. If a man's household had 
been spoken of as his property we might have explained the expression as 
pointing to the extent of the Patria Potestas, but, as the interchange is reciprocal, 
we must allow that the form of speech caries us back to that primeval period in 
which property is owned by the family, and the family is governed by the citizen, 
so that the members of the community do not own their property and their family, 
but rather own their property through their family. 269 
At the outset then, we may state that the law which regulates devolution of property from 
generation to generation has explicit recognition, that a person may dispose of resources 
subject to the following constraints: 
268 
269 
(a) Resources may not be hoarded indefinitely but must be distributed; 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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(b) No time limits are upon gifts of charity (to the community); 
(c) That dependants must be provided for; 
(d) If a person fails to make a distribution, the community through its laws will 
do so, providing for a distribution linked to proximity to the deceased; 
(e) The rules or Intestacy arguably reflect the community's views of proximity 
and set out an order for prioritizing claim upon a person's estate based on 
remoteness; and 
(f) All in the community are not entitled to equal interest upon devolution of 
an estate. Claims based on proximity and dependance detennine rights 
with the notion of the household historically playing a significant role. 
5.4 Exploring the development of the concept of stewardship in 
criminal law, torts and contract 
5.4.1 Criminal law 
lt was mentioned earlier in this chapter that the law is fundamentally proscriptive -
setting out what must not be done not what should be done. An exception arises, 
though, when persons fall into the category of steward of resources for another, upon 
which those others are ·entirely dependent. In such a case failure to care for the 
dependent others is a criminal offence both at common law and under the Queensland 
Criminal Code. The positive duty is expressed in a number of sections in Chapter 27 of 
the Queensland Criminal Code. 
Duty to provide necessaries 
285. lt Is the duty of every person having charge of another who is unable by 
reason of age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, detention, or any other cause, to 
withdraw himself or herself from such charge, and who is unable to provide 
himself or herself with the necessaries of life, whether the charge is undertaken 
under a contract, or is imposed by law, or arises by reason of any act, whether 
lawful or unlawful, of the person who has such charge, to provide for that other 
person the necessaries of life; and the person is held to have caused any 
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consequences which result to the life or health of the other person by reason of 
any omission to perform that duty. 
Duty of person who has care of a child 
286.(1) If is the duty of every person who has care of a child under 
16 years to-
(a) provide the necessaries of life for the child; and 
(b) take the precautions that are reasonable in all the circumstances 
to avoid danger to the child's life, health or safety; and 
(c) take the action that is reasonable in all the circumstances 
to remove the child from any such danger; and he or she is held to 
have caused any consequences that result to the life and health of the child 
because of any omission to perform that duty, whether the child is helpless or not. 
(2) In this section-
11person who has care of a child" includes a parent, foster parent, step 
parent, guardian or other adult in charge of the child, whether or not the 
person has lawful custody of the child. 
The chapter continues to impose similar duties visited by criminal sanction on persons 
who fait to provide for those apprentices or servants under sixteen years of age for whom 
they have contracted to provide necessities270 and to make liable to criminal prosecution 
those who are doing dangerous things271 or who work with things dangerous in 
themselves272 but fall to exercise reasonable care or precaution for the persons likely to 
270 Criminal Code (Queensland) Section 287. 
271 Ibid., Section 288. 
zn Ibid., Section 289. 
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be injured or killed by their failure to do so.273 
lt seems that once a person has a particular type of stewardship obligation, arising out 
of dependence and vulnerability if injury or death follows from breach, so follows criminal 
liability. Vulnerability and dependence upon the steward lie at the heart of the legal 
obligation. Thus the principles discussed in the last chapter appear to continue to shape 
social organization through the standards expected. 
5.4.2 History of crime and torts 
To the modem lawyer the idea that criminal law, contract law and the law of torts are 
drawn from the same moral concept (at least with respect to resource matters) may 
seem extraordinary. Historically, however, this seems to be the case. That the modem 
law of negligence grew out of the inability of contract to adequately address the claims 
for loss of third parties is well known. That contract grew out of the general action on the 
case is less well known.274 And it is even less known that in their infancy the laws of civil 
wrongs known as tort and the criminal law were indistinguishable to such an extent that 
it is impossible to know with certainty which preceded the other. 
The refined distinctions of each area of law are essential for certainty and justice in a 
modem society, but a brief review of the historical context of the development of these 
separate heads of laws, arguably lays bare the way in which stewardship has operated 
to ensure the development of each of the heads in working out justice for the community, 
and gives insight into the way the notion has been applied. For the development of each 
of these heads of legal obligation is founded in the assumption by one, of 
responsibilities to another. A general principle seems to be that once a person became 
a steward of a resource and by so doing took on responsibility for the discharge of 
273 
274 
lt is not the nature of the object alone to which the court looks in deciding whether the section has 
been breached but the context in which it is being used. Thus a sharpened lead pencil mis-used 
(R v Dabelstein [1966] Qd.R. 411) or a jagged piece of iron when thrown from a moving train 
(Hoffman v Nielsen [1924] St R Qld 364) can amount to a dangerous thing for the purposes of the 
law. 
This should not be surprising, though, as an action on the case meant that the case itself, its 
particular facts fell within the purview of a legal remedy even though the action could not be 
classified into a recognized category of law. For a definition of this see J.Burke, Osborn's 
Concise Law Dictionary 6111 Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1976. For discussion of the 
current laws see the next section. 
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certain duties with respect to that resource, if the steward failed to discharge that duty, 
the steward coerced may be compelled by law to do so. 
Assumption of moral obligation lies at the root of the development of each stage 
discussed below. That obligation is the moral obligation to be a steward (to the extent 
expected} of the resource. 
5.4.3 Action on the case 
The law of torts developed into a major head known as negligence and a lesser head 
known as the action on the case. 
Gravel in a river bed may not be the first resource which comes to the philosopher's mind 
as being the subject of a duty as steward. lt may not seem that failure by a local council 
to obtain a permit to take 12,000 yards of gravel for road construction out of the bed of 
the Albert River in the vicinity of the late Mr Smith's farm would be actionable. But in 
acting unlawfully in taking the gravel the council had ruined the river's natural water 
course making it impossible for the late Mr Smith and then his successors to pump water 
as they had former1y. The High Court turned to the ancient concept of action on the case 
to provide a remedy to Mr and Mrs Smith in the now landmark case Beaudesert Shire 
Council v Smith. lt is authority for the following principle: 
There is, therefore, a solid body of authority which protects one person's lawful 
activities from the deliberate, unlawful and positive acts of another. lt is not, 
however, possible to adopt a pr inc iple wide enough to afford protection in all 
circumstances of loss to one person flowing from the breach of the law by 
another, for regard must be had to the limitations which the law has placed upon 
the right of a person injured by reason of another's breach of a statutory duty to 
recover damages for his injury. Bearing this in mind, it appears that the 
authorities cited do justify a proposition that, independently of trespass, 
negligence or nuisance but by an action upon the case, a person who suffers 
harm or loss as the inevitable consequence of the unlawful, intentional and 
positive acts of another is entitled to recover damages from that other. If may be 
that a wider proposition could be justified, but the proposition we have stated 
covers this case and leads us to the conclusion that the [defendant] is liable to the 
[plaintiffs] for the loss occasioned by its unlawful trespass in removing gravel from 
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the river-bed.275 
Once the community has acted to express its values in the way a resource is to be 
managed it is expected that all in the community, including its governments, comply. 
The requirements that the conduct be unlawful and inevitable and that the conduct 
require positive acts are a further illustration of the willingness of the court to say that a 
person has assumed a responsibility as steward and will, as a consequence, be liable 
for damage in such situations where it is clear that the moral standard of the community 
has been set out by lawful enactment and the conduct of the person concerned has 
clearly assumed a willingness to violate that moral standard. 
5.4.4 Negligence 
The principal division of the law of torts is negligence. In the leading judgment in what 
is probably the most famous case to emerge from the British legal tradition and the 
foundation of our own laws of negligence, the author commences with a discussion of 
relationships and in particular the duty owed to one's neighbour. He makes reference 
to a passage from Luke's gospel.276 
The case is the famous snail in a bottle case of Donaghue (McAiister) v Stephenson. 
In that case Lord Atkin held: 
275 
276 
At present, I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, 
and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which 
the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for 
negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species 
of culpa is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrong doing 
for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code 
would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every 
person injured by them to demand relief. In this way, rules of law arise which limit 
the range of complaints and the extent of their remedies. The rule that you are 
to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and 
the lawyers question, Who Is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You 
Australian Torts Reporter para. 38-720, Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith, ( 1 966), 120 CLR 145 
at 155-156. 
Luke 10:25-37. 
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must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to Injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my 
neighbour? The answer ��ems to be·- persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought re�$onably to have them in contemplation as being 
. 
. 
. 
so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are ca/Jed 
in question. This appears to me to be the doctrine of Heaven v Pender .as laid 
down by Lord Esher (then Breff, M.R.) when it is limited by the notion of proximity 
introduced by Lord Esher himself and AL. Smith L. J. in Le Lievre v Gould ({1893) 
1 Q.B. 491, 597, 504/77• 
From this case, and par ticularly from these words, has developed the modem Australian 
laws of negligence. His lordship commences with the proposition that an ethical duty 
is owed. The duty is owed to a definable class of persons. The duty converts into a 
legal obligation in certain situations- reasonable foreseeability of injury to neighbour; and 
that when breach of that duty by a person causes damage to another within the specified 
class there is to a right to damages at law. The moral obligation to love one's neighbour 
is too broad to invite legal censure if breached but it does evidence roots in moral 
obligation. That moral obligation seems to be that a person assumes a responsibility for 
another if foreseeable injury results from the way one conducts oneself. If this is so, 
arguably the acceptance of the responsibility is the taking up of a stewardship obligation 
to care for one's neighbour and the neighbour is the person within a particular household 
-those foreseeable as suffering. 
5.4.5 Contract 
C.L. Pannam and P.J. Hacker in their work Cases and Materials on Contract write: 
2T7 
lt is usually, perhaps universally, said that a contract is a legally enforceable 
agreement and that it is formed by the process of "Offer and Acceptance',. lt is 
a/so said that the agreement must be supported by "Consideration" for it is the 
presence of consideration that makes the agreement enforceable. A further 
requirement is that "the parties must have intended to enter into legal relations" 
ie: they must have intended that their agreement should be one, for breach of 
which, remedies could be sought in the courts. In other words it must have been 
intended to be more than a mere social arrangement or one intended to be 
[1932] A.C.562 at 580. 
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binding in honour only. 278 
Critical to the arrangements is the freedom of the parties to decide the nature of their 
agreement but, once agreed and responsibilities accepted, they must be performed. 
Contract law has been dominated since its inception by a notion of privity. That is, only 
the parties to a contract may benefit by, and be liable for breach of, that contract. 
This stricture which has sound ethical justification can result in severe injustice to third 
parties. Sometimes courts have found ways around this, using other legal principles 
such as tort, trust, estoppel, waiver or unconscionable conduct. Sometimes legislation 
has provided relief. 
The difficulty with this notion of freedom to contract as one wishes, is that it allowed for 
substantive abuse. lt was possible for a party in a significant position of power to take 
advantage of the vulnerability of others. As a consequence, this century has seen 
substantial intervention in the general principle of contract law. 
Peter Gillies makes the observation: 
In the last hundred odd years, the courts and legislatures have become more 
interventionist in protecting the rights of contracting parties and thereby 
encroaching upon the notion of freedom of contract. This legislative intervention 
has become particularly marked in the last 20 or 30 years, so much so in fact that 
it has become fashionable to talk of the common law of contract as being 
obsolete I although such language has more than a touch of hyperbole. 279 
1t is not within the ambit of this work to digress into the various limitations placed upon 
the general principles of the contract and the number of statutes which limit and regulate 
2711 
279 
C.L. Pannam and P.J. Hocker, Cases and Materials on Contract, lawBookCompanyltd. Sydney 
Melbourne Brisbane Perth, 41h ed., 1979. · 
P. Gillies, Business law in Australia, The Federation Press, Leichardt, N.S. W, 1995, 11' ed., 
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contracts.280 The central and the most critical proposition need only be broadly asserted 
at this point. lt is that those regulations are designed to protect persons who are 
vulnerable or in need but that as a general rule people must perform in accordance with 
their promises.281 
From this may be gleaned the general principle that whilst it is important for parties 
generally to be free to do as they please, once a person is in a position of vulnerability 
and dependency the community, through its courts and regulators, will enforce laws to 
protect persons who are vulnerable or in need. 
5.4.6 Duty to third parties in contract, torts, statutes and bailment 
The duty to consider third parties beyond contract Jaw is now considered. 
In the last section, the concept of privity of contract was introduced but it was noted this 
can result in injustice to third parties. Queensland and Western Australia are the (only) 
two States of Australia to impose statutory obligations on a "person" to perform for the 
benefit of a third party where it was clearty intended that the third party's interest fall 
within the ambit of the first party's obligations.282 
More recently, though, Courts as high as the United Kingdom's Privy Council have 
sought to step around the notion of privity of contract. The 1994 decision of the Privy 
280 
281 
242 
The following are examples of the legislation intended to protect vulnerable persons in Australian 
jurisdictions: 
Commonwealth: Trades Practices Act 197 4 particularly part V; Insurance Contracts Act 1984; and 
the Privacy Act 1988; 
New South Wales: Contracts Review Act 1980; Credit Act 1984; Fair Trading Act 1987; Restraint 
of Trade Act 1976; and the Sale of Goods Act 1923; 
Queensland: Credit Act 1987; Fair Trading Act 1989; Sale of Goods Act 1891, and Hire Purchase 
Act 1959; 
South Australia: Consumer Credit Act 1972; Fair Trading Act 1987; and the Safe of Goods Act 
1895; 
Tasmania: Credit Act 1984; and the Fair Trading Act 1990; 
Victoria: Credit Act 1984; and the Fair Trading Act 1985; 
Western Australia: Credit Act 1984; Fair Trading Act 1987; and the Sale of Goods Act 1895, 
Australian Capital Territory: Fair Trading Act 1992; 
Northern Territory: Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990; the Sale of Goods Act 1972. 
The consistency with the ideas expressed by Aquinas over seven hundred years ago is 
noteworthy. See para. 4.6.1. 
Property Law Act s.55. (Queensland). 
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Council in HK Enterprise v Pioneer Container283 is an example of the extent to which 
courts will go in an attempt to strike a balance between the person in control of goods 
and the person to whom a duty is owed. 
Jn that case, cargo owners bailed goods to a carrier who sub-bailed the goods to a sub­
bailee whose boat sank. What duty had the sub-bailee to the owners as there was no 
contract between them? As a principle of stewardship the sub-bailee owed a duty to the 
owner to the same extent as the duty owed to the bailee from whom he took the goods. 
This was the conclusion to which the Privy Council came. lt did so, however, by 
developing a concept of sub-bailment on terms. The justification given by the Privy 
Council for this development was the principle of "Business Convenience". 
Simon Fisher, in his insightful article on this case284 comments in footnote 24 "An 
alternative explanation might be that the rationale of sub-bailment lies solely in the sub­
bailee's voluntary assumption of possession of the goods, and not in business 
convenience". lt is respectfully submitted that Fisher's insights are more likely to provide 
an enduring base for the development of the law in this area. His observations suggest 
the extent to which the concept that one assumes a duty by taking up possession is 
resident in the mind of lawyers (perhaps in everyone) and seeks to find expression even 
in the critique of judgments of highest courts. 
The general concept of stewardship inherent in Fisher's comments offers a simpler 
analysis and explanation of a sub-bailee's duties to a third party than does the 
refinement of the principles of contract offered by their Lordships of the Privy Council. 
5.5 The nature of the resource 
This thesis has focussed so far largely on the relationship between the steward and the 
person to whom the stewardship obligation is owed. lt will be recalled that when Plato 
began this inquiry he chose a specific type of property, "weapons", to make his point. 
283 1994 2 All E.R. 250. 
Carrier of Goods and Sub-bailment on Terms- The Pioneer Container, Qld Law Society Journal, 
1995, vol. 25, no.1, 33 at 36. 
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Would the situation have been different if the resource in question had not been a 
weapon but something else? 
The principles governing things dangerous in themselves, and things which are not 
dangerous in themselves but can be dangerous in certain contexts, is now regulated by 
the same principles in Australia. The principles are discussed in the High Court of 
Australia case of 8urnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty. Limited.285 In that case 
contractors to the Bumie Port Authority undertook welding in premises controlled by the 
Port Authority near substances which were flammable and stored in cardboard cartons. 
A fire resulted and serious damages were sustained by General Jones Pty Ltd. The law 
prior to this judgement was set out in a case called Rylands v Fletcher. The majority 
judgement in the Bumie Port Authority Case summarised that case in these terms before 
stating it was no longer good law in Australia. 
In Fletcher v Rylands ((59) (1866) LR 1 Ex at 279-280.), a strong Court of 
Exchequer Chamber ((60) Willes, 81ackburn, Keating, Melior, Montague Smith 
and Lush JJ), in a judgment delivered by 8/ackbum J, identified what was 
described as "the true rule of law": 
The person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps 
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, 
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by shewing that the 
escape was owing to the plaintiffs default; or perhaps that the escape was the 
consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists 
here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. 
The rule is important for it shows that the nature of the resource is, at least in some 
situations, critical and has been for a long time. 
The five High Court judges who made up the majority in a joint judgement stated 
however that the general principles of negligence (as discussed in the judgement of 
Donaghue v Stephenson) apply in slightly modified form to the situation where the 
285 (1994) 179 CLR520 (1994)Aust Torls ReporlsB1-264. (1994) 120ALR42, (1994) 68 ALJR 331. 
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resource is dangerous. lt is not necessary to satisfy the specific elements of the test just 
quoted in Rylands v. Fletcher. The majority stated the general rule in these terms: 
a person who takes advantage of his or her control of premises to introduce a 
dangerous substance, to carry on a dangerous activity, or to allow another to do 
one of those things, owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury or damage to the person or property of another. In a 
case where the person or property of the other person is lawfully in a place 
outside the premises that duty of care both varies in degree according to the 
magnitude of the risk involved and extends to ensuring that such care is taken. 
The Court then applied the rules just stated to the particular circumstances and found: 
The critical question for the purposes of applying the principles of ordinary 
negligence to the circumstances of the present case is whether the Authority took 
advantage of its occupation and control of the premises to allow its independent 
contractor to introduce or retain a dangerous substance or to engage in a 
dangerous activity on the premises. The starting point for answering that 
question must be a consideration of what relevantly constitutes a dangerous 
substance or activity. 286 
The Court then turned to identify the issues relevant to determining when the resource 
is dangerous and again considered that all of the circumstances would be critical relying 
on the principles laid down in Donaghue v Stephenson. 
45. In the context of the ordinary Jaw of negligence, the character of "dangerous" 
is not confined to those classes of things, such as poison, a loaded gun or 
explosives, which are "inherently dangerous" or "dangerous in themselves". This 
point was made by Lord At kin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC at 595-596 ..... 
The fact that a particular substance or a particular activity can be seen to be 
Aust Torts Reports, 264. 
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"inherently" or "of itself' likely to do serious injury or cause serious damage will, 
of course, ordinarily make characterisation as "dangerous" more readily apparent. 
That fact does not, however, provide a criterion of what is and what is not 
dangerous for the purpose of determining whether the duty of a person in 
occupation or control of premises to take care to avoid injury or damage outside 
the premises is or is not a delegable one. If suffices for that purpose that the 
combined effect of the magnitude of the foreseeable risk of an accident 
happening, and the magnitude of the foreseeable potential injury or damage if an 
accident does occur, is such that an ordinary person acting reasonably would 
consider it necessary to exercise special care or to take special precautions in 
relation to it. 287 
The Court held that the resources of welding and flammable substances together were 
sufficient to create circumstances imposing on the Port Authority such a duty as to be 
non delegatable and, accordingly, the Port Authority was held liable for the fire damage 
suffered by General Jones Pty. Ltd. even though the damage was caused by the 
negligence of :a contractor retained by the Port Authority. 
Interestingly, central to the court's decision were the issues of vulnerability and control 
holding: 
Viewed from the perspective of the person to whom the duty is owed, the 
relationship of proximity giving rise to the non-delegable duty of care in such 
cases is marked by special dependence or vulnerability on the part of that 
person.288 
1t follows that the laws of Australia require a person in control of a resource to give 
special consideration to the way in which that resource is utilised, having regard to the 
nature of the resource itself and those likely to be affected by the purpose to which the 
resource is put. The more dangerous the resource may be in the particular context the 
stricter must be the supervision of the utilisation of the resource. In some situations the 
responsibility for any liability, which may flow from the use of a resource, may not be 
281 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
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delegated from the person in control. Vulnerability and dependence bring a person 
immediately within the ambit of the persons who must be considered not only morally 
but, it would seem, also legally. 
5.6 Stewardship in equity 
5.6.1 Equity in context 
Equity developed as a branch of the legal system to remedy the injustice that sometimes 
followed the strict imposition of the common law. Initially its ambit was as wide as the 
Courts of Chancery thought appropriate to do justice as that court saw it. Cognisance 
was taken of the precedents available but, by and large, Chancery thought it knew what 
justice was and gave that justice to the litigants on the facts of the particular case. 1t was 
the court of conscience and in the community in which it developed, where the Christian 
religion had provided a strong written and shared cultural base, the conscience was 
considered to be shared by all. As Lord Ellesmere (who is reputed to be the first 
Chancellor to recognise the importance of precedent)289 put it: 
... the cause why there is a Chancery is for that men's actions are so divers and 
infinite that it is impossible to make any genera/law, which may aptly meet every 
particular act and not fail in some circumstances. 290 
Equity then developed to give justice where law might fail to do so. Two concepts it 
developed to assist in this: trust and the fiduciary obligation, take this inquiry further. 
5.6.2 Trusts 
One of the unique ideas birthed by the British legal tradition and regulated by the Courts 
of Chancery was the notion of a trust. 
The concept of a trust is a relatively simple concept but extraordinarily difficult to define 
exhaustively. 
289 Rossiter and Stone, UNSW Law Journal, 1988, vol. 11, 14. 
290 White and Tudor, Leading cases, 2,644 quoted in Rossiter and Stone. 
111 
The definition that is provided by Pettit291 is adequate for these purposes and is relied 
upon by other authors . 292 
Pettit states: 
lt is difficult indeed to improve fundamentally on the definition put forward by 
UnderhiJI.293 This, subject to certain additions printed in italics, is as follows: 
A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee)to deal 
with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) either 
for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries or cestuis que trustf94 
of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the 
obligation, or for a charitable purpose, which may be enforced at the instance of 
the Attorney-general, or for some other purpose permitted by law though 
unenforceable. 
lt is evident from this definition that a trust is a very precise form of obligation which is 
perfectly consistent with the notion of stewardship. lt is a kind of stewardship obligation 
that exists where the precise obligations of the steward in relation to the particular 
resources are well set out; if not in the trust deed then in the case law on the subject and 
in supporting legislation such as The Trusts Act (1973, Queensland). Whilst the law i� 
not prescriptive generally it does require, in this special context of stewardship, that the 
resources in question not be hoarded and wasted. The trust obligation is an obligation 
to wisely manage the trust resources to see they are put to their highest and best use 
having regard to the size of the estate and the wishes of the settlor. Considerable 
discretion is allowed a trustee, as a general rule, in the way an estate is managed295 but 
a trustee "is under a duty in the management of the trust property to take all those 
precautions which an ordinary prudent man would take in managing similar affairs of his 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
Pettit- Equity and the Law of Trusts, Philip H. Pettit. 2"d ed., 16. 
J. D. Heydon, W.M.C. Gummow, R.P. Austin, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts, 463. 
Law of Trusts and Trustees, 111t1 ed., 3, 1899, 15 L.O.R. 294 (W.G. Hart). 
This (which is a part of Underhill's definition) seems the correct plural of cestui que trust, not 
cestui que trusts or cestuis que trustent (1910), 26l.Q.R. 196 (C.Sweet). [This note is inserted 
as it appears in the text]. 
Subject of course to the express terms of the trust. 
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own but for the benefit of other people for whom he feels morally bound to provide" .296 
lt is a breach of trust to waste or hoard or to engage in speculative investments which 
may lose the estate.297 
5.6.3 Fiduciary obligations 
Beyond the specific legally defined relationships for unique property usage, we find a 
broader range of equitable duties which are said to apply wherever a person stands In 
a fiduciary relationship towards another. These notions too are rooted in the 
development of the Courts of Chancery. 
In Australia, the classic legal definition of a fiduciary relationship is found in the judgment 
of Justice Mason in Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation.296 
That High Court of Australia case involved a dispute between parties in a commercial 
relationship (in this case a manufacturer and distributor). The central issue revolved 
around the extent to which the distributor owed fiduciary duties to the manufacturer. 
The leading judgment in which fiduciary duties are defined is that of Justice Mason (as 
he then was). His Honour held: 
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or 
agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the 
exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other 
person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is 
therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the 
power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly 
vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position. 299 
His Honour then considers the argument that the distributor stood in the position of a 
fiduciary in all aspects of its responsibility as a distributor and rejected that analysis 
296 
297 
298 
299 
Ford and Lee, 385. 
lbid, 383-387 and the cases there cited. 
(1984) 156 CLR 41. Though, the quotes of the judgement included here are taken from the copy 
of the judgement found at http://WoNW .austlii.edu .au/ Last accessed 5"' February 1999. 
Underlining added. 
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preferring the more limited understanding of the fiduciary relationship as confined to 
particular resources. 
In this case, the product goodwill was the resource that was subject of the fiduciary duty. 
The precise resource in question is critical. The obligations arise in relation to a 
particular resource. They do not merely arise out of a relationship.300 
His Honour continued: 
80. {The manufacturer], by entrusting [the Distributor] with a responsibility for 
protecting and promoting the market for [the Manufacturer's] products in Australia, 
effectively constituted [the Distributor] the custodian of its product goodwill in this 
country. Its responsibility in procuring orders, making sales and effecting 
deliveries of [the manufacturer]'s products in Australia armed [the distributor] with 
a power and discretion to affect {the manufacturer]'s product goodwill. And in 
exercising this responsibility [the distributor] had a special opportunity of acting 
to the detriment of [the manufacturer] which was, accordingly, vulnerable to the 
abuse by [the distributor] of its position. 
His Honour concluded this point noting that a fiduciary may act in his own interests but 
must consider the ones to whom the duty is owed: 
300 
Although, as we have seen, it was entitled to prefer its own interests to the 
interests of [the manufacturer] in some situations where those interests might 
come into conflict, this entitlement was necessarily subject to the requirement that 
[the distributor] act bona fide and reasonably with due regard to the interests of 
[the manufacturer]. In no circumstance could it act solely in its own interests 
without reference to the interests of [the manufacturer]. This, as it seems to me, 
The noted writer in this area Paul Finn is emphatic on this point. At page 1 In the second 
paragraph of the first chapter of his work Fiduciary Obligations , Law Book Company, Sydney, 
1977, he declares: 
In the following pages it will be suggested that it is meaningless to talk of fiduciary 
relationships as such. Once one looks to the rules and principles which actually have 
been evolved, it quickly becomes apparent that it is pointless to describe a person - or 
for that matter a power - as being fiduciary unless at the same time it is said for the 
purposes of which the particular rules and principles that description is being used. 
These rules are everything. 
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fixed [the distributor] with the character of a fiduciary in relation to those activities 
mentioaed,301 notwithstanding that in pursuing them [the distributor] was also 
acting in its own interests and that it was carrying on the distributorship business 
generally for its own benefit and in no sense as a trustee for [the manufacturer]. 
.. . The rigorous standards appropriate to a trustee will not apply to a fiduciary who is 
permitted by contract to pursue his own interests in some respects. Thus, in the present 
case the so-called rule that the fiduciary cannot allow a conflict to arise between duty 
and interest (Kuys, at 1130) cannot be usefully applied in the absolute terms in which it 
has been stated. 
A fiduciary obligation arises in the context of a relationship. Finn organizes the 
obligations in eight categories but comments in the Preface to his work that these reflect 
his own appreciation stating "Doubtless others may see it differently". 302 lt seems 
arguable that whether a person is subject to a fiduciary duty is determined by 
ascertaining whether, in a particular relationship with respect to a particular resource, 
the person upon whom fiducjary obligations would be imposed stood in a position of 
steward as that term has been discussed. This work has argued that at a moral level 
there is, beneath this equitable principle, a moral principle and at least with respect to 
resource utilisation that principle is stewardship. The concept of stewardship fits well as 
an underlying moral conception for the fiduciary obligation discussed by Justice Mason 
in the Hospital Products case discussed above. Justice demands that a steward have 
cognisance of all legitimate c!aims upon the steward with respect to a resource but 
having regard to those claims a steward is still free to pursue the steward's own 
interests. The critical issue is the nature of the resource and the responsibility taken up 
by the steward in relation to it. 
301 
302 
Emphasis added. 
Finn preface v. Whilst it is not necessary for the purposes of this enquiry to go beyond the 
judgement of Justice Mason, discussed above, the detailed legal principles developed in the 
context of judgements regarding fiduciary obligations may prove useful to those interested in 
developing the idea of stewardship further. The classification of fiduciary duties by Paul Finn (now 
Justice Finn) in his work Fiduciary Obligations is the most accepted in Australia but his work is 
now dated and his divergence from the views of Mason in defining fiduciary obligations should 
be noted, as his work predates the judgement under discussion. 
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5. 7 Other areas of law where stewardship is apparent 
Further areas of law where the principle of stewardship seems to apply303 are: 
(1) Family Law where the needs of the parent responsible for the daily care 
of the children (who are usually the most vulnerable) are taken into 
account to adjust the allocation of the resources of the family between the 
parties notwithstanding the contribution by a party to the acquisition, 
conservation and improvement of those resources.304 
(2) In legislation regulating town planning and environmental matters not only 
as to efficient usage but also to ensure that ultimate end users (who in this 
context are the vulnerable absent stakeholders) have facilities which serve 
their purposes, not merely lots upon which to live.305 
(3) Company law, particularly in areas of insolvency. This last area is 
particularly instructjve on the issue of which claimants should be given 
priority in the contest for available funds when some must miss out. 306 
5.8 Conclusion 
In the last chapter stewardship was identified as one of the heads of Justice with a 
number of characteristics. In this chapter it has been shown that the ideas of 
stewardship appear to be inherent in modem laws and equitable principles, and that this 
303 
304 
305 
In this Chapter I have not reviewed the notions of Intellectual Property and the matters that come 
out of this. I am not at all convinced that the principles set out in this thesis do apply, or if they 
apply the extent to which they apply, to intellectual property and other resources which are 
arguably limitless or almost limitless. Software is perhaps the most modem and interesting case 
in point. 
See Family Law Act (Commonwealth) s.75. 
See for example the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 (Queensland), 
particularty parts 5 and 6. Section 5.6 requires in most cases the dedication of land as parks, and 
in some cases the provision of recreational facilities. In practice this not infrequently means that 
a developer must build playground equipment for children (who are vulnerable and affected 
absent stakeholders). 
See the Corporations Law (as amended) (Commonwealth) particularly part 5.6 division 6. 
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presence may further inform our understanding of the concept of stewardship. The 
philosophic ideas of property and ownership, separated from context and obligations 
discussed in Chapter 2, have had little or no impact on law. The legal system has 
developed specific legal conceptions which are linked to precise interests prioritised in 
the context of the resource having regard to the nature of the resource. 
The legal and equitable obligations considered in this chapter suggest that far from any 
absolute right to resources existing, persons must always consider others in dealing with 
resources. The others to whom a duty is owed will vary according to the circumstances. 
The relationship between the parties is the paramount issue but the nature of the 
resource will shape the duty. Central to the enquiry and continually emerging as guiding 
principles are: 
(a) extreme need which is visited with criminal sanction in appropriate cases; 
(b) dependency and vulnerability 
(i) which provides the justification for interference with contracts, 
(ii) which is worked out in the context of proximity in the cases of negligence; 
(iii) which is worked out in the context of the particular resource in the context 
of the relationship in the case of equity; and 
(iv) which is worked out in the context of the obligation to put resources to their 
highest and best use. 
If law is a reflection of what a community considers inappropriate conduct, and it follows 
that such conduct should not (morally) be done, then from these laws and equitable 
principles it seems possible to set out a series of questions which are drawn from these 
general legal principles which may assist in defining whether or not an ethical obligation 
may arise. 
These ideas are taken up in the attempt to move towards a Stewardship Paradigm in the 
next chapter. 
117 
CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS A STEWARDSHIP 
PARADIGM 
6.1 Introductory comments 
6.1.1 Bringing it all together 
This thesis is concerned with the ethical issues surrounding resource utilisation at the 
coal face of lived reality. As such, its focus is to identify applied ethical concepts and 
then locate these ideas within a framework which may be useful. The time has come to 
elucidate that framework generally and discuss how it may shape the approach taken 
to resource allocation and utilisation decisions and behaviours. The first task, elucidating 
the framework, is the subject of this chapter. How the framework may shape the 
approach taken to resource allocation and utilisation decisions, and behaviours from the 
perspective of different wo.r1d-views, is explored in the next chapter. This chapter then 
is a summary of the ideas explored thus far. Examples of the operation of the ideas in 
practise will not be given until the next chapter. The examples will be explored in the 
context of issues relevant to the wor1d-view under discussion.307 
6.1.2 Locating stewardship in justice 
Stewardship is one of the heads of Justice. 308 But the justice with which it is concerned 
is not merely a narrow abstract idea but a conception of justice which is: 
307 
308 
(a) embracing enough to bring together the ancient Greek and Christian ideas 
of justice; 
(b) consistent with justice as our legal system applies it; 
(c) able to be applied to the conflicts arising daily in our communities; and 
(d) capable of application from within a variety of wor1d-views. 
At points throughout this chapter the section from which the idea was drawn is noted and there 
are footnote references to the sections in the next chapter where the ideas are explored further. 
See for example para. 4.2.3 on Aristotle. 
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lt is the head of Justice which is concerned with the just ordering or arranging of 
resources.309 lt is the basis upon which a person justly decides to whom, or to what 
purpose, a resource should be put. 
6.1.3 The application of the stewardship obligation to all 
This idea of justice applies to everyone in control of resources. 310 The work so far has 
established· that a number of reasons have been offered as to why the stewardship 
obligation is said to apply to everyone. These reasons which will be accepted or rejected 
according to a person's worldview include: 
i. A steward is a member of the community and therefore cannot escape the 
duty to consider others in the community in decisions and actions involving 
others.311 
ii. A steward is obliged to recognise that all have a common origin in nature312 
and so there is nothing which would exempt a steward from their duty to 
others. 
iii. A steward is obliged to recognise that all have God as Father and must 
give account to God for the way in which they managed resources. 313 
iv. A steward is obliged to recognise that no-one (not even a steward) brought 
anything into the world so there is no basis for arrogating resources 
completely to oneself.314 
6.1.4 The resources to which the stewardship obligation applies 
This head of justice applies to all resources. The ambit of the resources to which it 
applies is all encompassing. l t  includes: 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
a. Land; 
See Para. 4.2.1 on lsidor of Pelusium, para. 4.2.2 on Plato, and para. 4.2.3 on Aristotle and 
chapter 5 for legal examples. 
See para. 4.2.2 on Plato, para. 4.2.3 on Aristotle and also footnote there on Rawls. 
See para. 4.5.2 and discussion on 1 Clement. 
See para. 4.5.5 and discussion on Tertullian. 
Ibid., and discussion on Tertullian and para 4.5.3 and discussion on Aristides at para. 4.5.3. See 
also the discussion of each of the protestant reformers particularly Calvin at 4.7.2 And Wesley 
at 4.7.4 
See para. 4.5.8 and discussion on BasiL 
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b. Things; 
c. Intangibles such as money; 
d. People; or 
e. Less well grouped resources such as one's conduct, time, body or life.315 
This framework extends the ambit of issues for consideration well beyond the resources 
the subject of proprietary interests. 
The stewardship obligation applies to everyone and it applies to all resources. What 
then is this obligation and how should it be discharged? 
6.2 How to apply the Stewardship Paradigm 
Stewardship is a universal principle. Everyone, and indeed everything, is entitled to 
equal consideration by the steward. Not only the person or creature who may benefit 
from the utilisation of the resource but the resource itself/themselves must also be 
considered.316 At its heart it is an obligation upon the person in control of resources to 
justly allocate and utilise.those resources. 
The obligation is discharged by weighing and then prioritising three factors in allocating 
and utilising resources: 
(1) The legal obligations and moral strings attached to allocating or utilising 
the resource; 
(2) The nature of the resource; 
(3) The characteristics of the claimants. 
Each of these is now considered. 
316 
316 
See the ambit of the definition by Ruemann at para. 4.1 and the broad way it is applied generally 
but particularly by the Protestant reformers Calvin and Wesley at para 4.7.2and para4.7.4 
respectively. 
See para. 4.2.4 and for an example the discussion of the environment in para. 7.3.5. 
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6.2.1 The strings attached 
Sometimes the resource is held with particular obligations as to its application 
embedded. These expectations may be of two kinds: 
( 1) Legal; or 
(2) Moral. 
I describe these expectations, where legal, as legal obligations and when only moral as 
"moral strings". If a resource is controlled subject to a moral obligation, the resource is 
said to be held with "moral strings attached".317 
Typical examples of legal obligations attached to resources are where: 
( 1) the resource is the subject of a contract including a contract of bailment or 
lease; 
(2) the resource is the subject of a trust; 
(3) the resource is the subject of enforceable fiduciary obligations. 318 
Typical examples of moral strings attached resources are: 
(1) A wedding ring; 
(2) Houses and heirlooms inherited and intended to be passed on to the next 
generation; and 
(3) Gifts to particular persons from their family or friends which were given with 
a particular purpose in mind. 
The string directs the steward as to who may use or receive the resource and the way 
it is used. 
The nature of the resources subject to moral strings, and the extent of the moral strings, 
will change from culture to culture but most persons in a culture will know the resources 
317 
318 
The expression •strings attached" as an applied ethical concept came from Trevor Jordan who 
informed that it was used by a community in Brisbane Australia who shared their possessions in 
a kind of voluntary communism. He stated that in relation to some resources it was not 
considered morally appropriate in that community for these to be pooled in an absolute sense and 
there may be conditions on which they could and should be used. 
For discussion and examples of these see paras. 5.3, 5.4.6, 5.5, 5.6.3 . 
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which are received with moral strings attached. 
If the steward holds the resource subject to moral strings attached then, unless the 
steward has a stronger moral obligation to break the strings, the household to be 
considered by the steward in the allocation or utilisation of the resource is reduced 
immediately from everyone and everything. The resource should, as a general rule, only 
be applied in accordance with those particular strings as the existence of legal 
obligations or moral strings will usually oblige the steward to act in accordance with those 
strings. 319 Exceptions are however foreseeable. Suppose the law recognises 
indefeasible proprietary rights but one person has all of the resources necessary for 
survival of a group and will not release them. The person in charge of protecting the 
resources may, in violation ofthe law, consider it morally right to give them away to those 
in extreme need and perhaps suffer charges for stealing320 or civil suit. 
6.2.2 The nature of the resource 
The steward must consider the nature of the resource in deciding the most appropriate 
allocation or utilisation of the resource. A wise steward will seek to ensure that 
resources are put to their highest and best use.321 
Some resources, because of their nature, call for special knowledge or skills on the part 
of the steward. Examples are: 
319 
320 
321 
(a) drugs; 
(b) confidential information such as that of a medical condition; 
See discussion of the concept particularly by Paul at para. 4.3.2, 4.3.3. For a discussion of 
church buildings and the problem of moral strings for some churches see para. 7.4.6. 
For an exam pie of how the issue of stealing necessities of life m ay be considered from within the 
Stewardship Paradigm see para. 7.3.5. 
That is to see the resource developed or utilised ·weu• as discussed in para. 4.2.5. lt is inherent 
in the teaching of Luke's gospel discussed at para.4.3.1 and in each of the Protestant reformers 
see particularly Calvin at 4.7.2. In the legal section it is discussed in the context of the nature of 
the resource at para. 5.5. Indeed some may argue (depending upon their worldview) that the 
resource itself should be considered as a claimant. The way in which the issue is analysed is not 
so critical as the overall stewardship outcome. A homely example of this need to consider the 
resource itself, not merely how it may be best utilized, was an experience I had as a child. I went 
with my father to cut down a Christmas tree for our house one Christmas. As I was ready to cut 
off a small pine tree at the base, my father stopped m e. He pointed out that if we took a branch 
off a larger tree, the little tree would grow to maturity as it should and the larger tree would grow 
another branch. We took the branch. 
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(c) dentistry text books; 
(d) a horse; 
(e) a legal team; and, 
(f) welding equipment. 
These resources by their nature exclude some potential recipients and favour others. 
They suggest some particular applications and exclude others. The nature of the 
resource then often reduces the ambit of the potential claimants to be considered. 
6.2.3 The qualities of the claimants 
The factors to be considered under this heading may be conveniently grouped under two 
sub-headings: 
(A) characteristics; 
(B) dependence.322 
(A) Characteristics 
Taking into account the matters discussed under the heading of "Strings Attached" and 
"Nature of the resource"', the steward will begin to see that the resource is more likely to 
be wisely utilised or judiciously allotted or utilized by some potential claimants than 
others. The attribute which describes this sorting I call Characteristics.323 Characteristics 
takes in more than character or virtue. lt includes acquired skills (or Jack thereof) and 
factors such as other resources at the claimant's disposal which may enhance a 
claimants overall prospects of receiving the resource in question. 324 
323 
324 
lt may reasonably be asked whether, when considering the resource itself, it should be 
considered under the heading of character or dependence. lt seems that the appropriate heading 
is dependence. 
The selection of the word "characteristics• which has its root is "character" is deliberate. Some 
may consider that •character• should have been chosen but its meaning is too narrow. Factors 
other than character must be considered, though, it seems character is a critical factor. The wider 
more embracing idea of "characteristics· (as distinct from "character") has a second advantage. 
In a pluralist society agreement may be reached on the characteristics preferred in deciding 
between claimants more easily than agreement on character. (For an introduction to the 
discussion of gcharacter" in moral philosophy see the section on ·character• by R. Crisp in The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy, T Honderich, ( ed. ), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, and 
cross references mentioned there.) 
See discussion at 4.2.6 regarding Zeno and the Stoics, at 4.3.2, 4.3.3 for discussion in a New 
Testament context and at 4.5.3. For corn ments on Aristide's examples of how this m ay affect a 
decision to store food, see para. 7.3.7. 
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Two negative characteristics stood out in the material reviewed as excluding a potential 
claimant: 
(i) freeloading: trafficking upon the generosity of the steward; and 
(ii) hoarding rather than using and developing resources. 325 
(B) Dependence 
Dependence falls to be considered under three subheadings: 
(i) extreme need and excess; 
(ii) proximity; 
(iii) vulnerability. 
{i) Extreme need and excess 
Extreme need is in fact a subheading of vulnerability but because it overrides all other 
aspects of vulnerability and also proximity, it is considered first and separately. 
Claimants in extreme need, even if they are complete strangers, should have their basic 
needs met above all others.326 
Conversely, claimants with excess who are hoarding or wasting are excluded from the 
steward's obligation to be considered.327 
The effect of the application of principles of the Stewardship Paradigm so far has been 
to limit the universal list of possible claimants to a smaller list by having regard: 
326 
327 
(a) to any strings attached; and 
(b) to the nature of the resource. 
See paras. 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.6.2, and 5.4.6, 5.5, 5.6.3 particularly for discussion. 
This is not an inviolable rule. See particularly para. 4. 7.1, 4. 7.1 where Luther confronts the issue 
of those who could work but chose to beg and the teaching of the Didache at para 4.5.6. 
See para. 4.7.2 and Calvin's teaching. 
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That list has then been further limited by having regard to the Characteristics of the 
possible claimants and whether they are in extreme need or have excess which is being 
wasted or hoarded. 
This leaves two very significant features to be weighed in assessing the merits of the 
remaining claimant's claims: 
(a) proximity; and 
(b) vulnerability. 328 
These factors seem best considered not in isolation but in relation to each other. 
(ii) Proximity and vulnerability 
Proximity is the word chosen to capture up the strength of the claimant's relationship with 
and consequently claim upon, the steward. For descriptive purposes it may be set out 
in linear form with persons dependent upon the steward such as dependent's spouse 
or children being closest, and unknown strangers being furthest away. 
steward dependants strangers 
lt may well be that from some perspectives the concepts will be applied to animals and 
the whole universe. lt is important also to note that the proximity of a claimant is context 
specific. A father may be dependent upon a son in some contexts and the son upon the 
father in others. Not only may this change over time it may change from occasion to 
occasion depending on the resource and the circumstances under which it is being 
considered. 
The line will be drawn differently by persons of different world views but for illustrative 
purposes this diagram is confined to human relations. 
3211 Whilst the central ideas are present in Chapter 4 the ideas are significantly explored in the legal 
context. In this regard see particularly para. 5.3 regarding succession law, para. 5.4 regarding 
crime, torts and contract, and para. 5.6 in which equitable obligations are discussed noting 
particularly the comments of Justice Mason at para. 5.4.6, 5.5, 5.6.3. 
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The length of the line is not relevant. The line's function is primarily to illustrate that 
some claimants will be closer to the steward than others and as a consequence the 
claim of such a person will, as a general rule, stand in priority to those more remote. 329 
The second central conception is bundled around the word "need". Need captures up 
the ideas inherent in extreme need, dependency and vulnerability in the strongest case 
and at the other end of the spectrum, luxurious waste.330 This idea may also, for 
descriptive purposes, be set out in linear form. 
Extreme Dependency Comfortable Luxury Waste 
Need 
Again the precise location of points on the line are not critical. Of importance is that 
there are degrees of need and at the more remote cases of no need there is luxury and 
waste.331 
As these two conceptions relate in 
their claim upon the steward for 
descriptive purposes it is useful to 
set these out on axes. 
If the strength of the relationship is 
set on the X axis and the degree of 
need set on the Y axis a diagram 
similar to that set out adjacent 
becomes apparent. 
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In principle the claim of a person with needs falling closer to the point marked A should 
329 
331 
See for example para. 4. 7.1, 4.7.1 and the application of this principle by Luther. 
For a discussion of how these issues of dependence and luxury may apply in the context of 
taxation policy see the discussion regarding the proposed goods and services tax at para. 7.2.7. 
See para. 4.7.2 and Calvin's comments and 4.7.4 and Wesley's teaching. 
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be satisfied before a claim furtherfrom the point marked A provided the point falls below 
"the line" passing through BC. 
This qualification (that the point be below "the line" passing through BC) applies for it 
seems clear that a steward should be directed to meeting needs falling below "the line" 
BC rather than as a general rule be providing for luxury for some other persons. 
The steward's obligation Instead, suggests the steward is to provide for those more 
remote from the steward rather than enjoy a luxurious lifestyle.332 That is, needs of 
persons at point P should be satisfied before the wants of the steward at point Q or the 
steward's dependants at point R. 
The "line" BC is not straight because stewardship is an art, not a science, and there will 
be tolerable variances within the general conceptions. 
Being limited as it is to two axes, the analysis excludes many other aspects of 
stewardship. lt is however a useful beginning to defining a key concept. 
The steward will often also be a claimant. 
The argument may therefore be advanced that the steward is entirely dependent upon 
and vulnerable to his or her self and, therefore, is entitled to all the resources under the 
steward's control, subject perhaps, to some strings attached obligations. The logic may 
be sound but the paradigm makes it clear that a steward should not be wasteful.333 
Wastefulness includes excessive use of resources for personal purposes. 334 Indeed, the 
idea of stewardship suggests that a steward should endeavour to keep consumption of 
resources to the minimum necessary for comfort and that, as a steward moves into a 
more luxurious lifestyle, the more it may be said that the steward is not being wise in the 
discharge of that stewardship. 
332 See as an example the model of John Wesley at para 4.7.4. 
333 See para. 4.2.3 where Aristotle is discussed and also the section on Luke's gospel, para.4.3.1. 
Such as is discussed in the section on Tertullian at para.4.5.5. 
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By the application of this paradigm, the steward is guided in the utilisation of resources 
and the allocation of resources amongst potential claimants (which will often include the 
steward) toward outcomes which are more just than those outcomes which are not 
consistent with the notions inherent in the paradigm. 
6.2.4 Equality 
To some stewards, when all the above factors are weighed it will be obvious "who should 
get what when". To other stewards however, amongst whom the available resources 
should be divided {if they are to be divided) may still be unclear. In such a case it seems 
that equality dictates that the resource, if it is to be shared, should be shared equally 
between the members of the relevant class. The wor1d-view of the steward may become 
critical in this context. From some perspectives equality will be a factor of last resort: 
When no other basis for differentiation is available then divide equally. For others, there 
will be primacy placed on equality and (subject to legal and moral strings) unless there 
are compelling reasons to the contrary, resources should be divided, if they are to be 
divided, amongst the largest possible class, equally. Stewardship is an art (a 
contemplative as well as a practical art335) not a science; and as such it is quite 
appropriate for stewards of different world-views to take it up and apply it in different 
ways. As an art, the values undergirding the actions, as well as the actions which flow 
from the attitude, are critical. 336 The purpose though, is always to be a good steward and 
as such there are legitimate limits to its application. These include the requirement that 
at a foundational level it must be undergirded by an attitude that always puts people 
before resources.337 
6.3 A mapping of the Stewardship Paradigm and a scheme. 
lt follows from what has been written that it should be possible to map diagrammatically 
the interrelation of the most significant factors making up the Stewardship Paradigm. 
336 
337 
See para. 4.2.5 and the discussion on Philodemus, para 4.7.2 where Calvin is keen to make the 
discretionary nature of the choices clear and para 4.7.4 Where Wesley sets out the clear 
categories he considers critical and the CGtegories where discretion is appropriate. 
See para. 4.5.2 and discussion on 1 Clement, para. 4.5.4 and discussion on Clement of 
Alexandria, and para. 4.5.8 and discussion on BasiL 
See para. 4.2.3 and discussion on Aristotle and Sentence of Sextus (329) at para.4.5.7. 
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Such a map is set below. The nature of the resource is not explicitly identified in the 
map. ft falls to be considered as a part of the issues for consideration under the heading 
of Utilisation and Allocation to developers before freeloaders. 
lt also follows that a schematic diagram of questions to assist the steward in decision­
making may be able to be set out. Such a scheme follows the mapping. 
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Are there legal obligations Is performance of 
to use or YES the legal obligation Perform t h e  attaching NO .., 
distribution of the resource ..., s o  m o r a l l y  -- legal obligation 
-
by the steward? reprehensible as to 
make it unable to 
be performed by the 
steward? 
NO 
YES 
'V 
\V Is performance 
Are there moral 
sufficiently morally Pe r f o r m  in strings YES reprehensible to NO accordance with attaching to the use or 
.., 
__.., m a k e  s t e w a r d  -- , the strings. distribution of the resource unwilling to comply 
by the steward? with the strings? 
NO YES l 
\V 
Does the nature of the YES Exclud e s u c h  resource lend itself to some 
_..., 
claimants from the claimants or uses and , class of claimants and exclude other claimants or uses considered uses? 
'lt 
� 
Are any of the claimants: 
YES Ex c lu d e  s u c h  (a) wasteful; 
_..., 
claimants from the 
(b) trafficking on generosity; ,. class of claimants and 
(c) too remote to be considered; uses considered 
(d) already too comfortable. 
Distribute resource amongst remaining claimants or use the resource preferring: 
(a) those in extreme need; 
(b) those more vulnerable over less vulnerable; 
(c) those more proximate to the steward over those more remote from the steward; 
I 
then 
I 
I 
then 
(d) those more likely to apply skill and judgment to the further allocation or utilisation of 
resource. 
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The circumstances to be taken into account in weighing the factors in the last box are 
so varied that it is not appropriate to further delineate. The steward's attitudes to equality 
and when equality applies may significantly shape the application of the paradigm. 
Stewardship is applicable to all of life - public and private. lt provides principles to 
critique not only personal but group and social conduct (and attitude). 
In a further attempt to clarify the interrelation of concepts that are brought together in the 
idea of stewardship, the following diagram may also be helpful. 
Own Conduct338 One's own communityl39 Society generauywo 
The principles of stewardship are not simply confined to the guidance of individual 
conduct. Stewardship provides the principles for the conduct of groups and a basis for 
. critiquing group conduct341 and generally, of not only society, but its laws and social 
structures. 342 
6.4 Towards a Stewardship Paradigm -a general summary 
Justice in a moral sense,343 requires that those in contror of resources exercise not 
merely the rights associated with the resource in question but also discharge the moral 
duties that are associated with that control.344 A moral duty always associated with being 
in control of resources is adequately called stewardship. lt is an obligation to consider: 
338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
See para. 4.5.5 and discussion on Tertulian. 
See para. 4.6.2 and discussion on Wycliffe. 
See para. 4.6.3 and discussion on More. 
See para. 4.6.1 and discussion on Aquinas and para.4.6.2 and discussion on Wycliffe. 
See para. 4.6.3 for discussion on More and para. 4. 7.1 , 4. 7.1 for an example of how Luther used 
the concept. 
As distinct from a legal sense. 
See para 4.7.3 for comments in Westminster Confession of Faith on this. 
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a) legal obligations and moral strings associated with control of the resource; 
b) the nature of the resource; and, 
c) the potential claimants to the resource. 
In considering the claimants preference is to be given to some claimants over others, 
though, the weighing of the strength of the respective claims is an art requiring moral 
judgement not the scientific application of a mathematical model. 
Claimants in extreme need have a priority claim. 
Vulnerable persons are to be given priority over those who are comfortably well off or 
living in luxury. 
Those claimants dependent upon the steward or proximate to the steward are to be 
preferred over those who are not dependent or are more remote. 
Those who will apply their skill and judgement to see a resource entrusted to them is 
developed to its fullest potential are to be preferred over those who will waste the 
resource or are simply taking advantage of the steward's willingness to distribute to them 
eg. freeloaders. 
The worldview of the steward will inform the ultimate allocation or utilization of the 
resource and within the general moral paradigm discussed differences of opinion on 
what is wise stewardship may be held. 
Finally, it must always be borne in mind that stewardship is but an aspect of justice and 
justice takes its place alongside, at least, mercy in informing relational decisions and 
actions. 
The interplay of those wider ethical issues will shape and even override entirely the 
obligation to be a good steward in particular situations. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE STEWARDSHIP PARADIGM 
WITHIN DIVERSE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS 
7.1 Introductory comments 
This chapter suggests ways in which the conception of stewardship discussed in the last 
chapter may be taken up within four quite diverse, but significant, ethical perspectives 
relevant to Australian society at the end of the 20th Century and be applied. Each section 
finishes with a case study designed to illumine how the paradigm may assist in moral 
enquiry into issues of concern, not only for the world view under discussion but also for 
the wider Australian community. The case studies apply the paradigm to problems of 
a nation- taxation: to problems of a group commune; to problems of an organisation; 
and, to problems of individuals. 
The first perspective explored is the secular approach developed by John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice and revised in Political Liberalism. lt will be recalled that whilst the 
philosophies of Hobbes and Locke seemed to be incapable of being understood in terms 
of the relational, contextual premises of stewardship, Rawls' philosophy seemed to open 
a door of possibility to the accommodation of such notions. 
The second ethical perspective taken up is the utilitarian framework developed by Peter 
Singer and expressed in his work Practical Ethics. 
The third perspective explored is that of the dominant religious conviction in Australia­
Christianity. Stewardship as an applied ethical concept is explored from within this 
perspective. 
The fourth perspective from within which stewardship is considered is feminism. 
The secularisation of Australian society has heightened the need for a secular theory 
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that works out "the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society". 345 lt is to this 
end that Rawls' work, A Theory of Justice, is directed. Rawls has been embraced with 
a passion·by justice theoreticians. A Theory of Justice is "one of the most discussed 
philosophical works of this century.346 Not to consider Rawls' refined secular philosophy 
would be to exclude one of the most dominant philosophies regulating the way property 
rights and obligations in society are viewed. 
Utilitarianism is the other dominant secular paradigm and the works of Peter Singer 
provide a significant contribution to the applied ethics agenda in Australia. 
To ignore the influence of Christianity in the fonnation of Australians' applied ethical 
principles and judicial determinations would be naive in the extreme. As the dominant 
religious tradition in AustraJia its influence in society and upon the applied ethical agenda 
must be considered if a case is to be sustained that the Stewardship Paradigm is 
capable of broad popular appeal. 
Feminism is an umbrella under which many ideas of relationship based ethics are 
discussed. Its place in the debate should be acknowledged and this work attempts to 
identify how the notion of stewardship may advance inquiry germane to feminist resource 
allocation agendas. 
If ideas of stewardship are to be embraced by a pluralist society such as Australia at the 
dawn of a new millennium, as an ethical concept setting out the dominant principles 
which regulate the use to which resources ought to be put, stewardship must be 
acceptable to a broad range of ethical perspectives. By addressing a variety of secular 
and religious frameworks, this chapter endeavours to establish that stewardship can be 
said to be an ethical conception that is reasonable, caring, and conforms to our ideas of 
economic justice in reflective equilibrium; conforms to the notions of love of God and 
neighbour as developed in the Bible and throughout the Christian tradition; and conforms 
with the legal structures applicable to our age. 
345 Rawts, 1972, viii. 
Freeman, 1994, 621. 
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7.2 Towards a Stewardship Paradigm from a Rawlsian perspective 
Could the Stewardship Paradigm be applied from within a Rawlsian world-view? Having 
written his "final statement" of the "two principles of justice for institutions�347 the first thing 
Rawls writes is a comment. He states: 
By way of comment, these principles and priority rules are no doubt incomplete. 
Other modifications will now surely have to be made ... 348 
No stronger encouragement could flow from the author himself to fortify the willingness 
of those inclined to investigate the possibility that stewardship may be able to advance 
enquiry into just resource utilisation from within the overall framework of justice as 
fairness. 
7.2.1 Stewardship and the original position 
Stewardship satisfies the criterion for selection in the original position. lt is not 
dependent upon the bald assertion that it is a necessary truth or derived from a 
necessary truth. rt is not dependent upon so called self evident premises but can be 
argued to arise from the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting 
together into one coherent view. lt is a concept which we have either accepted, as 
shown from our legal analysis in the 5ttt chapter, or we would accept it upon philosophic 
reflection. 349 
7.2.2 Reconsidering Maxim in's just application 
The presumption by Rawls that the relevant group to be considered when applying the 
maximin principle is "the state" is a critical and possibly unhelpful assumption. If the 
maxim in principle is applied to groups smaller than the state a concept which evidences 
some of the characteristics of stewardship as defined in this work emerges. The sense 
of obligation to others inherent in looking after lesser members in a particular class, and 
having a more remote duty to those more removed, is arguably more likely to find 
347 
34a 
349 
Rawls, 1972, 302. 
Ibid., 303. 
Ibid., 21. 
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acceptance in the hypothetical original position than an equal standard of duty across 
all citizens in a state as inherent in the concept as delineated by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice. This is because it fits more perfectly within the overlapping consensus which 
emerges from our considered reflections. A freestanding principle which is self evident, 
and acknowledged as such by Rawls, is that people care for their children before others 
and they care for relatives and neighbours before strangers.350 On this basis, if the 
maxim in principle would be accepted in the original position, it would be accepted in this 
amended form as this amendment "moves us closer to the philosophic ideal" though "it 
does not, of course, achieve it".351 lt may be that minimum standards will be set for 
various levels of remoteness. Stewardship then may not only be accepted but may be 
a refinement assisting in solving some of the dilemmas raised by Rawls. 
7 .2.3 Stewardship, priority and Rawls' concerns regarding redistribution 
If Rawls is correct in his assertion that one of the defects of constitutional government 
has been due in part to disputes regarding resource distribution, then the notion of 
stewardship may provide principles useful in addressing this from a philosophic and legal 
basis, as it recognises different groups to whom duties are owed within the community. 
This division makes analysis simpler and concords more completely with general moral 
duties to kin and neighbour. If the concept of stewardship is indeed a concept which can 
be justified by public reasons, and is embraced as a concept to which overlapping 
consensus is given, then all political institutions have a clear theoretical base for taking 
up the challenge of Rawls and acting justly in effecting redistribution; provided of course 
that redistribution is according to the ethical principles inherent in the concept of 
stewardship. 
lt is noteworthy at this point that stewardship is capable of many different interpretations 
according to the social, political and economic structures regulating the community. 
Rawls points out that from the perspective of his theory, the choice between a private­
property economy and socialism is left open; from the standpoint of the theory of justice 
alone, various basic structures would appear to satisfy its principles. 
350 
351 
Ibid., 475. 
Ibid., 50. 
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Stewardship is the concept that frts Rawls' concern in this regard. Stewardship relates 
to "property obligations". lt acknowledges the possibility that different economic 
frameworks could be adopted in the original position. lt is applicable to both a private­
property economy and a socialist regime. lt has been applied in the New Testament 
Christian context, Ancient Greek democracies, feudal England and in modem Australia. 
lt addresses the key concerns expressed by Rawls in a manner consistent with and 
developed from the theory of justice. lt spells out the concept of justice as fairness, 
arguably carrying the conception of the social contract as developed by Rawls, to a 
greater level of particularity. 
7 .2.4 Stewardship and justice between generations 
The method by which Rawls comes to the conclusion that "persons in different 
generations have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do"352 
is remarkably similar to the general concept of stewardship. Fir:stly, we note that Rawls 
affinns the duty. Secondly, the duty requires a bare minimum for the least advantaged 
as would be accepted in the original position. Thirdly, at least with respect to the difficult 
aspect of "savings", solution arises out of relationships; particularty ties of sentiment 
between successive generations.353 Fourthly, provided the basic ethical constraints are 
satisfied each generation Is free to pursue its own ends. Fifthly, Rawls speaks adversely 
of the unnecessary pursuit of wealth beyond a level necessary to establish just 
institutions and the fair value of liberty. In so doing he comments on excessive wealth 
being a hindrance, a meaningless distraction at best if not a temptation to indulgence 
and emptiness.354 Rawls' duties seem a far-fetched application of his doctrine as he 
concedes, but its basic principles are the core principles from which the more detailed 
stewardship doctrine set out in this thesis may be, and to some extent has been, 
developed to address rights and obligations between generations. There is nothing in 
this section of Rawls inconsistent with the Stewardship Paradigm. Arguably the 
development of the theory, by introducing the concept of stewardship to address some 
of the problems of political economy raised by Rawls, also addresses (in part} criticisms 
of the theory's basis in the freedom of the individual to choose whatever plan of life they 
352 
353 
Ibid., 293. 
Ibid., 292. 
Ibid., 290. 
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wish on the one hand, and the apparently eclectic duty to take into account the interests 
of others in the next generation on the other.355 
7 .2.5 Sentiment 
lt is not necessary for Rawls to rely upon sentiment or some similar psychological theory 
to justify duties in the original position. Parties may well adopt a far more complex set 
of moral principles in the original position than Rawls is willing to concede - such as 
stewardship. This is one of the difficulties of course with the original position. 356 If the 
concept of stewardship is adopted in the original position, this overcomes the need for 
reference to sentiment in the original position to answer the dilemmas about resource 
allocation. Furthermore care (for persons of the next generation or more generally) is 
better addressed from within a framework of justice mapped in the Stewardship 
Paradigm than by simply arguing for representatives357 as Rawls suggests. 
7 .2.6 Stewardship within a theory of justice 
Stewardship, as outlined in these pages, seems to comply with the necessary conditions 
for acceptance as a part of the scheme propounded by Rawls to develop the details of 
economic justice and seems to assist in answering some of the dilemmas raised in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
Rawls suggests that: 
355 
356 
357 
If the scheme as a whole seems on reflection to clarify and order our thoughts, 
and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to br ing divergent convictions more 
in line, then it has done more than one may reasonably ask.358 
See M. Fisk, 'History and Reason', ln Rawls' Moral Theory, in N. Daniels Reading Rawls : Critical 
Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, England, 1975. The way in 
which Rawls introduces care into justice between generations in the original position seems to 
call out for a fuller treatment. 
This thesis does not explore the criticisms of the original position. Reviews setting out in detail 
criticisms of the concept of the original position as postulated by Rawls are Thomas Nagel 'Rawts 
On Justice', Ronald Dworkin 'The Original Position', and Milton Fisk 'History and Reason in Rawts' 
Moral Theory, all published in Reading Rawls:Critical Studies on Raw/s' A Theory of Justice, 
1975, edited by Norman Daniels, Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
See Rawls 1972, 128. 
Rawls, 1972, 53, in rendering his justification for, and explanation of, the concept of reflective 
equilibrium. 
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This, stewardship seems to achieve for the reasons set out. 
The uncharacteristic indecision with which Rawfs introduces his section on distributive 
shares,359 coupled with his comments to the effect that "a just economic system" such 
as is developed in a Theory of Justice may admit of "several variations", 360 encourages 
the unfolding of concepts set out in these pages within the ambit of the theory 
propounded by Rawls. Provided these concepts satisfy the criterion for a principle that 
may be selected in the original position361 it seems reasonable to conclude that 
stewardship, as defined in this thesis, may be the paradigm regulating resource 
allocation selected in the hypothetical original position. Within the stewardship paradigm 
each person may be said to have an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and so far 
as social and economic inequalities are concerned the inequalities are to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Their claims are given priority within 
the overall scheme of justice. 
The argument for the adoption of the Stewardship Paradigm by those who begin from 
a secular Rawlsian approach can be carried further. For it is central to Rawls' theory as 
developed in Political Liberalism that the United States Supreme Court is, [for the U.S. 
community] the "exemplar of public reason" and there seems little reason why in 
principle the same general respect for the law, and reasons for it, would not apply in 
Australia. 362 If then our communal judgments are expressed in law and stewardship has 
been shown to be a foundational moral concept of our laws, stewardship arguably should 
be accepted as a condition selected in the original position. The concept of stewardship 
articulates our communal judgements as expressed in law, and in that, it dovetails neatly 
into the Rawlsian framework of justice as fairness. Furthermore, it addresses 
meaningfully the moral problems raised by Rawls and offers a paradigm with answers 
359 
361 
362 
eg. Ibid., 27 4, "There is presumably no general answer to [the question which system of economic 
arrangements is most just] since it depends in large part upon the traditions, institutions, and 
social forces of each country, and its particular historical circumstances•. 
Ibid., 274. 
ibid., 17-19. 
This is not to suggest that the High Court (or any other courts) in Australia play the same role as 
the US Supreme Court. The point is that the Australian Courts, particularly the superior courts, 
are also exemplars of public reason. 
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drawn from public reason. 
7 .2. 7 A case study - taxation issues in Australia 
Taxation is, from a liberal, social contractarian perspective, central to the issue of 
resource allocation and utilisation at an applied level. lf the Stewardship Paradigm is to 
be useful it should provide moral guidance in the realm of taxation policy for it is there 
that the moral propriety of redistribution battles will be fought. 
If stewardship is a concept inherent in the moral fabric of our society it is also reasonable 
to expect it will be evident in the nation's tax legislation. 
This section looks briefly at some of the current taxation laws in Australia in the light of 
the Stewardship Paradigm and then the current goods and services tax debate is 
considered in the light of the Stewardship Paradigm. 
Stewardship suggests that whenever and wherever persons are in extreme need, or 
helping those in extreme need, priority should be given to supporting with appropriate 
resources, such persons. Implicitly, resources should be redistributed from others to 
such persons. Vulnerable persons should also be the object of resource redistribution 
until basic needs are met. lt suggests that as comfort levels increase to the point of 
luxury and waste, interference by government becomes progressively more morally 
justifiable. 
lt is important to note that it is the increase in comfort, not increase in income that 
attracts the moral justification for interference by government. Stewardship suggests that 
where resources are being developed and utilised to best possible purposes, as distinct 
from being wasted or hoarded, tax benefits may be appropriate. Without undertaking an 
exhaustive review of the tax regime applying in Australia at the tinie of this work it is 
interesting to note that: 
(a) organizations which are expressly directed towards assisting those in 
extreme need are given not only income tax exemption but gifts to such 
141 
bodies are income tax deductlble;363 
(b) that organizations assisting those in need but not extreme need are given 
income tax exemption but not necessarily deductibility;364 
(c) that sales tax applies on a sliding scale in such a way that the necessities 
of life are exempt from sales tax but that as items are considered more 
items of comfort and finally more items of luxury, the scale increases;365 
(d) tax exemption is periodically given to encourage certain forms of 
developments. The most well-known example is the research and 
development concession offered to business to encourage the 
development of the nation's resources. The concession was a 150% 
allowable deduction and following the budget of the 20* August 1996 the 
allowable reduction was reduced to 125%.366 
At the time of writing this work, legislation designed to introduce a goods and services 
tax has passed the House of Representatives but has not passed the Senate of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. 367 The legislation is designed to impose a flat rate of 1 0 per 
cent tax on the sale and purchase of all goods and services in Australia with very limited 
exemptions. Such a broad based tax will enable reduction in income tax and it is said 
this will motivate persons to work harder and thereby increase the net wealth available 
to all.368 
lt is an argument essentially then I that a 11 will benefit if it is introduced I as those likely to 
suffer will be given appropriate compensation. 
363 
365 
367 
See the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act (1997) Division 30. See particularly Item 
4.1.3. 
Ibid., Division 50-5, 50-10 and 50-30. 
See the Commonwealth Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classifications) Act (1992). The first 
schedule sets out the exempt items and the rates of taxation applicable to various items on the 
sliding scale are set out progressively in the schedules which follow. 
See the Commonwealth Industry, Research and development Act 1986 Part Ill A and 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Sections 738, 73C, 73CA, 73CB and 730-G. 
Details of the debate and issues related to this topic may be accessed at 
http://vvwN.aph.gov.au/senatefcommittee/gstlindex.htm. Last accessed 19th February 1999. The 
home page was last reviewed 9111 December 1998 but Hansard and other following pages have 
been updated almost daily with delays of only a couple of days between hearings and transcript 
availability. 
Ibid. 
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lt replaces, among other things, sales tax which is a tax on goods alone. By spreading 
the tax base away from a dependence upon traded goods to include the services sector 
it is arguably more equitable as there is no immediate moral justification for preferring 
a tax on goods over one on services. 1t is, though, arguably unjust not to discriminate 
on the basis of whether the good (or service) is a luxury or a necessity. On this issue 
{alone perhaps) the application of the current regime -limited as it is to goods- appears 
consonant with the principles of stewardship, whereas the goods and services tax being 
a flat rate without consideration of circumstances doesn't seem so consonant. 
This is not to say that the current regime is morally superior or has overall the moral 
imprimatur of stewardship - the overall effect of the total tax reform package must be 
considered. On the simple comparison, though, of a flat tax rate on goods versus a 
sliding scale increasing with luxury and decreasing to nil on necessities the current 
arrangement seems morally superior. 
The capacity of the Stewardship Paradigm to contribute usefully to the debate is, though, 
of importance. For those of a Rawlsian wor1d view, if Rawls is correct that the laws have 
traditionally allowed too great a level of disparity of wealth, then stewardship offers a 
useful paradigm for guiding redistribution of wealth through taxation. 
7.3 Towards a Stewardship Paradigm from a utilitarianism 
perspective 
7.3.1 Stewardship as a tool 
The concept of stewardship developed in these pages, in the hands of a utilitarian, may 
not necessarily be a rule to regulate conduct, it may be only a tool to assist in achieving 
that greatest quest for utilitarians "the greatest good of the greatest number''. lt is a tool 
which is practical and of assistance possibly advancing utilitarian analysis in two major 
ways; by addressing the two problems raised in Chapter 3 for it offers practical 
assistance in clarifying the two vexed questions for utilitarians: 
(a) what is "the good"; and 
(b) "who" are the greatest number? 
143 
The earlier analysis on wealth is of significant assistance in defining the answer to the 
question "What is the good?". 
The analysis on "relationships" assists in defining the question regarding "the greatest 
number"- the group of persons to be considered. 
In developing the usefulness of stewardship for utilitarianism, the work of Peter Singer, 
Practical Ethics, is again taken as a base in the subsections which follow. 
7.3.2 Equality, equal consideration households and animal rights 
Equality within the Stewardship Paradigm could be understood to require that everyone 
and everything be considered initially in forming a view as to whether they belonged to 
the household to be considered or not, and that persons within the same household 
grouping be considered equally. lt would not mean a broad and general equality for all 
sentient beings. 
Singer points out the venom associated with comparing the rights of non-human life with 
human life.369 lt may be that stewardship can offer some sort of mediating framework 
or paradigm in this debate. Irrespective of the quality of the logic and the scholarship, 
it is difficult to succeed with an argument that thousands of rats equate in value 
somehow with human life. Yet few but the most ardent of animal haters would say that 
a person who had a pet mouse did not have a moral obligation to feed it and care for it. 
The concept of stewardship enables all life and resources to fall within the ambit of that 
which ought to be considered and for whom we have duties. lt also provides some 
guidance in prioritising the claims that each being has upon us.370 In this context, 
equality would be afforded all persons in the relevant household grouping and all would 
be entitled to be considered. 
369 Singer, preface, viii, ix. 
370 Ibid. 
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7.3.3 Rich and poor 
In his chapter on Rich and Poor371 Singer argues that all have an obligation to assist 
others. After setting out tragic facts about world poverty, he lists and comments under 
the five headings below objections to the argument that all people have this obligation 
to assist others: 
(i) taking care of our own; 
(ii) property rights; 
(iii) population and the ethics of triage; 
(iv) leaving it to the government; and 
(v) too high a standard? 
This work seems consonant with Singer's objective of arguing for an obligation to be 
owed and supports and strengthens grounds for this position against each of these 
objections (subject to one significant qualification). 
The argument that we must take care of our own is accepted only to a certain point- the 
point of (minimal) comfort. Resources which are to be applied to luxury and waste 
should be given to others. The gradient nature of the obligation enables the too high an 
(absolute) standard argument to be restructured on the basis that persons and 
communities are given not a benchmark to hit or miss but lifestyle choices to move 
toward and exercise discretion within. The particular context, nature of resource and 
relevant relationships will all inform the steward's decision. The communal nature of 
stewardship attacks the heart of both the "property rights" and •government's 
responsibility" arguments. These principles seem to speak also to the abhorrence of the 
triage argument that people should be left to starve because if they are fed they will only 
procreate and more suffering will result. Singer speaks against this yet concludes at 
p.241: 
371 
If the argument for an obligation to assist is sound, we have an obligation to 
reduce absolute poverty; but we have no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the 
best of our knowledge, have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run. 
Hence we have no obligation to assist countries whose governments have 
policies that will make our aid ineffective. This could be very harsh on poor 
Ibid., chap. 8, 218-246. 
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citizens of these countries- for they may have no say in the government's policies 
- but we will help more people in the long run by using our resources where they 
are most effective. (The same principles may apply, incidentally, to countries that 
refuse to take other steps that could make assistance effective -like refusing to 
reform systems of land holding that impose intolerable burdens on poor tenant 
farmers). 372 
The efficiency argument seems compatible with the Stewardship Paradigm but the 
attitude of the government does not seem a legitimate criterion nor does the long run 
argument (as against short run) from the idea as developed. The criterion informing a 
steward's decision will focus on relationship and responsibility, not government attitude. 
Our duty may, in some cases, not distinguish between citizens in one country, but 
frequently it will. We may have a greater duty to a child we sponsor, or a former fellow 
student with whom we studied than to others generally. Stewardship is not overly 
concerned with national boundaries. 
7.3.4 Insiders and outsiders 
A powerful observation on the inadequacy of the dominant philosophies and their 
inability to deal with issues which transcend national boundaries is made by Singer in his 
chapter on refugees. He writes: 
Very few moral philosophers have given any attention to the issue of refugees, 
even though it is clearly one of the major moral issues of our time and raises 
significant moral questions about who is a member of our moral community. 373 
He criticises Rawls' theory as being limited to discussing morality within the national 
boundaries of the State before turning to criticise Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice 
for simpty justifying the current attitudes.374 
Singer then argues a consequentialist perspective would push the agenda further to 
372 
373 
374 
Singer, 241. 
Ibid., 252-253. 
Ibid. 
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consider the refugees' needs more fully.375 
Central to the agenda is the difficulty of defining both the community in question and the 
rights of the refugees to be considered. Singer also argues that the character of the 
refugees should also be taken into account.376 
Singer concludes: 
So we have a complex m;x of interests - some definite, some highly speculative -
to be considered. Equal interests are to be given equal weight, but which way 
does the balance lie '?77 
The proposition inherent in stewardship that there is not necessarily just one community 
nor one standard of obligation but many; and further that the duty to members of 
different communities may be ranked according to proximity, advances the inquiry from 
a consequentialist perspective. Stewardship would also include character as a 
significant factor in assessing the rights of refugees and builds this into the relevant 
criterion in a way compatible with Singer's request. 
7.3.5 The environment 
Chapter 10 of Practical Ethics is devoted to a consideration of the environment and 
within that the obligation to consider future generations in decisions about resource 
allocation and utilisation. Central to the arguments propounded by Singer is an 
argument about the reverence which must be accorded to life. 
Singer points out again the limitations in focusing solely upon human life and argues for 
the extension of moral duties to include all life. He acknowledges the limits of a 
consequentialist approach, writing: 
375 
376 
377 
One might question whether life for animals in a natural environment yields a 
surplus of pleasure over pain, or of satisfaction over frustration of preferences. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 257. 
Ibid., 258. 
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At this point the idea of calculating benefits becomes almost absurd; but that does 
not mean that the loss of future animal lives should be dismissed from our 
decision making. 378 
Nevertheless, Singer continues and presses arguments for extension of moral duty to 
non-sentient beings. 
After criticising the Christian tradition, he turns to the Christian missionary, Albert 
Schweitzer, as the leading proponent of the reverence for life ethic. He quotes 
Schweitzer in these terms: 
Ethics thus consists in this, that I experience the necessity of practising the same 
reverence for life toward all will-to-live, as toward my own . ... A man is really 
ethical only when he obeys the constraint laid on him to help all life which he is 
able to succour, and when he goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living. 
He does not ask how far this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself, 
nor how far it is capable of feeling. To him life as such is sacred. He shatters no 
ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, 
and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks. If he works by lamplight on a 
summer evening he prefers to keep the window shut and to breathe stifling air, 
rather than to see insect after insect fall on his table with singed and sinking 
wings.379 
When we consider the ethical issues from a stewardship perspective, there is no magical 
line drawn at humanity, or sentient life. 380 
All of the cosmos is the subject of the stewardship duty. "An ice crystal that sparkles in 
the sun" and "a leaf" along with humans must all, so far as is possible, be developing into 
(or kept) to their highest and best. This is inherent in the ideas discussed earlier. 
378 
379 
Ibid., 276. 
Ibid., 278-279. 
Singer writes at ibid.: � lt is not clear how we should interpret Schweitzer's position. The reference 
to the ice crystal is especially puzzling, for an ice crystal is not alive at all". 
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This aspect of morality is as integral a part of moral life with respect to resources as the 
distributive aspect according to the Stewardship Paradigm. 
7.3.6 Singer's invitation 
I concede that what I have said does not fit squarely within the paradigms that Singer 
would necessarily adopt. The grouping of interests and the ranking of these in relation 
to their proximity to the steward is not to be found in Singer and is inconsistent with his 
broad idea of equality of considerations of interests. I am heartened, though, by his 
invitation in the following terms: 
Objections and counter-arguments are welcome. Since the days of Plato, 
philosophy has advanced dialectically as philosophers have offered reasons for 
disagreeing with the views of other philosophers. Disagreement is good, because 
it is the way to a more defensible position; ... 381 
Utilitarianism requires an enormous amount of flexibility of any rule or principle to enable 
the goal of the greatest good of the greatest number to be pursued. The detailed 
analysis of the concept of stewardship may be taken up or put aside (and parts of it may 
be taken up and others put aside) in assisting the attainment of the overall objective. lt 
is argued, though, that the concept called the Stewardship Paradigm is more useful than 
any of the other moral concepts offered as this ethical principle is defined in the context 
of relationships with other humans and indeed all of the cosmos. The idea of 
stewardship has been forged in the furnace of continual clashes over conflicts of interest 
in, and obligations regarding, resources which focuses upon the duty to develop 
(preserve) resources, not just distribute them. As such, it is argued not only to be able 
to serve a consequentialist wortd view such as Singer's but indeed to advance inquiry 
from within that world-view. A case study taken from Singer's work illustrates how 
stewardship might work for the utilitarian. 
7.3.7 A case study- the dilemmas in gathering fruit 
In introducing the importance in ethical decision making of not putting one's own 
interests above others simply because they are one's own, Singer introduces a simple 
31!1 Ibid., X. 
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dilemma arising out of gathering fruit.382 Should he "eat all the fruit [he has] collected 
myself, or share them with others". To answer this question Singer explains how he 
proceeds ethically:: 
I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. 
This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action 
most likely to maximise the interests of those affected. 383 
Singer does not explain either in this section or anywhere else in Practical Ethics how 
one decides who are "those affected by my decision" nor how to chose what will 
"maximise the interestsn of those affected. All he can say is "I must choose the course 
of action that has the best consequences on balance for all affected".384 
Singer acknowledges that such a process is potentially problematic for some potential 
recipients may be lazy and stop gathering if he so distributes.385 Inherent also in his 
explanation is the impossibility of making this kind of ethical calculation for every ethical 
decision. 
The importance of universalising the decision to make it moral seems to both make it 
impractical and subject to abuse. lt is possible, though, to maintain a moral standard as 
universally applicable and yet limit its application by providing that the same conditions 
for entry or exclusion apply to all. 
Laws as so drafted apply daily. 
Stewardship offers a similar process for utilitarians to assess, and prioritise, claims on 
resources. Application of the paradigm requires contextual details so it is necessary to 
contextualise the dilemma a little to show the way the paradigm may assist. This is best 
done by adding some complexity to Singer's example of gathered fruit. 
332 Ibid., 13 
333 Ibid. 
384 ibid. 
385 ibid., 14. 
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Assume the dilemma is particularly acute because Singer: 
(1) is a member of a community of persons dependent upon social security 
payments fortnightly, have two days until the next payment is due but no 
food is left among them; 
(2) has a wtfe and 14 month old child; 
(3) that the commune of about 30 adults and 30 children is located in a rural 
context and has a small herd of pigs which has not been fed for a week. 
( 4) has gathered: 
(a) one apple and none remain to be gathered; or 
(b) a large sack of apples and apples remain to be gathered; or 
(c) a truck load of apples and none remain to be gathered. 
As posed, there are no legal obligations nor moral strings attached. The nature of the 
resource, being apples, does not lend itself, in the context of the starving pigs and 
persons in the commune, to particular claimants or persons above others. 
The persons and pigs are all in what may be described as extreme need so the major 
factors which will influence Singer's decision making will be: 
386 
(a) vulnerability; 
(b) proximity; and 
(c) waste. 
On this basis it is suggested the following decisions and behaviours would be 
morally preferable.386 
Applying the Stewardship Paradigm, Singer would consider the needs of his wife, 
himself and his children as the first class of persons to whom he had 
responsibility and as the needs of the child are probably the greatest, the apple 
should be put at the disposal of the child, in case 4(a). 
For this analysis it is assumed that the members of this community will not eat the pigs. 
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Singer should not have any moral qualms about allocating the apple to his child 
and, if not to his child, to his wife and himself. He would have applied the 
Stewardship �aradigm to decide firstly the class of persons affected and then 
prioritised to serve his wife and child to the exclusion of each of the other persons 
even though they and the pigs were all affected. They are the most proximate 
and dependent. The universal principle has resulted in almost personal priority 
in this case. 
In the second situation where Singer has a large sack of apples, assuming this 
is sufficient to feed the commune adequately until the second day when the social 
security payment is received, clearly Singer has a duty to distribute beyond his 
own family to the commune but, on the facts as propounded, Singer would not 
need to be as concerned about not fulfilling his ethical obligation to the pigs. 
They are too remote. Singer may, having regard to the health, ability and needs 
of the commune, not distribute to freeloaders in the community but rather 
discharge his duty by telling them where to find the ap pies. They may gather their 
own. This may be the highest and best use of the earth's resources and in the. 
best interests of all affected. 
In the situation where there is a truckload of apples (particularly assuming thatth� 
apples may perish before the community is next in need of food) Singer would 
also have an obligation to consider the needs of the pigs. 
Thus, the utilitarian armed with the Stewardship Paradigm need not be as 
troubled by what may appear to be quite complex moral dilemmas. 
Interestingly, the same result would be achieved if one simply focused on the 
utilisation of the apple as an item of wealth (instead of the persons and 
relationships) to be distributed before it perished, according to the framework set 
out in this work. 
Singer, as steward of the apples, may prudently impose some moral strings on 
the persons to whom he gives the apples. Those strings may be to the effect that 
he expects the seeds to be kept, dried, planted and tended until the seedlings 
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have grown into trees capable of sustaining themselves. 
7.4 Towards a Stewardship Paradigm from a Christian perspective 
7 .4.1 Douglas Hall 
Of Christian theology in the late 20th Century which addresses the concept of 
stewardship the work of Douglas Hall stands out.387 He, like Singer, is concerned not 
only for humanity but for all of creation, and sees stewardship in terms of the whole 
wortd. He undertakes a detailed analysis of the idea and its interface with 20th Century 
issues and summarises his five principles which he sees as implicit in and relevant for 
the first world at the end of the 20th Century in these terms: 
Stewardship implies that we are responsible for the whole earth (first principle); 
that we are together responsible for the whole earth (second principle); that this 
responsibility includes the non-human as well as the human world (third principle); 
that this responsibility must seek to express itself in just and merciful political 
forms (fourth principle) - and (fifth principle) that this responsibility must be 
exercised in the light not only of the immediate situation but of the near and 
distant future as well. 388 
He continues -
387 
For with every one of these five principles of expansion there is an implicit 
criticism of and threat to the status quo: 
globa/isation can occur only against the entrenched spirit of a narrow nationalism, 
provincialism, and localism; 
communalisation can take place only by confronting head-on the persistent 
individualism of both society and religion; 
ecologisation runs headlong into the spirit of a rampant technology and the 
continuing bid for absolute sovereignty over nature; 
Mention should also be made of the extensive research on the topic set out in McDarmid's 
Stewardship and Tything in the Episcopal Church, unpublished PhD., University of Queensland, 
1994. The level of detail is beyond the ambit of this short section and the work has not had the 
critical review of Douglas Hall's work which makes the later work more suitable for analysis in this 
section. 
Hall, 148. 
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politicisation along any lines but those of the market economy immediately 
creates enemies in our society, and amongst influential segments within all of our 
churches as well; 
futurisation flies in the face of every private and institutional desire to secure 'the 
good life' here and now and the fatalised sense that in any case we can do 
nothing to alter the prospect of catastrophe.389 
From within the Christian world view, there is not only a biblical warrant for Christians to 
consider stewardship, not only historical examples from the period of the early Church 
to St Thomas More, but also modem theological argument and quite detailed praxis. 
The notion of stewardship developed within these pages arguably attempts to set out the 
way these principles may be lived out. Greater emphasis has been placed upon some 
points than on others. Hall may for example be pleased with the way the work confronts 
the head on persistent "individualism" and "communalisation". He might not be 
concerned greatly about the lack of direct focus on ecolisation, politicisation and 
futurisation. He may, though, be cautious about whether the work could be used to 
bolster the entrenched "nationalism, provincialism and localism" and this will be 
commented upon later. 
He may be pleased with the willingness to critique modernity and to point ·out that the 
agenda of modernity is against stewardship and that stewardship calls for service and 
simplicity. For that is central to his own approach, writing: 
Against the concept of human sovereignty that modern industrial hubris taught us 
to covet for our species, the symbol of the steward challenges human beings to 
assume the posture of those who serve. And contrary to the retreat from the 
world into which we have been seduced by our failure at mastering it, stewardship 
challenges us to serve responsibly and as those committed to creation. 390 
The notion of contentment and modest lifestyle is also inherent in Hall who makes 
profoundly the point that there is a difference between an honest appropriation of one's 
assets to one's needs and what Jesus condemned as laying up treasures: 
389 
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If we may bo"ow a leaf from the Marxist notebook (a fair exchange, since the 
Marxists borrowed a great many leaves from the tradition of Jerusalem), there is 
a point where a change in quantity introduces a qualitative change. This is called 
Engel's law. Given certain needs and obligations, it may be perfectly necessary 
for, say, Smith to maintain a bank account in six figures. But when Smith's 
account grows to seven or eight figures, take care! Something will probably have 
happened to Smith, and it will not be just the effects of inflation! From being a 
person who kept up his bank account for pragmatic reasons, Smith now likely 
believes his bank account is of special interest in ifs own right- and therefore it 
is a symbol of a sort very different from the one about which we have been 
thinking. Smith will have moved from treasuring to laying up treasures, and 
probably without even having noticed the fact. 391 
lt is into this context that stewardship speaks to the Christian ethicist about asset 
reallocation, about relationships. "Smith" must consider the obligations he has to 
develop the resources for others and consider who is his neighbour. Where does all of 
this fit in modem Christianity? The answer is unclear. Why? Hall suggests it may be 
because: 
The fact is [that] the symbol [stewardship] has played almost no role at all in the 
history of European Christianity. One looks in vain in the great systems of 
dogmatic theology for any mention of the theme. 392 
The result of my own investigations is consistent with Hall - so far as dogmatic theology 
and church doctrine are concemed.393 
Regarding the Biblical tradition, Hall points out: 
391 
392 
Ibid., 177. 
Hall,65. 
lt is not so correct, in my respectful opinion, to conclude, though, that because the symbol of the 
steward is absent from dogmatic theology and church doctrine, the concept has played almost 
no role in the history of European Christianity. Christianity, particularly as an applied ethical 
paradigm is much broader than dogmatic theology. My readings suggest that stewardship as an 
ethical concept has been applied variously by reformers, philosophers, business people and 
judicial officers without reference to the church's doctrines and dogmatic theology throughout the 
church's history as parts of chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate. The passages analysed in relation to 
Aquinas also suggest that the concept, albeit not explicitly as evident, and was applied as an 
ethical concept at the time of Aquinas by the church. 
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that the metaphor of the steward is conspicuously present in the biblical tradition, 
even though it has never been consistently or profoundly appropriated by evolving 
church doctrine. lt is there for our pedagogical and kerugmatik deployment, and 
it is there as a metaphor which already contains symbolic potential - a potential 
which has only been sporadically and imperfectly glimpsed in the Christian 
past.J94 
He states that we must begin with the Bible: 
... because the steward concept has its origins in these scriptural writings. I know 
that certain parallels may be found in other ancient religious and mystic sources; 
but for our own tradition, the biblical background is the most Immediately relevant 
and necessary. And what is particularly significant in this background is that 
Scripture's steward metaphor is both a major theme and one which has direct 
application to the question of human identity and vocation. 395 
7.4.2 References to stewardship in the Bible 
Hall points out that there are 26 direct references to stewards or stewardship in the Bible 
as a whole396 and that in the Hebrew writings of the Old Testament the description otthe 
steward or stewardship is always of a person filling an office or function.397 lt is the New 
Testament that takes up the concept metaphorically.398 The Old Testament makes it 
plain that the steward is someone, often with awesome powers to do as they please 
(unfettered by the modem concept of trust) but with a clear duty to give account. lt is a 
concept of a lord who is a servant and a servant who is a lord. The concept of an owner 
without title or a titleholder with duties.399 
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The concept is not so strange as m ight appear at first instance. lt is found in the roles of prime 
minister, board of directors, attorneys and mother and father. 
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7.4.3 A threshold issue from the teaching of Jesus 
The locus of the idea of stewardship within the broader teaching of Jesus recorded in the 
Gospels requires a consideration of the concept of "neighbour" which is central to the 
teaching. lt falls now to discuss this. 
The problems of Jesus age were not those of our own. Therefore some comment is also 
required on the issues of selectivity and the compatibility of the ideas here discussed 
within the Christian tradition. In discussing this it is also intended to address the 
possibility that stewardship might be a vehicle for "nationalism, provincialism and 
localism". 
7.4.4 Neighbour theology in the teaching of Jesus 
The Gospel of Matthew records 
... when the Pharisees heard that He had put the Sadducees to silence, 
they gathered themselves together. And one of them, a lawyer, asked Him 
a question, testing Him {Jesus], Teacher, which is the greatest 
commandment in the Law?' and He [Jesus] said to him 'You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your 
mind.' This is the greatest and foremost commandment. The second is 
like it, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself. On these two 
commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets. Matthew 22:34-
40. 
These two commandments set the frame work for Christian ethics. The first requirement 
to love God provides a focus for any ethical duties with respect to resources that may be 
owed towards God. The second commandment, the duty to love one's neighbour, 
provides the focus for exploring ethical obligations with respect to resource utilisation to 
others. As ethics is principally concerned with duties between humans (as distinct from 
duties towards God), this thesis explores the issues under the second commandment. 
The teaching of Jesus quoted above which is recorded towards the end of Luke is 
developed earlier in Luke's gospel in another context where Jesus expands the meaning 
of the expression 'neighbour'. Luke's Gospel records the dialogue in these terms: 
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And behold, a certain lawyer stood up and put Him [Jesus] to the test, 
saying, 'Teacher, what shall/ do to inherit eternal life?' And He said to him 
'What is written in the Law? How does it read to you?' and he answered 
and said, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all 
your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind; and your 
neighbour as yourself. And He said to him, 'You have answered coffectly; 
Do this and you will live'. But wishing to justify himself, he said to Jesus, 
'And who is my neighbour?' Jesus replied and said, 'A certain man was 
going down frorn Jerusalem to Jericho; and he fell among robbers, and 
they stripped him and beat him, and went off leaving him half dead. And 
by chance a certain priest was going down on that road, and when he saw 
him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite also when he 
came to the place and saw him passed by on the other side. But a certain 
Samaritan, who was on a journey, came upon him; and when he saw him, 
he felt compassion, and came to him, and bandaged up his wounds, 
pouring oil and wine on them; and he put him on his own beast, and 
brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the next day he took 
out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper and said, 'Take care of 
him; and whatever more you spend, when I return, I will repay you.' Which 
of these three do· you think proved to be a neighbour to the man who fell 
into the robbers' hands?' And he said 'The one who showed mercy toward 
him.' And Jesus said to him, 'Go and do the same'. 400 
In answering the question, Jesus does not limit the moral obligation to one's neighbour 
to any particular class of persons as is postulated in this work. Quite the contrary, in 
speaking to Jews he selects a Samaritan, that is, a person of a different race, different 
religious beliefs and of a people group he might expect to despise rather than help. 
Furthermore, in adopting a narrative approach to answer the question, Jesus makes the 
definition or delineation of moral duties much harder. His intention seems to be to point 
out that he expects his audience to take a very broad approach to ethical obligations and 
responsibility for others. 
This raises a threshold question as to whether the Christian ethicist should abandon 
400 Luke 10:25-37. 
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investigation of moral obligations with respect to resources beyond this broad teaching? 
The answer to this question, I believe, is that if our purpose is to assist "lawyers" such 
as the inquirer referred to in the passage to find excuses for limiting their ethical duties, 
clearfy the Christian ethicist ought not proceed further. That, however, is not the purpose 
in this work. The purpose is to explore the nature of these ethical obligations with 
respect to resource distribution in an endeavour to assist modem "lawyers" in resolving 
conflict between persons over rights with respect to resources and to assist the earnest 
enquirer in taking up these moral obligations. 
Argument may easily be advanced which may seem to stand against the idea of division 
of ethical duties into classes as set out in this work. Such writings point to the call by 
Jesus to love one's enemies (Matthew 5:33-34) as evidence of the extent to which 
Christians are to consider all persons as within the ambit of their responsibility. lt may 
be argued that Jesus' reminders to his followers that his teaching will divide families 
(Luke 12:51-53) and will set households one against another is in marked contrast to the 
concepts set out in these pages. Furthermore, Jesus himself did not give preference to 
his family but went to great lengths to describe how all that partake of his Kingdom are 
a part of his family. 
Is not this work an argument for justifying from a Christian ethical perspective 
nationalism, provincialism, localism and other forms of exclusion? The answer to this 
is no! The difference between the context into which Jesus spoke and the context in 
which this work is written provides the key to property unlocking the concepts. 
7 .4.5 Exclusivity, stewardship, solidarity and the New Testament teaching 
Our age, bedevilled as it is by individualism, cries out for people to take responsibility for 
one another. This work points out that there is a moral obligation to take up this 
responsibility for others and that that moral responsibility is as old as western philosophy. 
If a person is oot willing to take up their moral responsibility for all of humanity, they must 
at least take up the responsibility for those closest to them and it is appropriate, in some 
situations, for our community to sanction such behaviour with legal compunction. 
The age into which Jesus spoke was an age dominated by group solidarity. The Jewish 
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race to which Jesus belonged was proud of its exclusivity. Albert Nolan401 points to the 
way in which Jesus spoke so powerfully to such a community of the need to go beyond 
these narrow groupings, powerful, internal bonding and solidarity which operated as a 
framework for exclusivity. He points out that Jesus' teaching required his followers to 
embrace and include others- for they too are neighbour, according to Jesus. Jesus took 
the concept of the family unit and extended it to include all believers. 
Nolan, writing in relation to this, points out: 
The basic unit that lived together as one corporate being was the family - the 
extended family including all one's relatives. Ties of blood (one's own flesh and 
blood) and of marriage (one flesh) were taken very seriously indeed .... Any one 
could say to an outsider, Whatever you do to the least of my brothers, you do to 
me," or "Whenever you welcome one of my kinsmen you welcome me." To one's 
own kin one could say, Whoever welcomes you welcomes me; whoever is 
ashamed of you is ashamed of me. 402 403 
Nolan's thesis is that Jesus has taken this concept of obligation to others and 
extended it to all of humanity. He writes: 
Being in Christ is the reciprocal or mutual love of those who share the 
experience of Jiving in solidarity with all humankind and therefore with one 
another (1 Thess 3:12). Jesus appealed first of all for a loving solidarity 
which would exclude nobody at all. 
Solidarity with humankind is the basic attitude. 404 
This work does not argue that there is no duty towards all of humanity. Indeed it 
suggests the obligations may go beyond humanity to animals and all affected by our 
401 
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A. Nolan, Jesus before Christianity, Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 89 Lillie Rd., London SW6 
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actions including future generations. This work offers another perspective to those 
endeavouring to work out in a practical context what this means. In the context of 
Biblical, Christian ethics, it is not a justification for racism, classism, nor for any form of 
exclusion. lt does, however, wade into the debate about resource allocation where there 
is simply insufficient resources for everyone's wants and needs to be met. 
The significance of the stewardship conception is daily before Christians. Father Nolan, 
as Master General of the Dominican Order, having written quite cogently as to why one 
ought not be exclusive in one's love is then required to make decisions which could 
easily appear unjust to those who are not the recipients of resources he allocates. How 
does Father Nolan and the thousands of others like him, who have been charged with 
often substantial sums of money and resources, justly decide on the allocation of those 
resources amongst all possible claimants? lt is into this dilemma that the notion of 
stewardship may be able to whisper some quiet counsel- some pointers- towards a 
more just outcome. The Stewardship Paradigm is not set out as a moral argument to 
justify immoral conduct. lt is a tool for the sincere Christian as much as for any other 
person seeking to behave ethically when charged with duties to allocate resources. 
The case so far then is only this: Jesus in speaking to a community which recognised 
responsibilities to members of their own groups exhorted such persons to extend their 
care beyond those groups and to do so out of the resources at their disposal. In Chapter 
4 it was shown how this idea was then taken up in the Epistles where it was cfear; the 
natural family and the church community had some level of priority in the teaching of 
Paul. The section on the early church showed how this idea was refined, developed and 
applied to the conflicts that community faced. The section on Aquinas and the middle 
ages discussed further refinement and applications of the principles. The overall thrust 
of the work shows clearly that the Stewardship Paradigm is intended to be applied in a 
way that obliges people to take up responsibility for others not to insulate themselves 
and their group. But in obliging people to take up such responsibility it does not swamp 
them with an impossible moral responsibility to provide for the whole world. lt gives very 
practical guidance on what to do with what they have. 
7 .4.6 A case study - church buildings 
Some of the most interesting and challenging tests for the application ofthe Stewardship 
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Paradigm arise for the modem church. Take the Uniting Church in Australia, of which 
the author is a member, as an example. The teaching of Jesus and the apostle Paul, 
the witness of the early church and its own roots in Method ism oblige it to take seriously 
the call to wise stewardship405: but the context of its application is almost the antithesis 
of its historical roots. 
Far from the poverty of its progenitors, it finds itself burdened with substantive land and 
personalty. These resources are held, though, almost without exception, subject to 
significant legal obligations and/or moral strings. The most valuable resources are 
usually land upon which is erected a building designed and used for public worship. 
Some are heritage listed. This legal obligation may make sale virtually impossible. 
There may also be considerable expense associated with maintenance of such buildings 
which diverts money from other possible applications. 
These buildings and land were almost invariably acquired or built as a result of purpose 
given gifts. The givers are often still alive (or their children are) and often still keen to 
see the church maintained for the purpose of worship at that location, as the gift out of 
which it was built was intended. The moral strings are therefore both present and 
significant and should not be lightly broken. 
If the stewards capable of deciding the application of the resource in question, are willing 
and able to sell or break the moral strings, the resources are capable of conversion to 
money which makes the application of the Stewardship Paradigm to the dilemma 
405 Interestingly the most read work on stewardship has probably been the extraordinarily insightful 
sermon of John Wesley the founder of Methodism entitled 'On the Use of Money', which is often 
summarised as "earn all you can, save all you can, give all you can". That is maximise your assets, 
minimise your personal oonsum ption and maximise your giving. The work is readily available from various 
sources. One source of the text from the 1872 edition is from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library 
server, at Wheaton College Edited by Jennette Descalzo, student at Northwest Nazarene College 
(Nampa, ID), with corrections by George Lyons for the Wesley Center for Applied Theology 
http://ccel. wheaton.edu/wlwesley/sermons/sermons-htmVserm-050.html last accessed 26th January 1999 
last modified 30th September 1995. Some other works have had wide circulation and influence on the 
Christian response to resources and deserve mention at this point. John Stott's chapter on 'Poverty, 
Wealth and Simplicity' in Issues Facing Christians Today, Marshall Morgan & Soott Basingstoke, Hants. 
England, does not deal with wealth creation but does focus on generosity, simplicity and contentment. 
Richard Foster's, Celebration of Discipline, Hodder & Stoughton, London Sydney Auckland Toronto, deals 
with simplicity as a key to addressing anxiety and exhorts in terms not dissimilar to Philodemus, see para. 
4.2.5. An Australian work from within a Christian perspective clearly focussing on wealth creation is I. 
Hore-Lacy, Creating Common Wealth: Aspects of Public Theology In Economics, 1985 . For a profound 
attack on the lack of care in modern economics see Goudzaard & deLange, Beyond Poverty and 
Affluence Towards an Economy of Care. 
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simpler. But, as seems to be the case, liquidation is not a preferred option at least in 
some contexts, the challenge of stewardship becomes one of allocation of the available 
resources to their highest and best use having regard to the other factors relevant to the 
application of the paradigm. 
This presents a real challenge. Since such buildings were purpose built for worship and 
have certain zoning requirements they are not suited or may not be lawfully applied to 
the service of those who should rank foremost in the steward's consideration -those in 
extreme need, the vulnerable, dependants or developers. The buildings are suited for 
worship and often worship alone. thus their highest and best use is for worship and often 
worship alone. Stewards keen to see the resource used, therefore, may at least seek 
to increase the utilisation of the building for that purpose. This, a number of 
congregations have done making the building available usually to ethnic congregations 
in their area. Examples of this in the Uniting Church in Australia are Toowong Parish 
which makes its building available to a Korean congregation, Trinity Ipswich Parish which 
makes the Bundamba church building available to a Samoan congregation and Ipswich 
Central Parish which makes a church building at Leichhardt available to an Assemblies 
of God congregation. 
To some this may not seem an entirely adequate response but it is a stewardship 
response in what seems a very difficult context. Until a decision is made to break the 
moral strings, or those to whom the moral strings are owed release the stewards, it may 
be that there is little more that can be done with those particular resources. 
But this is not the end. The Stewardship Paradigm challenges those in the churches to 
consider each resource, on its merits in the context of the community and in the web of 
relationships in which it is found, to see the resource in question is wisely managed. 
Church buildings may be quite restricted but each parish may have cash hoarded, 
manses empty, buses under-utilized and people whose gifts and talents are wasted. lt 
may be that appointing and empowering certain people to the position of steward of 
certain resources in the church; people who will wisely develop and manage the 
particular resources with which they are entrusted, is the first step. The rest may flow 
from there. 
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7.5 Towards a Stewardship Paradigm from a feminist perspective 
7 .5.1 An ethic of care 
At the heart of the feminist and feminine approach to ethics is the assumption that 
humans are interdependent rather than atomistic.406 Integral to this is a concept that 
care is moral. 
This proposition is supported by a body of empirical evidence summarised for example 
in Carol Gilligan's first major book In A Different Voice. In that work she claims: 
That on average and for a variety of cultural reasons, women tend to espouse an 
ethics of care that stresses relationships and responsibilities, whereas men tend 
to espouse an ethics of justice that stresses rules and rights. 407 
7.5.2 Care and justice 
This claim brings Gilligan into an apparent.,direct conflict with the concepts of justice 
based in impartiality, impersonality, formal rationality and universal principle which have 
traditionally been considered core principles in moral theory.408 
Such an approach also brings Gilligan into apparent conflict with many other feminist 
writers such as Ann Ferguson, M aria Lujones, Elizabeth Spelman, Alison Jager, Claudia 
Card, Susan Moller Okin, Iris Young and Seyla Ben Ha bib who insist on the primacy of 
justice, even though justice has been seen as a traditionally masculine concem.409 
By demonstrating that care (at least in the specific paradigms of stewardship) is just; and 
that justice demands care (at least in the specific paradigms of stewardship); the 
conflict, tensions, debates and obstacles about justice v care and justice or care; or 
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prioritising claims between justice and care; arguably dissolve. The concerns by both 
sides appear to be addressed without compromise if a paradigm shift is made to 
embrace stewardship. 
7 .5.3 Engaged thinker v judging spectator 
Another concept emerging within the feminist agenda at the time of writing is that moral 
decision making, particularly in "liberatory theory'' requires an engaged thinking actor 
rather than a judging spectator.410 The concept of a steward and their stewardship is one 
of a person actively involved in the minutia of the relationships and in the characteristics 
of the resource; a participant in resource allocation, not merely a theoretician. The 
ancient concept of stewardship here is about behaviour, not dilemma solving. lt is an 
engaging, not merely judging, activity. 
7 .5.4 The selectivity of care 
One of the difficulties for those who embrace an ethics of care is to avoid the criticism 
that care can sometimes be hurtful in its selectivity. In the words of Rosemary Tong: 
We must examine who cares about whom and why before we give the feminist 
stamp of approval to the 'caring' act. 411 
By providing particular criterion which acknowledge the richness of relationships but 
providing just criterion for deciding resource allocation, stewardship serves as a useful 
tool in overcoming this dilemma. Stewardship answers the question "who, whom and 
why" in a very specific way. l t  provides an.objective, just basis for the voice to those who 
are excluded from care, perhaps because of racism, classism or lesbophobia. 
7 .5.5 The private is public 
Stewardship also seems to make no distinction between public and private. The same 
principles seem to apply in both spheres. As the umbrella of influence (in relation to a 
particular resource) which one's decision makes, can be shown to impact upon others, 
then such others come under the ambit of stewardship obligations. From earliest times 
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feminism has clarioned the call that "the private is the public1'412 but stewardship provides 
a very specific tool for analysing the extent to which private actions have public 
consequences, with respect to resources. 
7 .5.6 Grand theory 
Stewardship does not purport to be a grand theory nor dependent upon a grand theory 
for validation. Its expression in times, places and cultures will change over time. Its 
application by an Aboriginal matriarch may be very different from its application by a 
North American Chief Executive Officer. The central principles remain the same but the 
way in which it is expressed will vary substantially from culture to culture. This approach 
makes it quite compatible with what may loosely be called the feminist agenda. 
7.5.7 The feminine, feminism and the concept of stewardship 
A principle which has been expressed for at least 2,500 years through an enormous 
diversity of cultural contexts is difficult, for those who give any credence at all to 
accidental moral philosophy, to ignore. 
Crossing the disciplinary boundaries as it does (at least of philosophy, economics, law 
and history) and eschewing any claim to their grand theory, yet being bigger than the 
particulars of each case, stewardship fits comfortably within many of the themes of the 
feminist and feminine agenda. 
One of the greatest contributions of this concept to the feminist cause may be its 
usefulness as a moral tool for use in argument on behalf of those who are without 
proprietary rights for it gives them a clearly articulatable basis for moral claims to 
the redistribution of resources. 
Being essentially a theoretical tool drawn from the patriarchal world stewardship 
becomes, in the hands of those who property understand it, a resource for changing that 
412 lt would seem, though, that the term was used by Christian liberation theologians before it was 
used by feminists. See D. Turner, 'Religion: Illusions and Liberation' in Terrel Carver, (ed)., The 
Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 334. Quoted in G. A. Cohen, 
'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', 1987, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Winter 
1987, vol. 26 issue no. 1 , 3-25. 
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world. The case study which follows is an illustration of how the stewardship principle 
may be so applied. 
7.5.8 A case study .. the dilemma of Heinz 
One of the more challenging issues to confront the feminist agenda is the moral theory 
advanced by Gilligan's teacher and mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg.413 His moral theory, 
which sets out six stages of moral maturity, exclude the ethics of care from the agenda. 
Research undertaken using his paradigms also suggests that women do not readily 
develop moral maturity to the same extent as men. 
If stewardship is a critical concept in ethical decision making regarding resource 
allocation, and if the principles laid out earlier in this thesis are a sound moral principle, 
then the premises and the processes of Kohlberg's style of research stands open to 
criticism in the context of a resource allocation and utilisation discussion. 
The premise that the self is an independent, autonomous being and moral decisions are 
a matter of ranking individuals' rights is challenged by the proposition that morality, at 
least with respect to resource related issues, is essentially about the evaluation of 
relationship obligations- it is essentially communal, not individual.414 
The process is open to challenge as morality is not, at least in the context of 
stewardship, a matter of moral dilemmas with particular answers but a human response 
having regard to the relationships in which one finds oneself. 
The much debated moral dilemma known as "the case of Heinz" presents an excellent 
case study to demonstrate how useful stewardship may be as an alternate paradigm. 
In the case of Heinz, a husband with a grievously ill wife wishes to buy her a drug that 
might cure her. The drug is overpriced by the pharmacist. Heinz cannot afford to buy 
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it. The question is "should Heinz steal the drug?1'.415 The better moral answer, according 
to Kohlbergian frameworks is· that the right to life is greater than property rights and 
therefore Heinz should steal the drug. This was the answer of an 11 year old boy, Jake. 
Gilligan however points to the answer which an 11 year old gir1, Amy, gave which did not 
fall within the appropriate Kohlbergian framework. 
The answer Amy gave to the moral dilemma over the allocation of a resource, in this 
case a drug, is more consistent with an answer drawn from the Stewardship Paradigm 
and presses more deeply into that paradigm than does the simpler (perhaps simplistic} 
answer of Jake. 
Jake and Amy start with the question "are there legal obligations attaching to the 
resource" and conclude that there are. 
Those legal obligations authorise the chemist, not Heinz, to decide the purpose to which 
the resource, in this case. a drug, may be put. 
Both proceed to the next question which is whether the legal obligation is so morally 
reprehensible as to make it unable to be performed by Heinz. 
Jake's answer is a simple prioritizing of life over stealing and concludes in favour of 
stealing to preserve life. 
Amy's response is inconclusive. She would like to follow through the implications of 
breaking the legal strings in their relational context before making the moral decision. 
The analysis in Gilligan's work (and probably the work of the researcher} take Amy's 
answer no further. lt is possible, though, to press the paradigm further in an endeavour 
to see how it might assist in generating answers to this dilemma. This further pressing 
of the paradigm is evident in the answers given by Clare.416 Clare, having decided it is 
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appropriate to break the legal obligation argues the Phannacist has a moral obligation 
to take up the drug and apply it to this critical need or to allocate it to Heinz's wife. She 
says this is because: 
(a) Heinz' wife is in extreme need; and 
(b) Heinz' wife is dependent and "counting on" the druggist. 
The researcher also puts the question: uWhether the fact that Heinz loves his wife is 
irrelevant?" and Clare answers that it is irrelevant. This too is consistent with the 
Stewardship Paradigm. lt is the re/ationsh;p not love which is critical.417 
A researcher who accepts stewardship as a relevant moral paradigm will not simply be 
looking for a reasonable adjudication between the conflicting claims of proprietary rights 
and the rights to life but rather will be looking at the web of relationships and resources 
caught up in that web in the context of those relationships. In such an analysis, the gin's 
response may in fact be more mature than that given by the boy Jake whose answer was 
more classically Kohlbergian. 
Moral dilemmas come, in this context, to be a consideration of relational duties not 
clashes between abstract principles such as "theft" or "right to life". 
This brings into relief a critical issue and that is that stewardship is but one head of 
justice and justice is but one aspect of interpersonal relationships. The Stewardship 
Paradigm is no more than a tool to assist in moral decision making. lt does not trump 
other moral concerns. 
7.6 Ethical pluralism 
Ethical pluralism is a reality. 1t cannot be avoided. In accepting this the Stewardship 
Paradigm faces issues different from wor1d-view-specific theories. Some of the 
normative implications of some of these are discussed in this section. 
<417 Ibid., 54, 57, and 59. 
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7 .6.1 Accountable to whom? 
This work has proceeded so far without answering the question: To whom is the duty of 
stewardship owed?. If a specific approach such as Christianity or Hobbesian liberalism 
is adopted then the question of to whom account is to be given can be easily answered 
as to God or the sovereign as the case may be. A more sophisticated answer is 
required, though, as absolute answers, such as God or sovereign, satisfy only those 
adherents to the particular world-view in question but cannot answer every case. As may 
be expected by now the answer lies in the details of each particular case. The answer 
to the question; to whom is account to be given? in a pluralist context is: The person 
from whom the stewardship commission is given. 
The answer is as simple and complex as that. lt is not necessarily the potential 
claimants, though, it may be. 
In the situation where the source of commission is readily identifiable, the answer is 
clear. The clearest example may be that of a trustee with a specified list of beneficiaries 
and a deed setting out extensively the powers and obligations of the trustee. The 
situation is also relatively clear in the context of strings attached obligations. The 
situation becomes progressively more difficult as the source of commission and the 
process of accounting b�comes abstract. Take for example the slightly more complex 
situation of the directors of a company. The legislature and the courts have now 
recognised that the duty goes beyond the companys shareholders and locates that 
obligation in the rights derived from the community by the company.418 
The situation becomes more complex still as the socially enforceable communal values 
pale into private conscience. At this point theological and philosophic beliefs become 
paramount. Conceptions of the nature of the Divine (or absence thereof) move to centre 
stage and the extent to which these notions are shared by the community considering 
the obligation plays a major part in the community's understanding of stewardship. 
The uncanny fusion of classic Greek values and Hebrew conceptions of God as revealed 
418 See the Corporations Law for example section 232, the civil penalties provisions in part 9.5 and 
part 5.78 and the seminal case of State Wide Tobacco Services Ltd v Mor/ey, 2 Australian 
Company law Cases, 1990, 827. 
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in the person of Jesus of Nazareth have somehow provided a shared consensus 
sufficient for the idea of stewardship developed here to flower. History suggests there 
is no reason for pessimism as the values of secular, and other religious, world-views 
bring their candles to further enlighten our understanding of the paradigm, and flesh out 
the answer to the question: to whom is account to be given. 
7.6.2 Public morality, private morality and an ethic or ethics of the household? 
The obsession with the state and the individual derives from the importance given 
historically to the state of nature in philosophic discourse. From a stewardship 
perspective, though, the state is but another of the subgroups which comprise, in 
particular contexts, a household for whom a steward or stewards have responsibility. 
The government, responsible for taxation legislation in the case study at para 7.2.7, is 
a classic example. 
This has implications for the debate about public and private morals and the location of 
stewardship within that debate. Stewardship will vary in its application from context to 
context. Its application in the context of a family or club (to pick two small communities) 
will be different from its application in the context of a cabinet meeting or an A.P.E.C. 
summit (national or international communities) but the notion itself does not seem to be 
confined to one sphere or another nor does its core principles change. Instead of a 
public/private moral divide it suggests division at the level of the particular household or 
community in which context the resource is to be considered. lt may be no-one else's 
business (so to speak) what a family decides to do with dad's old doodlings after he dies 
unless the nature of the doodlings is such that others should be considered in relation 
to them. If dad happened to be one of Australia's internationally recognized artists, 
perhaps Albert Namatjira, the public/private debate in such a context seems less useful 
than the stewardship idea in giving moral guidance on who are the claimants to be 
considered. How private or how public a moral issue is would not, in such a context, be 
determined until the particular strings, the nature of the resource, and those affected are 
discerned. 
7.6.3 Stewardship, ethics, jurisprudence and the legal system 
Chief Justice Warren of the United States Supreme Court is reported to have stated that 
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"law floats in a sea of ethics" .419 This work, in attempting to gather together such maps 
as may exist of that part of the sea of ethics as relates to resources, seems to take moral 
philosophy much closer to the analytical jurisprudence of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. 
For if resource related moral philosophy moves from being predominantly about 
individual rights to an assessment of rights and obligations in the context of particular 
relationships the ideas developed by Hohfeld in his two now famous essays Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoninif2° and The Relations 
Between Equity and Law"'21 may prove to be of great assistance to moral philosophers. 
Hohfeld's analysis of law, as always being an interplay between jural correlatives and 
jural opposites, seems to sit comfortably with the ideas developed in this work. There is 
great opportunity for dialogue between moral philosophy, jurisprudence and law.422 
Acceptance in moral philosophical argument that resource are to be viewed in the 
context of relationships takes the discourse towards convergence. 
7 .6.4 Stewardship and the market 
If the law is a major institution regulating the utilisation and allocation of resources, a 
second, perhaps equally critical, institution is the market. 
Markets play a critical role in allocating resources in which a legal estate can exist 
amongst parties with sufficient financial resources to trade. 
Markets play a significant role in distributing resources in which an estate is held to 
ensure they are applied to their highest and best use. But the decision, as to whether 
the market is the best place to achieve that, is a moral one which is not excused or 
avoided by the mere existence of a market as the case of Heinz illustrates. The market 
419 
4ZO 
4Z1 
422 
N. Preston, Reply to Sir Max Bingham's Annual Ethics and Public Life Lecture sponsored by 
Queensland University of Technology, 1993. 
W. N. Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning', Yale 
Law Journal, 1919, 16-59. See particularly 30 ff. for matters raised in this section. lt is also 
noteworthy that Hohfeld is critical of the use of the word "property" citing it as an example of 
ambiguous language which confuses the nature of legal relations. 
W .N. Hohfeld. The Relations Between Equity and Law', Michigan Law Review, 1913, vol. XI no. 
8, 537. 
For an interesting exam pie of a barrister's reflections on this interplay of moral philosophy and law 
see R. Green. 'Lyotard and Mabo- an Unprecedented Liason', Arena Journal no.3, 1994, 149-
168. 
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is but one of many options available to assist the steward in applying a resource to its 
highest and best use. Markets do not guarantee that the resources of a community are 
put to the highest and best use. This is particularly the case with resources in which no 
estate or interest can be clearly identified. As Dasgupta observes "There are goods 
whose characteristics depend upon their not being marketable, 'love', 'loyalty', 
'autonomy', and 'bodily integrity' being prime examples. A number of institutions, such 
as the family, kinship, and village communities, in part fonn networks where such goods 
are created and exchanged".423 
The markets are important in resource allocation but they are but one quite limited 
avenue available to stewards to utilise in ensuring resources are put to their best use.424 
7 .6.5 Stewardship and the political regime 
lt should be evident from all that has preceded that the Stewardship Paradigm is not 
linked to any political system. lt was there as one of the most honoured of the faculties 
for Aristotle' in the ancient Greek Polis and it continues to shape the minds of our 
Australian politicians. 425 
This work has challenged the soundness of the moral justifications fundamental to 
absolute proprietary rights. lt has not suggested, though, that the political structures 
linked to these ideas must be abandoned. lt has been suggested that in accidental, 
moral philosophy the liberal, individualist philosophies which dominate moral discourse 
regarding allocation and utilization of resources are inadequate but this does not call for 
a complete rejection of a political regime recognizing proprietary rights. lt calls only for 
423 
424 
425 
Dasgupta, 140. 
The film Good Will Hunting [Mirrimax Film Corp., 1997] powerfully illustrates this. In that film, Will 
Hunting is an exceptional genius who will not take his ability into the market place for 
psychological reasons. lt is a maths professor and a psychologist who see the waste and 
endeavour to, and ultimately succeed in, seeing Will become a wise steward of the gift he has. 
Even when Will decides to put his gifts to the service of the community he elects to work in a 
hospital, in preference to a more highly paying job and in so doing affirms the place of the market 
in only a limited role to be used subject to over-riding moral constraints. 
See comments for example by Cheryl Kernot on the way the ideas of stewardship she inherited 
from her parents shape her approach to resources at page 52 of D. O'Reilly, Chery/ Kernot: The 
woman most likely, Random House Australia Pty ltd, Sydney New York Toronto, 1998. 
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a limiting of proprietary rights to take cognizance of moral claims.426 Just as in the last 
section the important role the markets may play was affirmed but not to the exclusion of 
moral judgement so proprietary rights may be affirmed but not to the exclusion of moral 
obligations. The law has managed this balance and there seems no reason why moral 
philosophy cannot draw from its insights. Moral philosophers dissatisfied with the 
arguments for absolute rights to resources are not required to adopt an alternative 
political regime as Marx427 advocated. They may, but the Stewardship Paradigm does 
not prefer any political structure per se. Some political outcomes will be preferred but 
these seem capable of being achieved under almost any regime. 
Stewardship remains a moral tool irrespective of the political regime. What it calls for 
is reintroduction of moral judgements to the arena of public and private debate about 
resource utilization and allocation whatever the preferred political framework of the 
participants to the moral discourse. 
The views of the participants to the moral inquiry as to the nature of the political system 
is not critical. 
Arguably this is one of the essential requirements of a moral paradigm which seeks to 
serve at an applied level extreme ethical diversity and possibly persons or groups of 
politically diverse world-views. 
-426 
427 
Exploring the way in which the ideas taken up in this work interface with the work of authors such 
as Mark Latham, David Marquand and Michael Sandel, who consider, in a political philosphical 
context, notions of social trust, obligations to one another with respect to resources and concerns 
as to the moral bankruptcy of liberal individualism is beyond the ambit of this work. lt is 
noteworthy, though, that there are many windows of different political hue, through which people 
are now looking in search of a moral base for carrying forward our understanding of, and 
response to, civil society and its government. Whilst each of these writers view these subjects 
quite differently it may be that the ideas developed here are capable of being taken up and 
applied by each perspective in the quest for a greater sense of shared responsibility for one 
another with respect to resources. See M. Latham, Civilizing Global Capital, Alien & Unwin, 1998, 
particularly chapters 29-34; D. Marquand, The Unprincipled Society, Jonathan Cape Ltd, London, 
1988, particularly chapter 8; and M.J. Sander, Democracy's Discontent, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1996. 
See Kart Marx and Fried rich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1848, translated into English 
1888. I worked from the copy at gopher://wiretap.area.com/00/Library/Ciassic/manifesto.txt last 
accessed on 29th December 1998 
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7 .6.6 Stewardship and ethical pluralism 
Our society is eclectic at its heart. lt will continue to be eclectic so long as it draws from 
and is succoured by philosophic or theological world-views which are fundamentally 
incompatible such as the logical, reasoned-based moral philosophy of the ancient 
Greeks and also from religious, revelation-based morality. lt will continue to be eclectic 
so long as its moral philosophy and its law adopt different methodologies and its political 
system of parliamentary democracy draws from both. Its eclectic nature is likely to 
increase rather than decline as the cross-pollenation of ideas of differing cultures 
continues. 
This is only a problem for moral philosophy if the agenda of moral philosophy is to 
establish a logically complete meta-narrative, encompassing all options and explaining 
all dilemmas within a tightly reasoned system. 
If the agenda, though, is to help real people with real problems ethical pluralism, far from 
being a problem, may be a fertile field to be cultivated and harvested as food for thought 
is required. The ideas do not have to be complete to be helpful. Most of life is pregnant 
with the wonder of that which is not completely understood. 
When Westerrnarck wrote The Origin and Development of the Moralldeas428 in 1912 he 
closed chapter xxvm titled 'The Right of Property' with the observation that at that time 
it was impossil;>le to foresee the likely outcome of the struggle between the "school of 
tradition, that it would be iniquitous of the State to interfere with individuals' long­
established claims to use at their pleasure the objects of wealth" (implicitly the liberal 
individualist regime) founded in Hobbes and Locke and its then rival, "the new scheme" 
(by which he seems to be referring to Marxism) and which "seems to appeal to the 
senses of justice in man".429 
Hobbes' and Locke's views defeated Marx in the economic and political context. They 
428 E. Westermarck, The Origin and Developmentofthe Mora/Ideas, 1912, MacMillan And Co.; 
London rpt., 1971, Johnson Reprint Corporation New York and London. 
Ibid., 71. 
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broke down not only every Chinese wa!!430 but a Berlin wall as well. 
The communist uenemy" fought on the same philosophic battleground; a battleground 
of rights rooted in labour and a struggle for philosophic supremacy through political 
action. 
The ideological difficulties confronting the dominant paradigm today are more akin to the 
circumstances in which it came to prominence itself. The battJefield of ideology is 
different. 
History reminds us that Locke's views came to dominance in the context of a peaceful 
revolution rooted in compromise. The Restoration took up Locke's political philosophy 
as its manifesto, and with it its inherent moral philosophy regarding property, because 
it offered answers to moral questions then being asked. Questions about individual 
rights to claim the world's unclaimed resources for example.431 
The circumstances which led to the immediate adoption of Locke's ideas are no 
longer.432 The world is no longer a vast frontier to be conquered (through trade and 
labour) by an imperialist culture struggling to establish freedom from its despotic rule. 
The world has become a fragile globe, its populations very aware of the limited and non­
renewable nature of its resources, and sensitive to the extreme diversity of the cultures 
who must live together justly with these limited resources. 
430 
431 
432 
See Kart Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manffesto, "The cheap prices of its 
commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it 
forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred offoreigners to capitulate. lt compels all nations, 
on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce 
what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it 
creates a world after its own image"_ I worked from the copy at 
gopher://wiretap.area.com/OOILibrary/Ciassic/manifesto. txt last access eel on 29111 December 1998. 
For an interesting discussion of the inconsistencies and incongruities in the way liberalism was 
applied in answer to the moral problems of its day see Bhikhu Parekh, 'Liberalism and 
Colonialism: a critique of Locke and Mill' in The decolonization of imagination, Zed Books Ltd. 
London, 1995. 
See for discussion of this aspect of British history Bertrand Russell, History of Western 
Philosophy, George Alien and Unwin Ltd., London,1946, 620-627. For an interesting discussion 
on the way the economic agenda has changed see Hirsch. 
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Stewardship comes into such a context offering help to real people with real moral 
problems about utilisation and allocation of resources. 
As the "hue and cry against the 'irrelevance' [of philosophers]" for their failure to provide 
practical assistance to moral problems which began in the 1960's433 continues, the great 
challenge for the dominant paradigm in resource related issues ·how to be relevant· 
seems better answered by accepting the inherent eclectic nature of accidental society 
than trying to strain out its inconsistencies. At least In the area of resource utilisation and 
allocation the Stewardship Paradigm seems more useful than the property and 
ownership approach, in part because it accepts and seeks to draw from the eclectic 
nature of accidental moral inquiry. 
433 See T. Coady, 'The Public Philosopher' Meanjin, 1991, vol. 50 {4), 479. 
177 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Plato's dilemma and our own 
The Stewardship Paradigm is offered as an alternative paradigm which incorporates the 
conception of a proprietary interest into the moral inquiry as to "who should get what, 
when?" lt postulates a method for approaching questions like the following: 
Should the Commonwealth Government change the taxation arrangements by 
abolishing a sliding Wholesale Sales Tax and replace it with a Goods and 
Services Tax of a fixed rate when regard is had to the redistributive effect of 
taxation on a nations resources? 
Should a person, when resources are scarce (as they usually are), favour family 
and friends over others? And if the answer may vary when is it right or wrong to 
do so? 
Should our moral concern about resource allocation include animals and even 
non-sentient beings and the inanimate? If so when? 
Should the churches be selling their buildings to feed the hungry? 
In what circumstances might it be morally appropriate to steal resources and what 
factors should inform the morally mature decision maker in such a context? 
lt offers a paradigm for approaching these and other significant questions related to 
resource allocation and utilisation for those of various world-views seeking to respond 
ethically. lt suggests possible ways forward with problems such as the five difficulties 
raised in Chapter 1 and fleshed out in Chapter 3. 
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8.1.1 Rights and obligations 
lt addresses the problems associated with the consideration of proprietary rights and 
sets such rights in a context where they are acknowledged as coming with obligations 
imbedded, for moral philosophy is not just concerned about "Who has a right to what, 
when" but also "Who should get what, when". The Stewardship paradigm offers this 
interface and with it a practical series of questions and processes which may be applied 
by the earnest inquirer in an endeavour to decide how a resource should be utilized or 
allocated. 
8.1.2 Pluralism 
The increasing diversity of cultural wortd-views ( eg. liberal, feminist, utilitarian, Christian) 
which makes consensus progressively more and more difficult to find requires the 
emergence of a paradigm which is not wortd-view specific. This, the framework of liberal 
individualism cannot offer, but the Stewardship Paradigm proposed does. But it goes 
further. lt offers guidance as to how the particular wor1d-view in question may, without 
compromising fundamental tenets, advance its own ethical inquiry. 
8.1.3 Philosophy v law 
Philosophy and law should, so far as is practical be consonant both in content and 
methodology. The Stewardship Paradigm by avoiding being wor1d-view specific but 
rather seeking so far as is possible to draw (eclectically) from the different perspectives 
which shaped accidental thinking; and doing so in a fashion which is compatible with the 
legal system and listening to it, brings these two otherwise disparate disciplines together. 
This reduces the likelihood of tension between systems for those who wish to respond 
both lawfully and morally. lt also suggest that moral inquiry may through the legal 
intervention line in times to come be able to offer greater assistance to legal enquiry into 
jurisprudential questions. 
8.1.4 Philosophy v experience 
People's experience is given place in the approach offered by the Stewardship paradigm 
but world-views which rely on abstract states of nature are also able to be 
accommodated. The paradigm, drawn as it is from history and informed by law, is not 
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removed from experience but is fed by it: as a consequence it is able to offer ordinary 
people, not only general moral guidance, but concrete examples of real historical or 
legal cases. 
8.1.5 Language difficulties 
The Stewardship paradigm offers not just a word (stewardship), which is understood by 
Australians of different world-views capable of conveying complex relational ideas in 
discussions about resource allocation and utilisation, but a full paradigm. When tested 
in the applied ethical domain from a number of different perspectives this paradigm, 
caught up in the word "Stewardship" is adequate to speak into the moral concerns raise 
at the outset of this work. lt describes the inter-actions between people (in communities) 
in retation to resources and as such it provides a fresh tool for the advancement of the 
discourse. 
8.2 An explanation and apology 
Eusebia of Caesarea's introduces his work with these words: 
But at the outset I must crave for my work the indulgence of the wise, for I 
confess that it is beyond my power to produce a perfect and complete history, and 
since I am the first to enter upon the subject, I am attempting to traverse as it 
were a lonely and untrodden path. I pray that I may have God as my guide and 
the power of the Lord as my aid, since I am unable to find even the bare footsteps 
of those who have traveled the way before me, except in brief fragments, in which 
some in one way, others in another, have transmitted to us particular accounts of 
the times in which they lived. From afar they raise their voices like torches, and 
they cry out, as from some lofty and conspicuous watch-tower, admonishing us 
where to walk and how to direct the course of our work steadily and safely. 
Having gathered therefore from the matters mentioned here and there by them 
whatever we consider important for the present work, and having plucked like 
flowers from a meadow the appropriate passages from ancient writers, we shall 
endeavor to embody the whole in an historical narrative, ... 
I adopt it as no better way to close this work. I, perhaps better than any, know the 
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apologies due not only to those whose works have been inadequately addressed but 
more so to those whose works have not been addressed at all. This work attempts an 
extraordinarily wide scope of enquiry. The subject required the breadth of material 
traversed but breadth always comes at a price. That price is depth. That price is the 
higher when the breadth is a sweep of history, a snapshot of current law and a brief 
consideration of some current, significant, philosophic perspectives. lt is even more 
marked when the perspective is so new and the way untrod. My failure to address such 
works (which I do not name for the list is too long) is because, rightly or wrongly I formed 
the view that the deft sketches of others were enough to conceptualise the arguments, 
for analysis. 
In communicating an idea a painter must first choose what is to be excluded and then 
choose the amount of canvas and the proportions to allocate to various possible 
inclusions. The idea to be conveyed dominates in each of these decisions. 
This work paints a picture of an aspect of civilisation from the pre-Socratics to the 
present day on a very small canvas. 
We are all participants in the resource allocation drama and will all have a view on how 
it would be painted if we had the brush and pallet. But that is not how a work of art 
should be judged. 
The evaluation should not be should "so and so" have been included. The issue rather 
should be does the canvas tell the story. Having written this there are perhaps few 
people who realise how many and how great are the works which are neglected in this 
short treatise. lt is something for which I am genuinely sad and for which I apologise. 
If there is anything of substance in the ideas explored here I can only hope that the 
passage of time will remedy the injustice resulting from the lack of canvas. 
8.3 Concluding comments 
The analogy of a path from the moral thinkers of ancient Athens and Jerusalem to the 
moral thinkers of today was suggested in Chapter 1. The question was then posed 
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whether, so far as the resource allocation and utilization agenda was concerned, a wrong 
bearing was made in cutting the path by Hobbes and Locke. lt is by no means clear that 
a wrong bearing was made. Proprietary rights to resources have at all times been a 
fundamental, moral and legal right. To deny this is to deviate from the well established 
path. Ethical obligations, though, have historically also been fundamental to moral 
inquiry regarding resource related issues. Thus (to push and re-mould the metaphor) 
the path has always been a two lane highway. Rights come with obligations side by side. 
The works of Hobbes and Locke endeavoured to close one lane- the obligation lane­
and thus exclude the moral content. lt was theoretically convenient but denied the reality 
that individuals are always in a communal context and any rights enjoyed in that 
community actually come with obligations. 
The law has managed to keep both the rights and the obligations lanes open and moral 
philosophy may draw from its insights. 
Once it is accepted that obligations come with rights, moral dilemmas regarding resource 
utilisation and allocation may be viewed in a different way- a way which seems to more 
readily generate practical moral guidance irrespective of the ethical world-view of the 
inquirer. 
The thousands of pages of legislation, judgements, proclamations and writings of moral 
philosophers that crowd the shelves of lawyers and ethicists, though their hues vary 
greatly, suggest that the pattern or principle that best expresses our shared moral values 
regarding not just rights, but also obligations with respect to resources, is stewardship. 
lt is there at the fountainhead of our systematic Greek heritage in Plato, as one of the 
three heads of justice and one of the most honoured of the faculties for Aristotle.434 
lt is there in the relationship based ethics of Jesus in the care of the Samaritan for the 
injured Jew whom he treated as his neighbour. lt is inherent in the feminist ideas of 
Carol Gilligan and her subjects. 
434 See Chapter 5 and para. 7.2.7. 
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l t  is there where the ancient notion of one's neighbour is taken up and re-stated to be 
the basis of our modern laws of negligence. And it seems to be there undertying (or 
compatible with) the principles of succession law, contract, torts (generally) trusts, and 
the equitable doctorine of fiduciary duties; at least so far as these concepts touch upon 
disputes over resources. 
l t  was lost in the pursuit of absolute proprietary rights and ownership agendas. 
lt comes again at the dawning of the new millennium to offer its services to an age 
bedevilled with pressure on resources. 
lt comes not as an abstract impersonal rule but as an idea as rich and personal as our 
idea of family, of neighbour and of friend. 
Plato's teaching opened this work and it seems appropriate for Jesus' teachings to close 
it: 
435 
From everyone who has been given much, much will be demanded; and from 
everyone who has been entrusted with much, much more will be asked. 435 
Luke 12:48. New International Version. 
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